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Abstract
There is empirical evidence that when people make decisions they are not only 
interested in the material outcomes of the decisions but they also try to maximise 
their post-decisional pleasure and minimise their post-decisional pain. This strategy 
implies that people anticipate their post-decisional emotions. However, research has 
also shown that people overestimate their emotional reactions to future events -  i.e. 
they predict them to be more intense than they actually are. This “impact bias” has 
been attributed to the fact that people tend to focus too much on the future events in 
question, thereby neglecting other future occurrences that will distract their attention 
and, as a consequence of this distraction, attenuate their emotional reactions. I tested 
the hypothesis that the influence of emotional anticipations on decisions is due to 
the “impact bias”. In other words, people overestimate how happy or unhappy they 
will become as a result of the outcomes of a decision. As a result of these 
mispredictions, when people face decisions with uncertain prospects they opt for 
alternatives that minimise the potential for future negative emotional reactions. In 
three scenario-based investment studies, I found evidence that people adopt a 
“regret-minimising” investment strategy only when they focus narrowly on the 
decision in question, but not when they see the decision in a broader context. In two 
negotiation studies and one study of risky choice, I found that people overpredicted 
their post-decisional emotional reactions to the outcomes of both tasks. In a more 
naturalistic study, I found that students overpredicted what their emotional reactions 
would be when they received feedback on academic assignments. Finally, in three 
studies on decision recall, I found that people who were narrowly focused on bad 
decisions reported feeling worse than people who put the decisions in the broader 
context of their lives.
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CHAPTER
1
Anticipated post-decisional affect: 
Concepts and models
1. Introduction: Predicted and experienced utilities
As Robinson and Clore recently put it, “self report is the most common and 
potentially the best way to measure a person’s emotional experiences 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002; p. 934). Building heavily on the availability and validity 
of self-reported affect, researchers in the Judgement and Decision-Maldng (JDM) 
literature have tried to model people’s choices and behaviours as functions of 
people’s anticipated emotional reactions to the outcomes of their decisions. 
Examples of these models are Regret Theory (e.g. Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 
1982); Disappointment Theory (Bell, 1985b; Loomes & Sugden, 1986); and Mellers 
and her colleagues’ concept of Subjective Expected Pleasure (Mellers, Schwartz, & 
Ritov, 1999). In order to capture all these emotional considerations, Kahneman and 
his colleagues coined the term “predicted utility” (Kahneman & Snell, 1992; 
Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997).
Over the last 15 years there has been empirical evidence that these 
anticipations indeed influence choices and behaviours (e.g. Mellers, 2000; 
Zeelenberg, 1999a). Since there is evidence that when people make decisions they 
try to maximise their post-decisional pleasure and minimise their post-decisional 
pain, the next step is to see what actually happens after the outcomes of the decision 
have materialised. In other words, once the outcomes of the decision become 
known, then the (pre-decisional) emotional anticipations become (post-decisional) 
emotional experiences. The transition from anticipated emotions to experienced 
emotions is conceptually captured by the transition from “predicted utility” to 
“experienced utility” (Kahneman & Snell, 1992; Kahneman et al., 1997),
Regarding the methodological approaches to the study of these utilities, three 
standard research practices have been established. The first one is to ask participants 
to experience a specific affective episode of either positive or negative valence. Pain
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or, more generally, discomfort episodes seem to be the most widely preferred. For 
instance, participants have been asked to immerse their hands in cold water, 
(Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993); to listen to annoying 
sounds (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000); or to endure a heating device that has been 
adjusted on their arm (Ariely, 1998).
The second methodological approach is to ask participants to judge the 
degree of discomfort that the episode would entail either for themselves, or for 
somebody else, without actually experiencing the episode. For instance, participants 
have been asked to assess the discomfort associated with carrying a heavy suitcase 
(Varey & Kahneman, 1992); or to rate the degree of negative affect associated with 
a particular decision made by a hypothetical person (Connolly, Ordonez, & 
Goughian, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).
In either of these two methodological cases, after the participants have 
experienced or imagined the episode, they are then asked to provide the researcher 
either with a judgement about the degree of discomfort, pain or negative affect 
associated with the episode, or to make a choice as to whether they would be willing 
to undergo the episode again (or for the very first time, in the case of imagined 
episodes). Sometimes, participants are also asked to indicate the minimum amount 
of money they would demand in order to accept going though the aversive 
experience.
The third methodological approach is to construct choice sets that consist of 
options that differ regarding the affective value of their outcomes and then ask 
participants to make evaluations or choices from these choice-sets. Participants’ 
preferences for some options rather than for others are then used to infer their 
motivation to maximise the positive affect that was associated with an option or to 
minimise the negative affect that was associated with another option. For instance,
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participants have been asked to choose between regret-minimising and risk- 
minimising investment options (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997).
In all cases, the aim of the researcher is to determine whether a particular 
variable, or combination of variables, influences the utility judgements or 
behavioural choices of the participants. In most cases, before asking participants to 
make a judgement or a choice, the researcher has experimentally manipulated the 
presence or the level of a particular variable. Subsequently, the measures that are 
obtained are assumed to capture the effects of the manipulated variable on 
judgements, choices, or other behaviours.
2. Models of anticipated post-decisional affect in the laboratory
Affective influences at the pre-decisional stage emanate from one of three 
distinct categories: Mood-related influences, or automatic visceral reactions, or, 
finally, anticipated emotional reactions to decision outcomes (Hastie, 2001; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers et al., 1998). As Loewenstein 
and his colleagues (2001; p. 268) put it, “to the extent that JDM research has 
addressed emotions, the emotions that have been taken into account are anticipated 
emotions"^ Therefore, in what follows we shall focus on models of these 
anticipated affective reactions. For reviews of mood-related influences see Mellers 
et al. (1998; p. 453-454 -  up to 1996) and Hastie (2001; p. 672 -  up to 2000). For a 
review of the influences of automatic visceral influences see Loewenstein (1996) 
and Loewenstein et al. (2001).
Lopes (1987) and Elster and Loewenstein (1992) offer a bipolar view of the 
anticipatory period before the resolution of the uncertainty inherent in any risky
' For instance, Svenson’s (2003) integration of affective influences into the Differentiation 
Consolidation Theory (Diff Con) refers en passant to the avoidance of decision-related regret as a 
basic motivation for the post-decisional consolidation; however, the affective influences that Diff 
Con addresses explicitly are mood-related ones.
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choice. According to the bipolar analysis, “hope and fear”, in Lopes’ terms or 
“savouring and dread”, in Elster and Loewenstein’s terms, operate throughout the 
pre-outcome period. These views are bipolar in the sense that they strongly 
differentiate between the valence of the expectations that the decision maker holds 
before the outcomes of his decision are known. Implicit in Lopes’ (1987) discussion 
and explicit in Elster and Loewenstein’s (1992) discussion is that these anticipatory 
states convey a utility of their own, which is essentially independent of the 
experienced utility conveyed by the decision outcome per se.
Other researchers, coming mostly from the economics tradition, have 
attempted to describe these affective anticipations in more formal terms -  in other 
words, they have attempted to model them. So far these attempts have culminated in 
three models of anticipated affective reactions: Regret Theory (RT); Disappointment 
Theory (DT); and Decision Affect Theory -  Subjective Expected Pleasure (DAT -  
SEP). In what follows we present separately each one of these models.
2.7. Regret Theory (RT)
The idea that people take into consideration the potential regret that is 
associated with a particular course of action was known well before the formal 
development of RT. It provided Wald (1939; 1950) and Savage (1951) with the 
basis for their minimax principle. The minimax principle postulates that a 
reasonable choice strategy is for the decision-maker to choose such a course of 
action that the maximum potential loss shall in any case be as small as possible. In 
other words, minimise the maximum loss, thus the name of the principle.
Janis and Mann (1977) devoted a whole chapter of their influential book to 
their concept of “anticipatory regret”, which is essentially the type of regret 1 am 
discussing here. In their words, ''anticipatory regret is a convenient generic term to
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refer to the main psychological effects of the various worries that beset a decision 
maker before any losses actually materialize...” (Janis & Mann, 1977; p. 222). Janis 
and Mann presented choice data straightforwardly explained in terms of regret 
aversion and they also argued that regret aversion has both positive effects (e.g. 
extensive information search) and negative effects (e.g. decision procrastination).
Finally, RT was independently developed by Bell (1982; 1983; 1985a) and 
Loomes and Sugden (1982; 1983; 1987a -  see Larrick, 1993, for a review). RT 
postulates that
a. Decision makers compare the actual outcomes of their actions with what 
those outcomes would have been, had they chosen differently; therefore, 
they experience either regret (when the comparison favours the foregone 
choice), or its positive counterpart, i.e. rejoicing (when the comparison 
favours the actual choice).
b. The magnitude of their regret is an exponential function of the magnitude of 
the difference between the outcomes of the chosen and the outcomes of the 
foregone alternative. The same holds for rejoicing as well, the only 
difference being that the curve is less steep.^
c. Decision makers anticipate these positive and negative post-decisional 
emotions (in other words, they forecast them) and take them into account 
when they make their choices.
Subsequent modifications to and expansions of the initial version of RT include
a. The additional postulate by Bell that the outcome of the foregone alternative 
should in some way be communicated to the decision maker -  i.e. there
 ^ For a general theoretical perspective regarding the asymmetry between positive and negative 
outcomes see Kahneman and Tversky (1979); for a psychological explanation of this asymmetry see 
Taylor (1991).
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should be some feedback on how good the outcome of the decision has been 
(Bell, 1983).
b. The empirical documentation by Zeelenberg and his colleagues that risk 
aversion and regret aversion are orthogonal choice strategies -  in other 
words, one does not necessarily follow from the other (Zeelenberg & 
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996).
c. The conceptualisation of regret as a counterfactual emotion. Counterfactuals 
are “ ... mental representations of alternatives to the past...” (Roese, 1997; p. 
133). Regret has thus been linked to Norm Theory (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and also to research on the cognitive 
appraisals and behavioural consequences of different emotions (Frijda, 
Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der 
Pligt, 1998).
2.2. Disappointment Theory (DT)
DT was developed by the same researchers that developed RT, i.e. Loomes 
and Sugden (1986) and Bell (1985b). Later, Gul (1991) proposed a different version 
of DT, with the intention of supplementing the strictly descriptive nature of the 
initial version of DT with a more normative theory. For the purposes of this review I 
shall treat all the above versions as roughly equivalent. Paralleling the postulates of 
RT, DT postulates that
a. Decision makers form expectations regarding the outcomes of their 
decisions.
b. Decision makers then compare the actual outcomes of their decisions with 
their earlier formed expectations; therefore, they experience either 
disappointment (when the actual outcomes fall below these expectations), or
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its positive counterpart, i.e. elation (when the actual outcomes exceed these 
expectations).
c. The magnitude of their disappointment is a function of a.) the discrepancy 
between the actual outcomes and the expected outcomes and b.) the 
probability of the occurrence of the expected outcomes. The same holds for 
elation, as well, the only difference being that the curve is less steep.
d. Decision makers anticipate these positive and negative post-decisional 
emotions and take them into account when they make their choices.
The above outline makes clear two differences between RT and DT. Firstly, 
whereas in RT actual outcomes are evaluated against possible outcomes that might 
have been received had a different decision been made, in DT actual outcomes are 
evaluated against possible outcomes had a different “state of the world” occurred. 
This alternative state of the world is the expected state of the world. Secondly, 
disappointment depends on the likelihood of a possible outcome becoming the 
actual outcome. In other words, because the basis for the experience of 
disappointment is prior expectations, disappointment unlike regret is sensitive to 
surprises (Brandstatter, Kiihberger, & Schneider, 1999; van Dijk & van der Pligt, 
1997). 1 note, however, that, to the best of my knowledge, the issue of whether 
regret is also sensitive to the manipulation of the probability of the decision 
outcomes has never been directly addressed.
2.3. Decision Affect Theory (DAT) and Subjective Expected Pleasure (SEP)
Mellers and her colleagues (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers 
et al., 1999) proposed a theory that conceptualises post-decision experienced utility 
as the experienced pleasure or pain that people report once the outcomes of their 
decisions have materialised. This conceptualisation is in line with the recent re­
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framing of the concept of “experienced utility” as experienced pleasure or pain by 
Kahneman and his colleagues (Kahneman & Snell, 1992; Kahneman et ah, 1997). 
Both approaches to experienced utility revive Bentham’s (1789 / 1996) original 
conceptualisation.
DAT postulates three distinct predictors of post-decisional affect (i.e. of 
experienced utility):
a. The decision utility of the outcome (e.g. the monetary value of risky 
gambles). The higher the outcome utility, the higher the experienced positive 
affect.
b. The decision maker’s expectations about the likelihood of occurrence of both 
the desirable and the undesirable outcomes. The more unexpected the 
outcomes, the more intense the emotional reactions to them -  for both 
positive and negative outcomes.
c. Finally, the counterfactual comparison evoked by the decision maker. This 
comparison is assumed to counterfactually evaluate the actual outcomes 
against the potential outcomes. “Upward” counterfactuals (i.e. 
counterf actuals that improve on reality) give rise to negative emotional 
reactions, whereas “downward” counterfactuals (i.e. counterfactuals that 
worsen reality) give rise to positive emotional reactions (Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993).
The above outline makes clear that DAT is similar to DT. The major 
difference between the two is that DAT focuses on the prediction of post-decisional 
affect rather than the influence of the anticipation of this post-decisional experience 
on decision behaviour. However, this link is provided by SEP.
SEP is an extension of the DAT that moves from a pure description of post- 
decisional affect to a model that also predicts how affective anticipations influence
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decisions. Essentially, SEP could be thought of as an attempt to integrate RT, DT 
and DAT into a bipolar model of anticipated affect. Borrowing concepts and 
postulates from RT and DT, SEP assumes that
a. People form emotional anticipations regarding the outcomes of their 
decisions.
b. These anticipations are taken into account when people make their choices. 
SEP can be thought of as an integrative model because regret and
disappointment effects are measured simultaneously; likewise, SEP can be thought 
of as a basically bipolar model because all self-reported affective reactions are 
conceptually collapsed into the overarching categories of “pleasure” and “pain”.
3. Empirical evidence: How influential are anticipated emotions on decision
behaviours?
3,1. Empirical evidence fo r  RT
The degree of empirical support RT has received so far is somewhat 
difficult to assess. As far as the initial economic models are concerned, the empirical 
findings have been rather mixed (for two short reviews of these findings see Lamck, 
1993 and Zeelenberg, 1999a). Recent direct tests of the theory can be found in 
Inman, Dyer, & Jia (1997), Mellers et al. (1999), and Mellers (2000). This research 
provides support for the predictions of RT.
More generally, the regret-minimising (as contrasted to the risk-minimising) 
aspect involved in risky choices has received extended empirical support (for a 
recent review of some of the research described below, see Zeelenberg, 1999a). It 
has been shown to hold for
a. Lottery tickets and gambles: People choose lotteries with minimum potential 
for post-decisional regret (Boles & Messick, 1995; Josephs, Larrick, Steele,
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& Nisbett, 1992; Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg et al., 1996); they are also 
unwilling to exchange a lottery ticket that they have been endowed with for 
fear that if it is the winning ticket, they will regret their decision (Bar-Hillel 
& Neter, 1996).
b. Financial decisions: People opt for regret-minimising investment options 
(Butler & Highhouse, 2000; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997); they are regret- 
minimisers in dyadic negotiation tasks (Larrick & Boles, 1995; Zeelenberg 
& Beattie, 1997); they are willing to forego objectively good bargain 
opportunities in order to minimise the post-decisional regret that stems from 
them having missed a better bargain opportunity (a phenomenon that has 
been termed “inaction inertia” -  Arkes, Kung, & Hutzel, 2002; Tykocinski, 
Israel, & Pittman, in press; Tykocinski & Pittman, 1998; 2001; Tykocinski, 
Pittman, & Tuttle, 1995); they time their purchasing decisions in order to 
avoid post-purchase regret (Cooke, Meyvis, & Schwartz, 2001; Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 1998; Simonson, 1992).
c. Medical decisions: People choose not to vaccinate their children against life- 
threatening diseases if the vaccination decision entails post-decisional regret 
(Ritov & Baron, 1990; 1995; Yaniv, 2000); regret-avoidance also influences 
people’s decisions to take medical screening tests (Lechner, de Vries, & 
Offermans, 1997); to refrain from binge drinking (Murgraff, McDermott, 
White, & Phillips, 1999); and to use condoms during sexual intercourse 
(Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1995; 1996).
d. Driving behaviour: People refrain from committing driving violations if they 
are primed with the post-violation regret (Parker, Manstead, & Stradling, 
1995; Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996).
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e. Decision avoidance: People procrastinate decisions that entail potential for 
high post-decisional regret (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994).
In addition, experienced regret and regret-related counterfactual thinking 
have been shown to be an important consideration in people’s lives in naturalistic 
settings (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; 1995; Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; 
Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998). For instance, in samples of 
professional athletes, Medvec et al. (1995) showed that whereas bronze Olympic 
medallists counterfactually compared themselves to non-medallists, silver medallists 
counterfactually compared them selves to golden medallists. These comparisons 
resulted in the bronze medallists feeling happier than silver medallists -  a rather 
perplexing finding.
3.2. Empirical evidence fo r  DT
Loomes and Sugden (1987b) and Loomes (1988) provided some empirical 
support for their formulation of DT. As Zeelenberg and his colleagues pointed out 
research on the effect of anticipated disappointment on decision-making is scarce 
(Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000). In the only published 
paper that tackles this question, van Dijk, Zeelenberg, and van der Pligt (2003) 
found that people indeed lower their expectations when self-relevant feedback on 
some decision of theirs is imminent.
In general, research on the lowering or the manipulation of expectations right 
before the disclosure of the decision outcome that can be thought of as indirectly 
supportive of DT’s postulates about unmet expectations. On the one hand, lower 
expectations are, by definition, more likely to be met than higher expectations 
(Armor & Taylor, 1998). On the other hand, surprising negative outcomes are more 
aversive than expected negative outcomes (Feather, 1967; 1969; Spector, 1956;
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Verinis, Brandsma, & Cofer, 1969). Taken together, these two assertions mean that 
the lower the initial expectations, the less likely they are to be disconfirmed and, as 
a logical corollary, the less likely is the decision maker to experience 
disappointment. This hypothesis has been supported by empirical findings 
(Carlsmith, 1962 -  cited in Pyszczynski, 1982; Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; 
Loewenstein & Linville, 1986; Nisan, 1972; Pyszczynski, 1982; Shepperd, 
Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998)^.
Lowering of expectations can also occur ex post facto, thus taking the form 
of a hindsight effect (Fischhoff, 1975; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990): People have been 
found to re-evaluate downwards their initial chances of achieving a goal once this 
goal has been missed (Tykocinski, 2001). In addition to expectations, other elements 
of the past can also be subjected to this adjustment procedure: Ross and his 
collaborators (Conway & Ross, 1984; Ross, 1989; Ross & Newby-Clark, 1998) 
have shown that people revise their personal histories in the light of their current 
state of being. These revisions are made on the basis of relevant implicit theories of 
either stability or change. Finally, in order to be acceptable, the revision should 
satisfy a certain reasonability criterion (Armor & Taylor, 1998).
A second means to avoid disappointment is based on the generation of 
excuses for an aversive outcome: The decision maker can behave in a way that will 
provide him with a “good enough reason” for failure -  i.e. a reason that will explain 
away the unfortunate outcome (e.g. Snyder & Higgins, 1988; for a review see 
Armor & Taylor, 1998; for early work on the “fear of failure” see Atkinson, 1964).
 ^ Another line of research that could be thought of as relevant here is research conducted on 
Temporal Construal Theory (TCT -  Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000). According 
to TCT people approach decisions with desirability considerations when decision implications (i.e. 
decision outcomes) lie far in the future, whereas they switch to feasibility considerations as these 
implications gradually become more imminent. Although this reversal is explained in cognitive terms 
(contextualised versus de-contextualised construals for the distant and near future, respectively), I 
think that a motivational account (i.e. disappointment aversion) could also be valid (e.g. Gilovich et 
a!., 1993; Shepperd et al., 1996; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998).
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The literature on “egotism” (i.e. the motivation to protect one’s se lf-esteem  against 
anticipated negative outcome feedback) provides empirical support for this 
defensive strategy (e.g. Berglas & Jones, 1978; Frankel & Snyder, 1978; Snyder, 
Smoller, Strenta, & Frankel, 1981).
Finally, dissonance-reduction-based reasoning has been found effective in 
reducing potential disappointment: The decision maker can convince himself that 
the outcome was not so desirable after all (Carlsmith, 1962 -  In Pyszczynski, 1982; 
Festinger, 1957; Pyszczynski, 1982).
3.3. Empirical evidence fo r  DAT -  SEP
The initial experimental results are supportive of the model’s postulates 
(Mellers et al., 1999; Mellers, 2000). In addition, these results showed that SEP has 
greater explanatory power than both the minimax principle and RT (Mellers, 2000) 
-  given Mellers et al.’s (1997) position that DAT (and therefore SEP) is similar to 
DT, there is no comparison between SEP and DT in terms of their relative 
explanatory power.
Shepperd and McNulty (2002) compared DAT with “cognitive consistency” 
theories (for instance, the theory of “cognitive dissonance”, Aronson, 1958; 
Festinger, 1957; see also Heider, 1958). These theories predict that unexpected 
outcomes feel worse than expected ones regardless of their positive or negative 
valence. This is because unexpected outcomes demonstrate people’s inability to 
generate accurate forecasts. In the three empirical studies that Shepperd and 
McNulty (2002) reported, these predictions were not supported, leading these 
researchers to the conclusion that DAT provides a more accurate model of affective 
experiences.
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4. Should we or should we not anticipate post-decisional emotions? Some 
functional and normative considerations
Common in all the models of anticipated post-decisional affect is the notion 
that a decision maker who systematically anticipates post-decisional affect and 
factors these anticipations into the decision process behaves rationally. In other 
words, the inclusion of these anticipations in the decision utility function is taken to 
be beneficial and in no way does it constitute a sign of irrational behaviour.
For instance, Loomes and Sugden (1982) argue that there are two main 
reasons for their modification of the traditional utility function. The first reason is 
that the new utility function (i.e. the one that incorporates anticipated regret) offers a 
better account of the empirical findings. The second reason is that the decision 
maker who seeks to maximise this modified function behaves rationally.
A more elaborate argument on the rationality of regret anticipation comes 
from the functional analysis of counterfactual thinking in general -  which, of course, 
encompasses regret and disappointment, since these are defined as counterfactual 
emotions. According to this analysis (Roese, 1997), counterfactual thinking can 
have both negative and positive aspects for the individual.
The negative aspect arises from contrast effects, which are assumed to be the 
first mechanism that produces counterfactual consequences for the individual. Any 
post-hoc comparison of an obtained outcome with its counterfactual alternative is 
capable of producing this type of effect; given, though, that these comparisons are 
more often than not of the “upward type”, they tend to result in exaggerated 
negative affect for the individual -  and thus their generally negative aspect.
The positive aspect of counterfactual thinking arises from causal inferences, 
the second assumed mechanism for the generation of counterfactual consequences 
(Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Because they can be construed as conditional
24
propositions inherently related to an actual event (i.e. the event that is 
counterfactually construed), counterfactuals lead to causal inferences -  therefore 
conveying information about causality. According to Roese’s analysis, this 
information is useful for the individual, since it allows for the future self-regulation 
of behaviour on the basis of the judgement of causality: If, for example, through the 
counterfactual construction of the event a particular omission is identified as the 
causal antecedent of a negative outcome, then it can be expected that in the future 
the recipient of the negative outcome will perform the initially omitted behaviour so 
as not to receive the same outcome again (see also 2^elenberg, 1999b for a similar 
argument and Mandel, 2003 for an empirical approach to this issue).
However, the functional aspect of counterfactual thinking has been strongly 
challenged by others. For instance, Howard (1992) strongly disagrees, arguing that 
preferences should only be based on a set of possible futures and not foregone and 
counterfactually construed ones. Moreover, in his attempt to qualify the verdict on 
the appropriateness or non-appropriateness of regret considerations, Burks (1946) 
long ago pointed out that the necessary prerequisite for regret to be reasonable is 
“[...] not merely [the assumption] that there are laws of nature, but that these laws 
are more than mere summaries of matters of fact (past, present, or future)” (Burks, 
1946; p. 170, italics in the original). The property of being “more than mere 
summaries” implies that they should hold true irrespective of the actor’s actions (or 
inactions), so that the latter can meaningfully regret his promptness (or failure) to 
initiate a causal chain -  since the presence or absence of this behaviour changes the 
state of the world he ends up in.
All the above said, and taking a broader perspective on the functionality / 
rationality issue, the controversy as to whether emotions in general (i.e. not only 
anticipated emotions) impede or enhance rational decision-making seems to remain
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unresolved. A reason for this seems to us to be the fact that researchers often fail to 
distinguish between the different types of emotions they are considering. For 
example, Mellers (2000) compares Loomes and Sugden’s (1982) with Damasio’s 
(1994) views. This comparison, however, fails to take into account a fundamental 
difference, namely the fact that Loomes and Sugden focus on anticipated affect (i.e. 
a cognition-based emotion), whereas Damasio focuses on anticipatory affect or “gut 
feeling”. Their overall convergence could be helpful in making the (rather over­
generalising) point that “affect is beneficial for rational decision behaviour”, but it 
would fail to address any aspects of that point specifically linked to either 
anticipated or anticipatory affect.
A final consideration within the functional and normative context that has 
only recently been brought into attention is the accuracy of the decision makers’ 
affective anticipations. Two rather striking features characterise this issue. First, it 
has largely been ignored by researchers working within the field of anticipated 
emotions. Second, when it is mentioned as a critical aspect of the decision-making 
process (e.g. Mellers, 2000), it is not directly linked to the rationality of the 
subsequent decision. In other words, the normative or non-normative character of 
the decision is presented as independent of the prediction accuracy.
This neglect of the accuracy issue in the anticipated emotions literature 
results in the scarcity of published research that directly addresses this question. The 
aim of the second part of this review is to summarise the existing knowledge on 
affective self-forecasting.
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CHAPTER
2
Affective forecasts: 
How accurate are they?
1. Introduction: Types of self-forecasting
To the best of my knowledge, there has so far been no all-inclusive review of 
the area of self-forecasting. This is understandable, because, on the one hand the 
literature on self-forecasting seems vast, and on the other hand the diversity of the 
research that falls under the “self-forecasting” category makes any superimposed 
categorisation inadequate. For the purposes of this review, however, a working 
categorisation of the current research questions and results needs to be established. I 
propose that, overall, the area should be viewed as incorporating two major sub­
categories: The cognitive self-forecasts and the affective self-forecasts.
Looking at cognitive self-forecasts, performance seems to be the dominant 
consideration. Therefore, I conceptualise this sub-category as inclusive of all 
instances of individual performance predictions, both within and outside the 
laboratory (e.g. task completion times; questions correctly answered out of an 
almanac; etc.). The accuracy of these forecasts has been discussed in terms of the 
overconfidence phenomenon. Simply put, when people are asked to make 
confidence judgements for their estimated performance at an upcoming task, their 
confidence judgements are higher than their actual performance scores. In other 
words, the overconfidence phenomenon implies that people overpredict their future 
performance. The empirical robustness of overconfidence has been established 
across a variety of tasks, in both naturalistic and laboratory settings (for reviews of 
the vast literature, see Harvey, 1994; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; 
McClelland & Bolger, 1994; for a different view, see Gigerenzer, 1994).
Looking at affective self-forecasts, I have been able to distinguish three 
types: Moods and emotions; tastes and their changes; and visceral factors. In this 
context I refer to “visceral factors” as inclusive of hunger, pain, and fear forecasts. 
The anticipated emotional reactions I am primarily interested in fall into the “moods
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and emotions” category. In what follows, I review the evidence on the accuracy of 
the three types of affective forecasts. For the relevant literature on cognitive 
forecasts see the reviews cited above.
A final methodological note is needed here. As will become apparent, a 
major difference between the research on affective influences on individual 
decision-making and the research on the accuracy of affective forecasts is that 
whereas the former has been theory-driven, the latter has largely been empirically- 
driven. In other words, JDM researchers started from the assumptions of RT; DT; 
and DAT -  SEP and they collected empirical evidence that either supported or did 
not support these assumptions. Therefore, the emotion-related empirical research in 
the area of JDM is essentially a process of empirical validation of RT; DT; and DAT 
-S E P .
In contrast, researchers who looked at the accuracy affective forecasts started 
with practical concerns. For instance, health and clinical psychology researchers 
might want to know if normal participants predict less fear when they see a snake or 
a spider compared to phobic participants. Snake phobias or spider phobias are then 
modelled as overpredictions of the fear that pathological people associate with the 
phobic object. Moreover, it follows that a behavioural treatment that would reduce 
the overprediction of fear would be effective for the treatment of the phobia (for an 
overview, see Rachman & Bichard, 1988). Likewise, health psychology researchers 
might want to know if participants who avoid a medical treatment overpredict the 
pain that is related to their treatment compared to participants who do not avoid 
taking the treatment. Treatment avoidance is then modelled as an overprediction of 
pain and behavioural treatments focusing on the reduction of this overprediction are 
introduced (for an overview, see Rachman & Amtz, 1991).
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Therefore, this stream of research has had applied, rather than basic, 
motivations. In the light of these motivations, I review the evidence on the accuracy 
of affective forecasts starting from the existing empirical evidence; I then move on 
to review some of the existing accounts of the inaccuracies that have been 
documented regarding these forecasts; finally, I focus on one of the suggested 
accounts and elaborate on a possible link between the JDM emotion-related research 
and the affective forecasts research.
2. Accuracy of affective self-forecasts
2.1. Visceral factors
According to George Loewenstein, the defining features of visceral factors 
are “[...] a direct hedonic impact and [,..] an influence on the relative desirability of 
different goods and actions” (Loewenstein, 1996; p. 273). Though in the same broad 
domain, visceral factors differ from tastes in that a.) they have an independent 
hedonic impact; b.) they are correlated with well-defined external circumstances 
(e.g. fearful stimuli); c.) they change more rapidly; and d.) they are based on 
different neurophysiological mechanisms (Loewenstein, 1996; p. 273). Hunger, 
thirst, sexual desire, craving for a drug, and emotions like fear and physical pain are 
all examples of visceral factors. Unlike the other emotions, visceral factors exert 
their influence without any conscious cognitive mediation.
Regarding people’s perceptions of and reactions to visceral factors, 
Loewenstein (1996) points out first, that people fail to appreciate future visceral 
factors that will affect their behaviour and, second, that people also fail to predict 
accurately their own future behaviours under the influence of visceral factors. For 
instance, when people put the alarm clock out of immediate reach before they go to 
sleep, they fail to appreciate that the sleepiness of the next morning will motivate
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them to stay in bed longer. By putting the alarm farther away they are essentially 
arranging a self-torment. However, if people fail to put the alarm far from the bed 
they may be underestimating the size of the influence of the sleepiness -  in other 
words, they might never get out of bed on time. Essentially, then, these behaviours 
work in opposite directions: The first underestimates the pain associated with 
waking up the next morning; the second underestimates the influence of this pain on 
the next morning’s effort to get out of bed.
The literature on self-control (e.g. Ainslie & Haslam, 1992; Elster, 1999; 
Elster & Skog, 1999; Schelling, 1984; 1992; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981) provides some 
philosophical insights regarding the emergence of these visceral influences and 
people’s behaviours when they are faced with them. The mere idea of attempting to 
impose control on future behaviours seems to constitute an anomaly, since it implies 
that people are consciously willing to bind themselves against their own future 
preferences\ The whole issue is captured in a very lively way in the following 
excerpt from Schelling (1984; p. 8):
“When we ask the mother who an hour ago was frantic with pain 
whether she is glad the anesthesia was denied her, I expect her to 
answer yes. But I don’t see what that proves. If we ask her while she 
is in pain, we’ll get another answer”.
The point here is again the erroneous forecasts people generate about either the 
feelings associated with the activation of a visceral factor, or the degree of influence 
the latter can exert on their future behaviours.
The visceral factors that are more closely related to my aims in this review 
are the aforementioned hunger, physical pain, and fear.
* In the self-control literature these predictions are commonly referred to as predictions of future 
preferences; since I have clearly stated that I endorse Loewenstein's (1996) differentiation between 
tastes and visceral factors, and for the sake of simplicity, in this paragraph luse the two terms 
interchangeably.
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2.1.1. Hunger forecasts
The basic research question that has been attempted regarding the visceral 
state of hunger is whether its presence or absence has any effect on subsequent food- 
related choice behaviour. The typical study within this area comprises two groups of 
participants, one hungry and the other satiated (or at least one group “hungrier” than 
the other). The dependent measure is either actual or intended food consumption 
behaviour.
Nisbett and Kanouse (1968 -  cited by Loewenstein, O ’Donoghue, & Rabin, 
2003) investigated the impact of hunger on shopping behaviour in a naturalistic 
setting -  namely a supermarket. What they found was that the shoppers’ hunger 
(operationally defined as the temporal distance between the shoppers’ last meal and 
their visit to the supermarket) and the quantity of unwanted goods they purchased 
during their shopping trip were positively correlated.
This finding was replicated by Gilbert, Gil, and Wilson (in press). In their 
also naturalistic study they manipulated hunger by offering half their participants a 
muffin before they went into a grocery store. Among other findings, Gilbert et al. (in 
press) found that participants who had eaten the muffin eventually purchased a 
smaller number of unwanted food items than participants who had not eaten 
anything (34% versus 51%, for less and more hungry participants, respectively).
Similar findings were obtained by Read and van Leeuwen (1998), who 
showed that that participants who are hungry at the point of choice (i.e. late in the 
afternoon) are more likely to choose unhealthy snacks to consume in a week’s time 
than participants who are satiated (i.e. immediately after lunch). Satiated 
participants favour y snacks instead.
Overall, research on hunger has empirically documented an influence of 
hunger on food-related choice behaviour.
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2.1.2. Pain forecasts
The basic research question that has been attempted regarding the visceral 
state of pain is whether pain is accurately predicted or not. Pain has been induced 
and measured in laboratory situations or it has been measured in naturalistic settings 
with patients. In the typical study within this area, participants go through multiple 
consecutive pain trials. Before starting a trial, they are asked to forecast the intensity 
of pain they are about to experience. These forecasts are made on “Visual Analogue 
Scales” (VAS), which are horizontal graphs divided into distinct intervals and 
anchored at 0 and 100. The time-spans used are minutes (i.e. the time intervals 
between two consecutive trials).
Two criteria of accuracy have been used. According to the first criterion, a 
pain forecast is judged to be accurate if it falls within 2% or 5% (variable across 
studies) of the actual pain experience; if the forecast exceeds this limit it is declared 
inaccurate. According to the second criterion, experienced pain is compared to 
predicted pain. If the difference between the prediction and the experience is 
statistically significant, then the forecast is declared inaccurate; if the difference 
between the prediction and the experience is not significant, then the forecast is 
declared accurate. In the overview of the relevant literature that follows, I report 
empirical evidence regarding both criteria, wherever this evidence is available.
Looking at naturally occurring pain, in their review of the relevant literature 
Rachman and Amtz (1991) reported results from 29 chronic arthritis patients 
(Rachman & Lopatka, 1988); 30 headache patients (Rachman & Eyrl, 1989); and 40 
menstruating women (Rachman & Eyrl, 1989). Arthritis patients made accurate 
forecasts in their first predictions (Dpredicted-expenenced = 2.26, n.s.), whereas using the 
2%-5% criterion they were accurate in 56.86% of cases, overpredicting in 25.49%, 
and underpredicting in 17.65% of them. Moreover, a learning effect was found
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across trials: The change in the forecasts was predicted by the degree of discrepancy 
in the preceding trial.
The headache study was done on students who were experiencing severe 
headaches. First predictions of pain were again accurate (Dpredicted-expenenced = -1.14, 
n.s.). Likewise, first predictions of relief due to medication were also accurate 
(Dpredicted-expenenced = 2.83, n.s.). Participants were accurate in 24% of the cases, 
overpredicting in 43%, and underpredicting in 33% of them. Higher pain predictions 
were associated with more intense pain experiences -  therefore the predictive 
judgements appeared to have some predictive validity.
The menstruation study was done on female students who were experiencing 
severe menstruation symptoms. First pain predictions were accurate (Dpredicted- 
expenenced = 3.78, n.s.). The data on the first predictions of relief due to medication 
were not available. Participants were accurate in 18% of cases, overpredicting in 
45%, and underpredicting in 37% of them. No learning effect was found in this 
study. These findings led Rachman and Eyrl (1989) to conclude that chronic pain 
(arthritis) is generally more accurately predicted than recurrent pain (headaches; 
menstrual pains).
Looking at experimentally induced pain, Amtz and van den Hout (1988) 
used minor electric shocks as the painful stimuli. One of the two groups they used 
were accurate in their first pain predictions (Dpredicted-expenenced = 2.00, n.s.), whereas 
the other group underpredicted pain in their first forecasts (Dpredicted-expenenced = - 
14.00, p < .05). There were no differences between the groups regarding the 
percentages of accurate and inaccurate forecasts: Participants were accurate in 26% 
of cases, overpredicting in 40%, and underpredicting in 34% of them -  thereby 
exhibiting an unclear pattern, with both under- and overpredictions. A learning 
effect was also found: The forecasts became more accurate over trials.
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Amtz and Lousberg (1990) also used electric shocks as the painful stimuli. 
Because of the experimental manipulations in this experiment, only the data of the 
control group are of interest here. Unfortunately, the predicted and experienced pain 
scores are only graphically depicted in the paper (see Amtz & Lousberg, 1990; pp. 
21-22, graphs “a”). Visual inspection of the graphs reveals that participants began 
by underpredicting, continued with more or less accurate predictions, but, by the 
middle of the experiment, they tumed to overprediction. Therefore, I (somewhat 
arbitrarily) conclude that overprediction was the prevalent finding from these data. 
A leaming effect was also found. Overall, then, Amtz and Lousberg's (1990) 
findings are in line with Amtz and van den Hout’s (1988) findings on electric 
shocks.
Rachman and Amtz’s (1991) overall conclusion from their review is that 
people tend to overpredict pain. This conclusion is apparently based on the stringent 
proportional criterion of accuracy. However, the initial forecasts were accurate in 
five out of six cases (the only exception being the Amtz & van den Hout, 1988 
control participants).
More recent research has looked at dental pain (Amtz, van Eck, & Heijmans, 
1990), chronic low back pain (Amtz & Peters, 1995; McCracken, Gross, Sorg, & 
Edmands, 1993), and post-operative pain (Thomas, Robinson, Champion, McKell, 
& Pell, 1998). In the dental pain study (Amtz et al., 1990) participants were 40 
people visiting their dentists. Participants were accurate in 21.25% of cases, 
overpredicting in 62.50%, and underpredicting in 16.25% of them. In this study an 
individual differences variable (namely, dental anxiety) was introduced for the first 
time. When participants were split in two groups depending on the amount of 
anxiety they were experiencing about their dental treatments, “high-anxiety” 
participants overpredicted their pain much more than “low-anxiety” participants
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(  h i g h  â n x i c t y  , D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d  — 22.20, lOW S F lX icty  . D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d  — 3.90 — 
averaged across two reported visits; significance levels not available, see Amtz et 
al., 1990; p. 36). A leaming effect was also observed.
The anxiety variable was introduced again in the chronic low back pain 
study by McCracken et al. (1993). The 43 chronic low back pain patients were 
accurate in 42.00% of cases, overpredicting in 19.47%, and undepredicting in 
38.42% of them. In this study, however, when participants were split in two anxiety 
groups “high anxiety” participants were accurate in 54% of cases, overpredicting in 
20%, and underpredicting in 26% of them, whereas “low anxiety” patients accurate 
in 40% of cases, overpredicting in 16%, and underpredicting in 44% of them. In 
other words, the pattem of findings was the opposite of the Amtz et al. (1990) study. 
A leaming effect was once more observed.
The discrepancy between McCracken et al.’s (1993) finding that chronic 
patients err in the direction of underprediction and Rachman and Lopatka’s (1988) 
finding that chronic patients are more or less accurate, but, when they err, they tend 
to overpredict, led Amtz and Peters (1995) to conduct a further study. In this study 
they compared 20 chronic low back pain patients with controls in order to 
investigate any latent pattem in the chronic patients’ responses. Their findings for 
the first trial show that whereas both groups tended to underpredict, the patients did 
so to a greater extent (patients. D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d  ~ “11.80, controls. D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d
= -5.50, significance levels not available). Moreover, patients’ forecasts were 
consistently underpredictions, whereas controls’ forecasts were accurate.
Finally, in a study of post-operative pain predictions, Thomas et al. (1998) 
asked 91 patients to predict how much pain they thought they would experience 
over a period of six days. The time-span between the forecasts and the experiences 
is not reported. The patients overpredicted their pain for the first three days, but they
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were accurate in their pain predictions for days four to six. Moreover, female 
patients both underpredicted more and experienced more post-operative pain than 
male patients. Finally, predicted pain was a valid predictor of experienced pain 
when the former was high, but not when the former was low. This finding is in line 
with the fact that predictions were generally higher than experiences.
2.13. Fear and anxiety forecasts
The basic research question that has been addressed regarding the visceral 
states of fear and anxiety is whether fear and anxiety are accurately predicted or not. 
Both emotions have been induced and measured in laboratory situations and they 
have also been measured in naturalistic settings with patients. The typical study 
within the area is identical to the typical study within the area of pain research. The 
same comments apply regarding the criteria of accuracy. For qualitative reviews of 
the empirical findings, see Rachman and Bichard (1988), Rachman (1994) and 
Marks and DeSilva (1994).
Rachman and Levitt (1985) asked 13 student participants who had been 
screened for claustrophobia to predict their fear when they would enter a dark room. 
Unfortunately, the predicted and experienced fear scores are only graphically 
depicted in the paper (see Rachman & Levitt, 1985; p. 591, fig. 2). Visual inspection 
of the graphs reveals that students were inaccurate in their fear predictions, 
exhibiting an inconsistent pattem of over- and underpredictions. Valentiner, Telch, 
and Bolte (unpublished data -  cited in Telch, Valentiner, & Bolte, 1994), however, 
documented overpredictions in fear forecasts for claustrophobies.
Rachman and Lopatka (1986a; 1986b) asked student participants who had 
been screened for snake phobia to predict their fear when they saw a snake. 
Overprediction was documented in both the first trial (Dpredicted-expenenced = 16.13, p <
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.001; study 1) and at the aggregate level. The forecasts were accurate in 32.15% of 
cases, with overpredicting in 44.90% and underpredicting in 22.96% of them 
(averaged results from both studies). A leaming effect was also observed, as 
participants became more accurate over trials.
Taylor and Rachman (1994a; 1994b) studied snake-phobics and spider- 
phobics. In the first study, 224 students who had been screened for snake phobia 
overpredicted their fear in two successive instances (1 ‘^ trial; Dpredicted-expenenced = 
9.60, p  < .001; 2"  ^trial: Dpredicted-expenenced = 26.80, p < .001). In the second study, 100 
students who had been screened for spider phobia predicted their fear accurately, but 
only when they were primed with a relevant cue (i.e. written account of an 
encounter with a spider) before the prediction (Dpredicted-expenenced = -2.10, n.s.). When 
the cue was irrelevant (i.e. a written account of an irrelevant experience) participants 
overpredicted their fear ( D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d  — 7.30, p .05).
Rachman and Bichard (1988) reviewed two studies that were done on non­
student samples. Rachman (1983) found that 21 parachuting trainees overpredicted 
their fear (Dpredicted-expenenced = 8.09, p  < .05). McMillan and Rachman (1988) 
replicated these findings with a larger sample (N = 105; Dpredicted-expenenced = 11.10,
< .01). Both these results were based on one single parachuting instance.
The only study so far that has not replicated the finding that fear and anxiety 
are overpredicted is a study by Telch, liai, Valentiner, and Craske (1994). Telch et 
al. (1994) found that 37 student participants who had been screened for 
claustrophobia underestimated their fear. Telch et al. (1994) did a second study on a 
separate sample of claustrophobies, this time manipulating the proximity of 
perceived safety resources available to them (i.e. the distance from the door that 
would lead them out of the testing room). Telch et al. (1994) found that forecasts 
were accurate when perceived safety resources were proximal (Dpredicted-expenenced =
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1.20, n.s.), whereas they were underpredictions when perceived safety resources 
were distant ( D p r e d i c t e d - e x p e n e n c e d  = -4.10, p < .05). Telch et al. (1994) concluded that 
underprediction of fear is more likely when perceived safety cues are absent or 
distant.
A similar line of research has investigated the accuracy of anxiety forecasts. 
Amtz et al. (1990), in the dental pain study that I described above, found that at the 
aggregate level anxiety was predicted more accurately than pain. Before the first 
visit to the dentist patients were accurate in 25% of cases, overpredicting in 60%, 
and underpredicting in 15% of them. Before the second visit, the accuracy 
percentages changed to 50% accuracy, with 35% overprediction and 15% 
underprediction. Focusing exclusively on clinical anxiety, Amtz, Hildebrand, and 
van den Hout (1994) showed that psychiatric patients (two studies; N = 48) tend to 
overpredict their anxiety (as might be expected). They also found a leaming effect, 
as forecasts tended to become more accurate over trials.
2.2. Tastes and their changes
March (1978) argued that one of the prerequisites for rational choice is a 
“good guess” about uncertain future preferences. The uncertainty that surrounds 
future preferences arises from the fact that although the traditional microeconomic 
view of tastes postulates that they should be absolute, relevant, consistent, precise, 
and exogenously determined, tastes have been found to be relative, irrelevant, 
unstable, inconsistent, imprecise, and showing evidence of intemalities.
The JDM literature has been more or less silent regarding the question of the 
accuracy of preference predictions. Varey and Kahneman’s observation almost ten 
years ago that “[...] little is known about the question of how accurately people 
predict their future tastes [...]” (Varey & Kahneman, 1992; p. 189) is indicative of
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this state of neglect. The situation has not changed dramatically in the last ten years. 
In fact, Varey and Kahneman’s (1992) paper is one of the few pieces of published 
research available that directly addresses this issue.
In Varey and Kahneman’s pilot study, participants had to predict how much 
they would like a serving of ice-cream and a particular piece of music after 
experiencing them each day over the time periods of one day and one week. The 
general finding from this pilot study was that participants overpredicted how much 
their liking for these two consumption goods would decrease. In Varey and 
Kahneman’s main study, participants had to predict how much they would like a 
serving of yoghurt and a particular piece of music after experiencing them each day 
over one and eight days. This task was more naturalistic, since participants filled in 
the relevant questionnaires at home and returned them after the last day of the study. 
The results of the main study replicated the results from the pilot: Participants were 
again inaccurate in their predictions. Not only did participants overpredict the 
decrease in their liking for that particular yoghurt and piece of music. In addition, 
some of them failed to accurately predict even the direction of the change. In other 
words, for some 29% of the participants liking for that particular yoghurt and piece 
of music increased, rather than decreased -  but only 3% of them had predicted an 
increase.
A related phenomenon from the area of behavioural economics is the so- 
called “endowment effect”. According to Thaler’s (2000) conceptualisation of the 
phenomenon, people often demand more money to give up an object they possess 
(i.e. their “endowment”) than they would be willing to pay to acquire it in the first 
place. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1990; 1991), Loewenstein and Adler 
(1995), van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein (2000) and van Boven, Loewenstein, 
and Dunning (2003) provided empirical documentation for the phenomenon using
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time-spans of only several minutes. Kahneman et al. (1991) showed that the effect is 
due not to an increased attractiveness of the possessed object, but to the enhanced 
pain that is linked to parting with it. Loewenstein and Adler (1995) and van Boven 
et al. (2000; 2003) further showed that participants do not predict this pain 
accurately. For instance, the selling prices participants offered when they were in 
possession of the object (e.g. a mug engraved with their school logo) were on 
average $1.12 greater than their buying prices^ (Loewenstein & Adler, 1995). 
Moreover, in another experiment, 50% of participants stated that they would like to 
revise their selling prices upwards after having acquired the object. Leaming does 
not seem to be enough to counteract these inaccuracies (Kahneman et al., 1990; van 
Boven et al., 2003).
2.3. Future emotions and moods
The number of studies directly investigating the accuracy of affective 
forecasts is rather small. The first series of relevant studies is the one reported by 
Mitchell, Thompson, Peterson, and Cronk (1997). The task for their participants was 
to give pleasure ratings both before and during a trip to Europe (study 1); a 
Thanksgiving vacation (study 2); and a 3-week bicycle trip to California (study 3). 
The time span between predictions and experiences was one month for the first; one 
week for the second; and three weeks and two days for the third study. The results 
obtained by Mitchell et al. allowed them to coin the term “rosy prospection” for 
their participants’ forecasts: In all the three studies, and across all different time- 
spans, participants overestimated the degree of pleasure they would later be 
experiencing.
 ^ I have averaged three within-participants elicited price differences, namely $1.67 for the 1" 
experiment -  Carnegie Mellon sample, $1.17 for the T‘ experiment -  Pittsburgh sample and $0.53 
for the 2"^  experiment; all these differences were significant.
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A similar series of six studies was run by Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, 
and Wheatley (1998). For five out of their six studies Gilbert and his colleagues 
used a different type of assessment of accuracy: Instead of comparing data within- 
participants (i.e. in a typical before-after way), they divided their participants into 
“forecasters” and “experiencers” and they assessed the discrepancies between the 
two groups. The greater these discrepancies, the larger the inaccuracy. The type of 
task they used was mixed: Half of the studies used naturalistic tasks (dating 
relationships in study 1; academic tenure in study 2; and election results in study 3), 
whereas the other half used typical laboratory tasks (negative personality feedback 
in study 4; story about baby’s death in study 5; and unsuccessful job application in 
study 6). In the first three studies they also contrasted the positive versus negative 
content of the affect forecasted. Finally, the time-span they used in their only 
within-participants measure of affect (study 6) was 10 minutes.
Gilbert et al. (1998) found that participants were accurate in their affective 
predictions about dating relationships, long-term tenure professors, and election 
winners, but inaccurate in their affective predictions for short-term tenure professors 
and election losers. In other words, the observed inaccuracies were associated with 
forecasts of negative affect only.
Therefore, in studies four to six Gilbert et al. focused on negative affect only 
and they found more empirical support for the inaccuracy argument. Participants 
were unable to predict that they would feel better after having received negative 
personality feedback from a fallible (compared to an infallible) source; after having 
read a blameworthy (compared to a blameless) story; and after having been rejected 
in an unfair (compared to a fair) manner. The final result reported from this series 
was the within-participants comparison of the sixth study, where again participants 
overpredicted the negative affect they would experience.
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Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, and Axsom (2000; study 3) provided 
more evidence of affective misprediction. In this within-participants study a time- 
span of two months was used and the event in question was an actual football game. 
Participants had to predict their affective reactions to the result of the game. Wilson 
et al. (2000) found that participants overpredicted both their positive affect (i.e. in 
case their team won) and negative affect (i.e. in case their team lost). Wilson et al. 
(2000) eventually coined the term “durability bias” to capture these affective 
overpredictions. Thus, Mitchell et al.’s (1997) findings were replicated for both 
negative affect and for a significantly shorter time-span between prediction and 
experience.
Similarly to Gilbert et al. (1998), a combination of before-after and 
“forecasters” versus “experiencers” design was also employed by Sieff, Dawes, and 
Loewenstein (1999) for the assessment of accuracy in predicting emotional reactions 
to HTV test results. In this naturalistic study, one group of participants predicted 
their emotional reactions to the test results and, four weeks after they found out their 
actual results, they were asked to report their emotional state (before-after and, at 
the same time, “forecasters” group). In addition to this group, another group of 
participants did not make any predictions, but only reported their emotional state 
four weeks after they had found out their actual results (“experiencers” group).
The within-participants analysis of the first group showed that they were 
fairly accurate in their predictions: Although predicted affect was higher than 
experienced affect, this discrepancy did not reach significance. In addition, 
predicted and experienced affective states were correlated (Pearson r  = .62), thereby 
demonstrating a reasonable degree of judgement validity. The between-groups 
analysis, however, revealed a different pattem: Compared to the “experiencers”, the
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“forecasters” significantly overpredicted both the increase in distress after a positive 
test result and the decrease in distress after a negative test result.
Tackling a slightly different research question, Totterdell, Parkinson, Briner, 
and Reynolds (1997) investigated people’s accuracy in predicting their moods. 
Totterdell et al. (1997) hypothesised that participants would not be particularly 
insightful in their forecasts of their own moods. This hypothesis was based on 
previous empirical findings by Wilson, Laser, and Stone (1982). Wilson et al. 
(1982) found that participants (“targets”) who were recording their everyday moods 
were not any more accurate than another group of participants (“observers”) who 
were also recording the “targets’” moods. Totterdell et al.’s participants had to 
report their moods from home or work for 14 consecutive days. The time-spans 
between predictions and the experiences were half a day (more or less, since 
participants had to forecast their moods in the beginning of the day and rate their 
experienced moods by the end of it) and one week.
The results of the study partially confirmed Totterdell et al.’s hypothesis. On 
the one hand, participants were accurate in their predictions, with the errors being 
inconsistently both under- and overpredictions. However, when the experienced 
mood ratings were regressed on the predicted ratings, the explained variance of the 
model did not exceed 9%. Inclusion of other predictors (e.g. concurrent mood; 
hassles that occurred the same day or the day before; etc.) significantly improved the 
accuracy of the model. This pattem of findings suggests that, although accurate, 
mood forecasts did not contribute substantially to the prediction of subsequently 
experienced moods. In contrast, concurrent mood (i.e. mood fluctuations around the 
point of assessment) was the weightiest predictor of experienced moods. Finally, no 
difference was found across time-spans.
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Mellers (2000) summarised the results of three naturalistic studies. 
Participants had to predict how they would be feeling after receiving their grades 
(four-month time-span); after receiving feedback on their weight-loss progress (one- 
week time-span); and after receiving the results of pregnancy tests (ten-minute time- 
span). Apart from the different time-spans, the other major difference between the 
three studies was the degree of familiarity with the outcome (high for the grades and 
weight loss studies; low for the pregnancy test study).
Mellers’ findings were mixed. Whereas students were accurate in their 
predictions, pregnant women and dieters were not. In addition, across the three 
studies participants who were inaccurate tended to overpredict the pain associated 
with possible negative outcomes, but not the pleasure associated with possible good 
outcomes. In Mellers’ words “Actual pleasure is greater than anticipated, especially 
for undesirable outcomes” (Mellers, 2000; p. 919).
Mellers et al. (1999) were the first to investigate the accuracy of post- 
decisional emotional anticipations. Mellers et al. used a gambling task and a one- 
week time-span and they found that participants were accurate in their predictions of 
post-decisional regret and disappointment (Pearson rs between predicted and 
experienced emotions varied between .96 and .98). However, participants 
underestimated the affective impact of “surprise effects” -  in other words, their 
predictions of emotional reactions to outcomes that were judged unlikely to occur 
were lower than their corresponding experiences. There also were some outlying 
participants, who appeared unable to predict even the valence of their reactions.
Coughlan and Connolly (2001) replicated the finding that surprise effects are 
underestimated. In the second study, they asked bowlers to estimate their game 
satisfaction as a function of unexpected outcomes. Participants underpredicted both 
their satisfaction with surprisingly good outcomes (Dpredicted-expenenced = .69, p  < .001)
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and their dissatisfaction with surprisingly bad outcomes (Dpredicted-expenenced = -.55, p < 
.02). Coughlan and Connolly commented on these findings: “Surprises, in short, 
tend to have more of an amplifying effect on satisfaction ratings than subjects 
predicted they would” (Coughlan & Connolly, 2001; p. 11).
3. Theoretical accounts for the mispredictions
3.1. Short- and long-term projection biases
In an effort to provide a theoretical account of the pattem of findings 
obtained by Sieff et al. (1999), Loewenstein and his colleagues summarised 
empirical evidence that demonstrates that people consistently and across a variety of 
domains underestimate adaptation^ (Loewenstein et al., 2003; see also van Boven & 
Loewenstein, 2003) -  in other words, people consistently underestimate their 
abilities to adapt to new circumstances. As a result of this underestimation, people 
exaggerate the impact of positive and negative future events on their overall well­
being. The underprediction of adaptation and the accompanying overestimation of 
the impact of future events on one’s well-being are instances of what Loewenstein 
and his colleagues call “long-term projection bias”.
Loewenstein et al. (2003) also referred to the phenomenon of overprediction 
of negative affect that Gilbert and his colleagues documented as an instance of the 
“long-term projection bias”. Gilbert et al. (1998) found that people overpredict the 
negative affect that they will experience as a result of negative events that will 
happen to them in the future and they attributed these overpredictions to “immune 
neglect”. “Immune neglect” refers to people’s failure to appreciate the effectiveness 
of their “psychological immune system”, which is activated after negative
 ^Which, interestingly, they refer to as “a common type of taste change” (Loewenstein et al., 2003; p. 
1212). See my discussion of the “short term projection bias” that follows.
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experiences in order to minimise the degree of negative affect. Because of this 
failure, people overestimate their future displeasures.
Additional empirical evidence for the validity of the “long-term projection 
bias” as an explanatory mechanism comes from a famous series of studies by 
Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978). Brickman et al. (1978) used the 
“targets vs. observers” paradigm (commonly used in social judgement research) and 
they found that neither major positive events (e.g. winning a lottery), nor major 
negative events (e.g. paraplegia) changed the targets’ everyday lives for the better or 
for the worse to the extent that the observers imagined they would. In the line of the 
projection bias hypothesis, Brickman et al. (1978) argued that people perceive their 
financial states or states of health as changes relative to their present status quo -  
thereby overpredicting the impact of more money or less health in their lives. This 
explanation of the real-life empirical findings also falls well in line with Prospect 
Theory’s postulate that people judge levels of wealth and other utilities as transitions 
from some reference point and not in absolute terms (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Alongside the “long-term projection bias”, Loewenstein and his colleagues 
also introduced a “short-term projection bias”"^. Not only do people overestimate the 
impact of future events on their well-being; they also overestimate the degree to 
which their future preferences, tastes, and utilities in general will resemble their 
present ones. This overestimation results in erroneous predictions of what people 
will want or enjoy in the future. The difference between the “long-” and the “short­
term projection bias” is the time frame of reference, which is much longer for the 
former bias than for the latter.
The “short-term projection bias” accommodates the empirical findings on 
the influence of hunger on behaviours. When people make their decisions under the
The distinction between the two appears to be empirical, rather than conceptual.
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influence of a current state of hunger, they project this state into the future, thereby 
overpredicting how much they will want to eat in the future, and they behave 
accordingly (for instance, they buy things from the grocery store that they did not 
intend to buy; they choose unhealthy snacks rather than healthy snacks; etc.).
In addition, the “short-term projection bias” accommodates the findings of 
the research on the “endowment effect”. People fail to anticipate their attachment to 
the object they will be endowed with, because they project their current state of non­
attachment to the object into the near future. Likewise, people also fail to see that if 
they did not have the object they would be much less attached to it -  thereby 
attaching a lower value to it. These mispredictions provide the frame for the 
“egocentric empathy gaps” between “buyers” and “sellers” in the situations where 
the “endowment effect” has been studied that have been described by van Boven et 
al. (2000).
3.2. Erroneous shared theories
In their effort to account for the mispredictions of their participants’ liking 
for ice-cream, yoghurt, and music Varey and Kahneman (1992) argued that in order 
to predict their future tastes people rely on shared (or “lay”) theories. For instance, a 
shared theory might postulate that “continuous consumption of a certain good will 
eventually lead to a decline in its likeability” -  i.e. a satiation effect. On the basis of 
such a theory, people predict that they will come to hate a serving of ice-cream after 
having had one every day for a week -  which, however, is not the case.
Mispredictions of everyday moods have also been attributed to erroneous 
shared theories. An explanation of the findings that “targets” are not more accurate 
judges of their own moods than “observers” (Wilson et al., 1982) is that both 
“targets” and “observers” rely on the same theories to predict everyday mood
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fluctuations. These theories predict, for instance, that people are overall in higher 
spirits on Fridays and Saturdays -  which, as was the case with the satiation 
prediction, is not true.
3.3 Evolutionary explanations: “Better safe than sorry”
Looking for a psychological explanation for the empirically documented 
overprediction of pain and fear, Rachman and Amtz have claimed that the 
overestimations of pain and fear should be viewed as instances of a more generic 
tendency to overpredict aversive events -  in other words, overprediction might be an 
innate characteristic of the way people and other animals deal with aversive, or 
threatening stimuli (for pain: Rachman & Eyrl, 1989; Amtz, 1996; for fear: Amtz; 
1995; Rachman, 1994; Rachman & Eyrl, 1989).
Moreover, Rachman and Amtz have also argued that these overestimations 
are functional. Their rationale is that, since underpredicted pains and fears are more 
aversive and motivate more avoidance behaviours than accurately predicted pains 
and fears (e.g. Amtz & Hopmans, 1998; Amtz, van den Hout, van den Berg, & 
Meijboom, 1991; Amtz, van Eck, & de Jong, 1991), people have a “hardwired” 
motivation to avoid unpleasant surprises. Therefore, they “choose” to err in the 
direction of “safety” -  hence the overpredictions.
Regarding the leaming effects that have been documented (i.e. the pain and 
fear forecasts becoming less inaccurate over consecutive trials), Rachman and 
Bichard (1988) have argued that people have an innate “drive towards accuracy”. 
This “drive towards accuracy” has been founded on Rachman and Amtz’s (1991) 
argument that predictability and controllability are highly desirable features of the 
environment for both humans and animals. Therefore, once people have leamt that
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their environment (or laboratory situation) is more or less predictable, they are better 
calibrated in their forecasts.
3,4. Focalism
In Wilson et al.’s (2000) studies of affective predictions, participants 
consistently over-predicted the duration of their affective reactions to future events -  
a phenomenon that was called “durability bias”. In their discussion of the “durability 
bias” Wilson and his colleagues suggested that the psychological mechanism that 
underlies this phenomenon is what they termed “focalism”. In Wilson et al.’s words, 
when people generate predictions about how they will be feeling after a future event 
“ ...people focus too much on the event in question and not enough on the 
consequences of other future events” (Wilson et al., 2000; p. 821; see also Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2000). The pattern of findings that Wilson and his colleagues obtained in 
their experimental studies provided the empirical documentation of focalism.
Expanding the breadth of “focalism”, Wilson and his colleagues also 
suggested that “focalism” might be the underlying cause of the reversal from 
desirability to feasibility considerations as the time of a future decision or behaviour 
becomes more imminent (Gilovich et al., 1995; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & 
Liberman, 2000). Moreover, Wilson et al. (2000) suggested that focalism might 
operate retrospectively, as well as prospectively. They reported some preliminary 
data that document the durability bias when people were asked to recall how they 
felt with respect to a past event that had occurred to them (Wilson, Meyers, & 
Gilbert, 1999; see also Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, in press) -  in other words, they 
found evidence for “retrospective focalism” (i.e. as opposed to “prospective 
focalism”). Wilson and his colleagues suggested that this retrospective focalism 
might also operate when people recall their life regrets (cf. Gilovich & Medvec,
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1995). They further suggested that a way of reducing these regrets might be to 
prompt people to de-focus from their decisions and see their lives in a broader 
perspective -  thereby realising that “there were myriad forces making it difficult to 
act in the desired way” (Wilson et al., 2000, p. 835).
Wilson et al. (2000) actually tested the effectiveness of such a de-focusing 
manipulation. Before their participants predicted their affective reactions to future 
events, some of them were asked to fill in a diary of events that were likely to 
happen to them concurrently with the event in question -  i.e. the “focal” event. 
Wilson et al. (2000) found that participants who had filled in the diaries before 
predicting their affective reactions (i.e. “de-focused” participants) were more 
accurate in their predictions than participants who had not filled in the diaries (i.e. 
control participants). Moreover, Wilson et al.’s (2000) data provided support for the 
notion that the diaries function as reminders of other future occurrences, rather than 
as affective competitors -  in other words, it was not the affective valence of the 
diary events that changed participants’ judgements, but rather the reminder that 
these events would frame the focal event.
Looking at interpersonal, rather than intrapersonal judgements, Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) found empirical evidence for a mechanism they termed “focusing 
illusion”. In their words:
“When a judgment about an entire object or category is made with 
attention focused on a subset of that category, a focusing illusion is 
likely to occur, whereby the attended subset is overweighted relative 
to the unattended subset” (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; p. 340).
According to Schkade and Kahneman, the “focusing illusion” was the 
mechanism that led their Midwesterner participants to judge Californians as happier 
than themselves (whereas Californian participants did not actually judge themselves
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as happier than Midwesterners). The attended category in this case was the weather 
-  generally better in California than in the Midwest.
Schkade and Kahneman (1998) also suggested that focalism might be the 
mechanism that underlies people’s misjudgements about sudden changes in their 
own, or others’ life circumstances -  i.e. people’s undepredictions of adaptation (cf. 
Brickman et al., 1978; Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999). To summarise, focalism has 
so far been empirically documented in three different areas. Firstly, in concurrent 
judgements of general happiness about others (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). 
Secondly, in predictive judgements of general happiness about one’s self (Wilson et 
al., 2000). Thirdly, in retrospective judgements of general happiness about one’s self 
(Wilson et al., 1999). Moreover, provision of a frame of reference for the focal event 
via a diary-filling technique has been found effective in attenuating the influence of 
focalism in predictive judgements of general happiness about one’s self.
Therefore, it appears that “focalism” and the “projection biases” are closely 
linked. On the one hand, “intrapersonal focalism” in the domain of affective self­
prediction is arguably an instance of the “short-term projection bias”. On the other 
hand, “interpersonal focalism” in the domain of self-other discrepancies in 
judgements of happiness is arguably an instance of the “long-term projection bias”.
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CHAPTER
3
The present research:
Rationale, hypotheses, and overview of empirical work
1. The present research: Aims and general hypotheses
The present work draws heavily on two currents of research. The first one is the 
research on anticipated post-decisional affect. According to all existing models, when 
people make decisions they forecast what their post-decisional affective reactions to the 
decision outcomes will be. Subsequently, people factor these forecasts into their utility 
functions -  alongside the decision outcomes. People’s motivation regarding these post- 
decisional affective reactions then is to minimise their post-decisional pain (cf. regret 
and disappointment) and to maximise their post-decisional pleasure (cf. rejoicing and 
elation). This is an assumption shared by all the theories that have attempted to model 
people’s anticipations of post-decisional emotions.
The second current of research is the research on the accuracy of affective self­
forecasts and, more specifically, the research on “focalism”. The existing empirical 
findings show that focalism is one of the mechanisms that cause affective 
overprediction. People overpredict their affective reactions to future events because 
they are focused on the events in question. Because of this focus, people fail to notice 
that other occurrences (i.e. occurrences other than the focal event) will also occupy their 
attention in the future, thereby attenuating the emotional impact of the focal event.
The aim of the present research was threefold. Firstly, I wanted to test the 
possibility that people overpredict what their affective reactions to the outcomes of their 
decisions will be. The first research hypothesis was the following: People’s predictions 
of the affective reactions that they will experience when they receive the outcomes of 
their decisions are overpredictions. In other words, people overestimate how happy or 
how unhappy they will become as a function of receiving the outcomes of their
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decisions. In order to test this, I compared people’s affective forecasts with their 
affective experiences.
Secondly, I wanted to test the possibility that the overpredictions of decision- 
related affect are due to focalism. The second research hypothesis was the following: 
People’s predictions of the affective reactions that they will experience when they 
receive the outcomes of their decisions are overpredictions only when people are 
focused on the outcomes in question. When people see the outcomes of their decisions 
in a broader context (i.e. when they are de-focused from the outcomes), their forecasts 
of decision-related affect are accurate. In other words, people’s overestimations of how 
happy or how unhappy they will become as a function of receiving the outcomes of 
their decisions are due to focalism. In order to test this, I compared focused people’s 
affective forecasts with de-focused people’s ones.
Thirdly, I wanted to test the possibility that the influence of affective 
anticipations on decision intentions or behaviours is due to focalism. The third research 
hypothesis was the following: People try to minimise the pain and maximise the 
pleasure that they will experience when they receive the outcomes of their decisions 
only when they are focused on the outcomes in question. When people see the 
outcomes of their decisions in a broader context (i.e. when they are de-focused from the 
outcomes), their forecasts of decision-related affect are less influential on their decision 
intentions or behaviours. In order to test this, I looked at people’s choice behaviours and 
compared the predictive validity of focused people’s affective forecasts with that of de- 
focused people’s forecasts.
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2. Overview of the empirical work
Ten empirical studies are summarised in this Thesis. Studies 1, 6, and 7 were 
designed to address the question whether people predict their future emotions 
accurately or not. Studies 2, 3, and 4 were designed as indirect tests of the question 
whether affective misprediction can be attributed to focalism; the same question was 
directly addressed in studies 5, 6, and 7. Studies 8, 9, and 10 investigated the presence 
of focalism in affective post-dictions -  i.e. affective experience after the recall of a past 
event. Finally, studies 2 to 6 were designed to address the question whether the 
influence of affective self-forecasts on individual decision behaviours can be attributed 
to focalism.
In the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), I report a real risky-choice study 
(Study 1). Participants were offered a choice between a safer but less rewarding task 
and a riskier but more rewarding task. The feedback on participants’ actual performance 
was manipulated in order to introduce surprise effects. Regarding participants’ observed 
task choice behaviour, I tested the predictions of RT; DT; and DAT -  SEP by 
contrasting the effects of affective forecasts to the effects of performance expectations. 
Regarding participants’ self-reported decision-related affect, I compared participants’ 
affective predictions and their corresponding affective experiences across the different 
levels of performance feedback.
In the second empirical chapter (Chapter 5), I report three scenario-based 
investment studies. Studies 2 and 3 introduced two positive investment options, with 
post-decisional regret potential associated with one of them. Participants had to indicate 
their intentions to invest to each one of the two options. Regarding participants’ self- 
reported intentions to invest, I contrasted the predictions of Prospect Theory to the
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predictions of Regret Theory for participants who were either focused on the investment 
decision or de-focused from it. Study 4 introduced two negative investment options, 
with post-decisional regret potential associated with one of them. Participants had to 
indicate their intentions to invest to each one of the two options. As was the case in 
Studies 2 and 3, regarding participants’ self-reported intentions to invest, I contrasted 
the predictions of Prospect Theory to the predictions of Regret Theory for participants 
who were either focused on the investment decision or de-focused from it.
In the third empirical chapter (Chapter 6), I report two negotiation studies. Study 
5 was a hypothetical two-party negotiation with regret potential associated with some of 
the outcomes. Regarding participants’ self-reported negotiation behaviour (i.e. 
monetary offers), I contrasted the behaviours of focused and de-focused participants. 
Study 6 was a real two-party negotiation with regret potential associated with some of 
the outcomes. Regarding observed negotiation behaviour (i.e. monetary offers), I 
compared participants’ behaviour when they were focused on the outcome to their 
conesponding behaviour when they were de-focused from it. Regarding participants’ 
self-reported decision-related affect, I compared participants’ affective predictions and 
affective experiences when they were focused on the outcome to their corresponding 
predictions and experiences when they were de-focused from it. Regarding the 
influence of affective forecasts on game behaviours, I compared the influence of 
affective predictions on participants’ negotiation behaviour when they were focused on 
the outcome to the corresponding influence of these predictions on participants’ 
negotiation behaviour when they were de-focused from the outcome.
In the fourth empirical chapter (Chapter 7), I report a naturalistic study of 
academic performance, where the feedback on participants’ performance was not
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manipulated (Study 7). Students predicted their affective reactions to receiving their 
coursework marks. When they received their marks they recorded their reactions. 
Regarding participants’ self-reported decision-related affect, I compared affective 
predictions and affective experiences of focused and de-focused students.
In the fifth empirical chapter (Chapter 8), I report three naturalistic studies of 
decision recall using self-elicited emotional stimuli (Studies 8, 9, and 10). In Study 8, 
participants recalled a decision of theirs that resulted in positive or negative outcomes 
and then they recorded how they were feeling about it. In Studies 9 and 10, participants 
recalled a decision of theirs that resulted in negative outcomes and recorded how they 
were feeling about it. Regarding participants’ self-reported decision-related affect, I 
compared affective experiences of focused, de-focused, and otherwise distracted 
participants.
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CHAPTER
4
Anticipated post-decisional emotional reactions in a risky choice
situation:
From performance expectations and affective forecasts 
to performance feedback and affective experiences
Post-decisional regret considerations in risky choice tasks
Over the last 10 years, empirical research has documented evidence for the 
presence of regret considerations in risky choice situations. For instance, Ritov 
(1996) used simple gamble tasks and found that participants were regret-averse in 
their preferences for different gambles. Boles and Messick (1995) obtained a similar 
pattern of regret aversion using gamble tasks and interpersonal comparisons as the 
source of regret. Josephs et al. (1992) also replicated these results using gambles, 
but they failed to observe regret aversion in the domain of losses. Zeelenberg et al. 
(1996), however, observed regret aversion in risky choices in the domain of losses 
using a gamble task and a different manipulation to introduce regret considerations^
The research question that motivates the stream of research summarised 
above is the interplay between risk aversion and regret aversion as strategies that 
people employ when they are faced with a risky choice with uncertain outcomes. 
Whereas the initial conclusion was that regret aversion leads to risk aversion, the 
research by Zeelenberg and his colleagues demonstrated that risk aversion and 
regret aversion are independent choice strategies. Furthermore, the research 
summarised above makes the assumption that when people are faced with a risky 
choice with regret potential they forecast how they will be feeling as soon as a.) they 
receive the outcomes of their choices and b.) they find out the outcomes of their 
foregone choice (s). These forecasts, in turn, are assumed to guide people’s choice 
behaviours.
A common criticism that the research outlined above has attracted is that the 
context-free gamble paradigm that has been used is a poor substitute for real-life 
situations where people might face choices with regret potential. Put in a different
‘ I shall consider in greater detail Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) empirical evidence regarding the 
presence of regret aversion in the domain of losses in Chapter 6.
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way, this research has been criticised as being of limited generalisability (e.g. 
Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; p. 65).
Study 1: Aims and hypotheses
To summarise, the research on risky choice summarised above has three 
limitations. The first limitation is its potential lack of generalisability to real-life 
situations due to the exclusive use of the gamble paradigm. The second limitation is 
that it has narrowly focused on post-decisional regret considerations and neglected 
more general emotional considerations that might arise in a risky choice situation. 
The third limitation is that it has assumed the presence of regret considerations 
without actually investigating their emergence or their nature. For instance, how 
accurate are regret anticipations?
Study 1 was designed to address these criticisms. Specifically, the first aim 
of Study 1 was to generalise prior findings by providing a richer context in which 
risky choice can be studied. I offered participants a choice between an easier and a 
more difficult version of an anagram-solving task. Participants’ reward for doing the 
task was contingent on their task selection and on their task performance. This 
reward contingency enabled me to regard the easy task as corresponding to a safe 
choice and the difficult task as corresponding to a risky choice.
The second aim of Study 1 was to scrutinise the assumption that affective 
forecasts guide risky choices. Closely related to this, the third aim of Study 1 was to 
provide a thorough investigation of the accuracy of these affective forecasts. I 
explicitly asked participants to generate affective forecasts before they chose the 
task they would do. When participants finished the task, I asked them to record their 
affective experiences. In this way I was able to investigate a.) the extent to which 
affective forecasts guide choice behaviour and b.) the accuracy of these forecasts. In
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line with previous research, I expected that a.) participants’ choices would be 
influenced by their anticipations of post-task emotions and b.) participants would 
overpredict their post-task emotions (cf. Mellers, 2000; Sieff et al., 2000; Wilson et 
al., 2000).
Finally, I gave participants feedback regarding their performance at the task. 
Performance feedback was manipulated, so that some participants thought that they 
could have done better, others that they could have done worse, and others that they 
would have done equally well had they made a different task choice. These 
counterfactual comparisons are conceptualised by RT; DT; and DAT -  SEP as 
primary sources of post-decisional affect -  therefore they are an essential 
component of the study of this type of affect. In addition, the interaction between 
task choice and performance feedback also allowed me to introduce and examine 
surprise effects in participants’ affective judgements. Regarding these effects, I 
expected that participants would underestimate the impact of surprises on their 
experienced emotions (cf. Coughlan & Connolly, 2001; Mellers et ah, 1999),
Method
Participants: Seventy-one participants volunteered for the study (mean age = 24.73 
years; SD = 6.26 years; forty-eight females and twenty-three males). Participants 
were paid £8 for their participation (in this and other studies), plus any money they 
made from the anagram-solving task (up to £7 or £9).
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Variables and Design: The design was a three independent groups design, with 
Feedback (Equal vs. Better vs. Worse) as the independent variable. There were 23- 
25 participants in each condition.
Regarding the dependent variables of the experiment, participants chose a 
task, predicted their task performance, and stated their confidence in their 
performance prediction. Participants also predicted what their emotional reactions 
would be when they received feedback on their performance. Participants used the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988) to record these predictions. The Positive Affect (PA) scale of the PANAS 
consists of the following 10 items: Attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, 
inspired, proud, determined, strong, and active. I also included rejoicing and elation 
(i.e. emotions that have been of theoretical interest in the JDM domain). The 
Negative Affect (NA) scale consists of the following 10 items: Distressed, upset, 
guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, and afraid. I also included 
regret, and disappointment. In what follows, I shall refer to rejoicing, elation, regret, 
and disappointment as “decision-related” affect.
Once participants were finished with the task, I recorded their actual 
performance, their perceptions of how difficult the task was, and their perceived 
expertise at the task. Participants also recorded their experienced emotions 
immediately after receiving performance feedback and also a couple of days later.
Materials and Procedure: In the first stage of the study, all participants were 
presented with a short booklet containing manipulations and dependent measures. 
All participants received the following instructions: “For this study you will be 
presented with a choice between two tasks. The two tasks are quite similar; they 
both require anagram solving. They differ, however with respect to their difficulty,
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as one o f the two is easier than the other. Your aim fo r  either task is to solve as 
many anagrams as possible (100 in total), in 15 minutes. Your extra payment fo r  
participating in the study depends on your task performance. In other words, the 
more anagrams you solve, the more money you make. The maximum amount o f 
money you can make i f  you choose the easy task is £7 (£0.07 per anagram); the 
maximum amount o f money you can make i f  you choose the difficult task is £9 
(£0.09 per anagram) -  that is, the difficult task is approximately 29% more 
rewarding than the easy task. In addition, you will be asked to describe how you 
think you will be feeling after having finished the task and having found out how 
well you actually did. Once finished with your chosen task you will receive feedback 
on how well you actually did. In addition, you will find  out how well you would have 
done, had you chosen the other task (whichever this task is). We will estimate this on 
the basis o f your scores on the individual differences scales you have filled in 
already -  or you will fill in before going through the anagrams. O f course, because 
this score is an estimate, we do not expect it to reflect your performance with 100% 
accuracy; however, it should be a fairly valid predictor o f your performance at the 
non-chosen task. All this sounds slightly confusing, but it will become much clearer 
as you go through the study! There will also be a follow-up session, a couple o f days 
after the first one. This last session can be done over the phone”.
Either before or after reading these instructions, participants completed some 
unrelated personality scales. Repeating the instructions, the experimenter informed 
participants that, on the basis of some combination of their scores on the personality 
scales, he would be able to estimate how well they could have done at the task they 
would not eventually choose. In this way, participants were told they could compare 
their actual performance at the task they chose with their estimated performance at 
the task they did not choose.
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Once participants had read and heard the instructions and before they started 
solving the anagrams, they made all their predictions. Regarding their performance, 
participants predicted how many anagrams out of the 100 they thought they would 
solve and they also stated their confidence in this prediction. The confidence item 
read as follows: ''What do you think is the probability (0% -  100%) that the number 
o f anagram you actually solve falls within 5 anagrams either way o f the number you 
just now predicted (e.g. i f  you predicted 50 anagrams, then: 45 ^5 0 -^55 )?” 
Participants gave their answers on an 11-point percentage scale, anchored at 0% = it 
will definitely not fall within 5 anagrams either way and 100% = it will definitely 
fall within 5 anagrams either way, through the 50% midpoint = falling within 5 
anagrams either way is a 50-50 chance.
Regarding their post-task emotions, participants predicted how they thought 
they would be feeling after receiving feedback on their task performance. 
Participants were given three possibilities, pertaining to the relation between their 
actual performance at their chosen task and their estimated performance at the non­
chosen task: They predicted how they would be feeling if their actual performance 
matched their estimated one; if their actual performance exceeded their estimated 
one; and, finally, if their actual performance fell below their estimated one. 
Participants predicted their immediate affective reactions (“immediate prediction”) 
and their affective reactions two days later (“delayed prediction”). The instmctions 
for the “immediate prediction” were a modified version of the PANAS instructions 
(Watson et al., 1988; p. 1070), and read as follows (instructions for the “delayed 
prediction” in brackets): "The list that follows consists o f a number o f words that 
describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the 
appropriate answer into the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you will 
be feeling this way immediately after you finish with the task (two days after having
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finished with the task), fo r  each o f the three described possibilities”. The three 
possibilities outlined above read as follows: “Tjf your actual performance at the 
chosen task matches your estimated performance at the non-chosen task” (feedback 
“equal”); ''If your actual performance at the chosen task is higher than your 
estimated performance at the non-chosen task” (feedback “worse”); "If your actual 
performance at the chosen task is lower than your estimated performance at the 
non-chosen task” (feedback “better”). Participants also filled in the decision-related 
affect scales for each of these three possibilities.
Once they had finished with the predictions, participants chose one of the 
tasks (i.e. either the easy, or the difficult one). In reality, both versions were 
identical (i.e. they contained exactly the same anagrams). The only difference was 
that participants who opted for the easy task received an anagrams pack with 
“EASY” printed on the first page, whereas participants who opted for the difficult 
task received an anagrams pack with “DIFFICULT” printed on the first page 
instead.
Next, participants did the anagram-solving task that they had chosen. 
Participants who chose the easy task received the following instructions 
(instructions for participants who chose the difficult task in parentheses): "In the five  
pages that follow you will find  100 anagrams. Your task is to solve as many o f them 
as possible in 15 minutes. All the anagrams can be solved. Some o f them can be 
correctly solved in more than one way. Note also that some o f them are more 
difficult than others. I f  you fin d  an anagram too difficult to work out, move on to the 
next one. Here is an example o f  a solved anagram: gear-^ rage. For each anagram 
you solve correctly (i.e. you produce a grammatically correct word) you will receive 
£ 0.07 (£0.09). Good luck!”
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In the next stage of the study, participants evaluated the task and their own 
expertise at it using the following scales: '’'‘Overall, the anagram task was difficult”', 
'‘'The anagram task was more difficult than I initially thought”', and “7 am 
experienced with anagram solving”. Participants gave their answers on 5-point 
scales, anchored at 1 = completely agree and 5 = completely disagree. In the time 
participants took to record their answers, the experimenter counted the correctly 
solved anagrams and calculated the amount of money that participants would be 
paid.
Next, all participants received the Feedback manipulation. “Feedback-equal” 
participants were told that on the basis of some combination of scores in the 
personality scales, the experimenter estimated that had they chosen the other version 
of the anagrams task (i.e. the easy version for participants who had chosen the 
difficult one; the difficult version for participants who had chosen the easy one) they 
would have done equally well (i.e. they would have solved roughly the same 
number of anagrams). “Feedback-better” participants were told the same cover 
story, except that the experimenter estimated that they would have done better (i.e. 
they would have solved more anagrams). Finally, “feedback-worse” participants 
were told the same cover story too, except that the experimenter estimated that they 
would have done worse (i.e. they would have solved fewer anagrams).
After having received this feedback information, participants recorded how 
they felt regarding their performance using the PANAS and the decision-related 
affect scales (“immediate experiences”). A couple of days later, participants were e- 
mailed or called on the phone by the experimenter and they were asked to say how 
they felt regarding their performance using the PANAS and the decision-related 
affect scales (“delayed experiences”).
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Results
1. Anticipated emotions and choice behaviour
Participants were more likely to choose the easier than the more difficult 
version of the anagrams task = 4.07, p = .044]. Next, I used hierarchical 
logistic regression modelling in order to predict choices of task on the basis of 
anticipated emotional reactions to task performance and confidence scores.
The 10 positive items and then 10 negative items of the PANAS were 
separately summed in order to obtain the overall PA and NA scores, respectively. 
Across the two predictive judgements (“immediate predictions”; “delayed 
predictions”) the PA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .90 (Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient). The NA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .92 (Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient).
I built a two-stage model, with performance prediction, confidence in 
performance prediction, and expertise entering in the first stage and anticipated 
emotional reactions entering in the second stage. These anticipated emotional 
reactions comprised both immediate and delayed predictions for PA, NA, and 
decision-related affect. As can be seen in Table 4.1, performance-related measures 
alone were not enough to predict task choice. The inclusion of post-game affective 
anticipations improved accuracy of prediction of the choices by 14.50%. Overall, 
more anticipated rejoicing after the completion of the task and higher perceived 
expertise led participants to choose the more difficult task. In contrast, more 
anticipated regret immediately after the completion of the task led participants to 
choose the easier task.
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Table 4.1. Logistic regression modelling of task choice as a function of confidence and anticipated
post-game emotions
1®‘ stage model 
(performance; 
confîdence; 
expertise)
Predictors
(b-weights)*
Model
accuracy
2“** stage model 
(all the 
previous & 
anticipated 
emotions)
Predictors
(b-weights)*
Model
accuracy
= .07-.09; 
/ 0 )  = 4A2, 
p = .219
Expertise
(-.60)
64.50%
/P = .34-46; 
/ ( 1 2 )  = 21.15, 
p = .048
Rejoicing-IM (-1.72)** 
Regret-IM (1.21) 
Expertise (-1.05)
79.00%
*A11 predictors significant at p < .05; ** Abbreviations; IM: prediction of immediate emotions
2. Predicted and actual performance
Participants’ predicted and actual performance at the anagram-solving task 
can be seen in Table 4.2. These scores were submitted to a Choice*Judgement 
mixed ANOVA, with Choice (Easy vs. Difficult) as the between-subjects factor and 
Judgement (Predicted vs. Actual) as the within-subjects factor.
The analysis yielded only a main effect of Judgement [F(l, 68) = 83.76, p  < 
.001], such that, overall, participants overpredicted their performance. This effect 
was anticipated, since overestimation of skilled performance is a well-established 
empirical phenomenon (e.g. Harvey, 1994). Importantly, the analysis did not reveal 
any effect of Choice on performance. The absence of any such effect rules out 
motivational accounts of participants’ performance (for instance, that participants 
underperformed at the difficult task in order to attribute their low scores at an 
objectively difficult ask to lack of effort rather to lack of competence, etc.).
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Table 4.2. Predicted and actual performance across Choice and Feedback conditions (SDs in
parentheses)
Easy task Difficult task
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
F -  Equal 43.93 (20.49) 22.86 (8.56) 36.50 (20.01) 29.10(8.47)
F -  Better 55.77 (20.40) 34.85 (12.65) 63.00(10.59) 32.50(7.59)
F -  Worse 53.31 (18.52) 28.69 (8.56) 57.86 (19.97) 27.86 (7.93)
3, Predicted and experienced positive and negative affect (PANAS)
The 10 positive items, and then 10 negative items of the PANAS were 
separately summed in order to obtain the overall PA and NA scores, respectively. 
Across the four judgements (“immediate predictions”; “delayed predictions”; 
immediate experiences”; and “delayed experiences”) the PA scale had a mean inter­
item reliability of .91, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .90 
to .93. The NA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .88, with Cronbach Alpha 
reliability coefficients ranging from .84 to .91.
Regarding the accuracy of participants’ affective judgements, since the 
effects of expectations and surprise that I am interested in depend entirely on a.) 
participants’ choice of task and b.) the type of feedback that participants received 
after they completed the task, I split the participants into six independent groups on 
the basis of their choice of task and my feedback manipulation. The resulting groups 
were the following: Easy/equal; easy/better; easy/worse; difficult/equal;
difficult/better; difficult/worse. Participants’ predicted and experienced PA and NA 
across these six conditions can be seen in Table 4.3 (feedback-equal); Table 4.4. 
(feedback-better); and Table 4.5. (feedback-worse).
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Next I submitted these affective judgements to an Affect*Judgement*Time 
ANOVA, with Affect (PA vs. NA), Time (Immediate vs. Delayed), and Judgement 
(Predicted vs. Experienced) as the within-subjects factors. In order to make the 
analysis easier to follow, I have broken down the findings on the basis of the above 
grouping.
3.1. Easy /  equal (table 4.3.; upper panel): The analysis revealed an effect of Affect 
[F(l, 12) = 7.26, p  = .020], such that participants reported overall more PA than NA. 
The analysis also yielded an effect of Time [F(l, 12) = 13.48, p  = .003], such that 
immediate judgements of affect were higher overall than delayed judgements of 
affect. The absence of any effect of Judgement shows no evidence of affective 
misprediction in this group.
3.2. Difficult /  equal (Table 4.3.; lower panel): The analysis revealed an effect of 
Affect [F (l, 7) = 26.39, p = .001], such that participants reported overall more PA 
than NA. The analysis also yielded an effect of Time [F (l, 7) = 24.24, p = .002], 
such that immediate judgements of affect were higher overall than delayed 
judgements of affect. These effects were qualified by a significant Affect*Time 
interaction [F (l, 7) = 48.66, p < .001]. Analysis of this interaction revealed that the 
immediate judgements of PA were higher than the delayed judgements of PA [t(l) = 
5.83, p  = .001], but that no difference between immediate and delayed judgements 
was observed for NA [r(7) = .60, p  = .567]. The absence of any effect of Judgement 
again shows no evidence of affective misprediction in this group.
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Table 4.3. Predicted and experienced PA and NA in the Feedback-equal groups (SDs in parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 21.69 (9.15) 18.39 (8.68) 13.39 (3.55) 14.69 (5.07)
Delayed 15.62 (8.69) 16.46 (7.34) 11.00(1.87) 13.15(5.68)
Difficult task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 21.25 (5.70) 18.25 (5.87) 11.63 (2.83) 10.63 (1.06)
Delayed 13.13(3.64) 12.63 (3.29) 11.50 (3.86) 10.38 (0.52)
3.3. Easy /be tter  (table 4.4.; upper panel): The analysis revealed an effect of Affect 
[F(l, 12) = 5.90, p  = .032], such that participants reported overall more PA than NA. 
The analysis also yielded an effect of Time [F (l, 12) = 22.19, p  = .001], such that 
immediate judgements of affect were higher overall than delayed judgements of 
affect. More importantly, the analysis also yielded an Affect*Judgement interaction 
[F(l, 12) = 22.72, p < .001]. Participants overpredicted the NA [/(12) = 4.43, p  = 
.001] and they underpredicted the PA [r(12) = -3.37, p = .006] that they experienced 
when they found out that they would have been better off choosing the more 
difficult task. The presence of this effect of Judgement shows evidence of 
misprediction of both PA and NA in this group.
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Table 4.4. Predicted and experienced PA and NA in the Feedback-better groups (SDs in parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 18.39 (4.03) 22.46 (6.98) 17.31 (6.52) 12.85 (3.93)
Delayed 14.54 (4.33) 19.39 (6.54) 15.00 (5.72) 12.69 (5.22)
Difficult task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 17.89 (2.37) 22.33 (7.40) 17.78 (6.70) 13.44 (5.62)
Delayed 14.33 (4.56) 21.11 (7.24) 15.56 (6.82) 12.56 (4.16)
3.4. Difficult /  better (table 4.4.; lower panel): The analysis revealed a weak effect of 
Affect [F (l, 8) = 4.44, p = .068], such that participants reported overall more PA 
than NA. More importantly, the analysis also yielded an Affect*Judgement 
interaction [F (l, 8) = 16.78, p  = .003]. Participants marginally overpredicted the NA 
[/(8) = 2.18, p  = .061] and they underpredicted the PA [r(8) = -4.02, p  = .004] that 
they experienced when they found out that they would have been better off choosing 
the easier task. The presence of this effect of Judgement shows evidence of 
misprediction of both PA and NA in this group.
3.5. Easy /  worse (table 4.5.; upper panel); The analysis revealed two main effects 
(Affect and Judgement); three two-way interactions (Affect*Time; 
Affect*Judgement; and Time*Judgement); and, to qualify all the other effects, the 
analysis also yielded an Affect*Time*Judgement interaction [F (l, 13) = 11.83, p  = 
.004]. Analysis of this interaction revealed that participants overpredicted only the 
immediate PA that they experienced when they found out that they would have been 
worse off choosing the more difficult task [t{l5) = 4.47, p  < .001]. No evidence of
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misprediction was obtained for immediate NA [r(15) = -1.02, p  = .324]; delayed PA 
[t(l5) = .63, p  = .540]; or delayed NA [r(13) = -1.04, p = .319]. The presence of this 
effect of Judgement shows evidence of overprediction of PA in this group.
Table 4.5. Predicted and experienced PA and NA in the Feedback-worse groups (SDs in
parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 29.00 (9.66) 21.29 (8.29) 11.07 (2.46) 12.00 (2.66)
Delayed 20.86 (8.43) 19.57 (9.20) 10.50 (0.94) 11.07(1.69)
Difficult task
Predicted PA Experienced PA Predicted NA Experienced NA
Immediate 33.00 (8.62) 24.86 (7.99) 14.74 (6.70) 14.43 (5.44)
Delayed 25.00 (6.73) 24.14(8.90) 12.86 (6.72) 13.43 (4.39)
3.6. Difficult /  worse (table 4.5.; lower panel): The analysis revealed a main effect of 
Affect [F(l, 6) = 26.51, p = .002], such that participants reported overall more PA 
than NA. The analysis also yielded two other main effects (Time; and Judgement), 
which were qualified by a weak Time*Judgement interaction [F(l, 6) = 5.49, p  = 
.058]. Analysis of this interaction revealed that participants overpredicted only their 
immediate affective reactions [t(6) = 4.76, p  = .003]. No evidence of misprediction 
was obtained for delayed affective reactions [t{6) = .10, p  = .928]. The presence of 
this effect of Judgement shows evidence of overprediction of immediate affective 
reactions in this group.
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4. Predicted and experienced decision-related affect
As was the case with the PANAS, participants’ predicted and experienced 
regret, disappointment, rejoicing, and elation across the six groups were submitted 
to an Affect*Judgement*Time ANOVA, with Affect (Regret vs. Disappointment vs. 
Rejoicing vs. Elation), Judgement (Predicted vs. Experienced), and Time 
(Immediate vs. Delayed) as within-subjects factors. I present the findings of this 
analysis following the groupings used in the previous section.
4.1. Easy /  equal (tables 4.6.1. & 4.6.2.; upper panels): The analysis revealed an 
effect of Time [F(l, 12) = 7.26, p = .020], such that immediate judgements of affect 
were overall higher than delayed judgements of affect. The absence of any effect of 
Judgement shows no evidence of affective misprediction in this group.
Table 4.6.1. Predicted and experienced regret and disappointment in the Feedback-equal groups
(SDs in parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted Experienced Predicted Experienced
regret regret disappointment disappointment
Immediate 1.85(1.35) 2.08 (1.04) 1.77(1.01) 2.23 (1.36)
Delayed 1.23 (0.83) 1.54 (0.66) 1.69(1.18) 1.46 (0.78)
Difficult task
Predicted Experienced Predicted Experienced
Regret regret disappointment disappointment
Immediate 1.13(0.35) 1.50 (0.93) 1.38(0.74) 1.63 (0.92)
Delayed 1.25 (0.71) 1.25 (0.71) 1.13(0.35) 1.25 (0.71)
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4.2. D ifficult/equal (tables 4.6.1. & 4.6.2.; lower panels): The analysis revealed an 
effect of Time [F(l, 7) = 7.30, p  = .031], such that immediate judgements of affect 
were overall higher than delayed judgements of affect. This effect was qualified by a 
marginal Affect*Time*Judgement interaction [F(3, 21) = 2,94, p  = .057]. Analysis 
of this interaction revealed that participants overpredicted the immediate rejoicing 
[f(9) = 3.00, p  = .015] that they experienced when they found out that their choice of 
task did not affect their performance. No evidence of misprediction was obtained for 
the other decision-related emotions and time perspectives. The presence of this 
effect of Judgement shows evidence of overprediction of rejoicing in this group.
Table 4.6.2. Predicted and experienced rejoicing and elation in the Feedback-equal groups (SDs in
parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted
rejoicing
Experienced
rejoicing
Predicted
elation
Experienced
elation
Immediate 1.69(1.03) 1.15(0.56) 1.85 (1.28) 1.62 (0.96)
Delayed 1.31(0.86) 1.23 (0.83) 1.15(0.38) 1.39 (0.65)
Difilcult task
Predicted
rejoicing
Experienced
rejoicing
Predicted
elation
Experienced
elation
Immediate 1.63 (0.52) 1.00 (0.00) 1.50 (0.93) 1.38 (0.52)
Delayed 1.13(0.35) 1.00 (0.00) 1.25(0.71) 1.13(0.35)
4.3. Easy /  better (tables 4.7.1. & 4.7.2.; upper panels): The analysis revealed an 
effect of Affect [F(3, 33) = 18.48, p  < .001], such that participants reported overall 
more regret and disappointment than rejoicing and elation. The analysis also yielded 
an effect of Time [F(l, 11) = 12.48, p  = .005], such that immediate judgements of
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affect were overall higher than delayed judgements of affect. More importantly, the 
analysis also yielded an Affect*Judgement interaction [F(3, 33) = 13.99, p < .001]. 
Participants overpredicted the regret [t{\2) = 3.03, p  = .010] and the disappointment 
[f(12) = 5.20, p < .001] and they underpredicted the rejoicing [?(12) = -2.55, p  = 
.025] and the elation [r(ll)  = 3.55, p  = .005] that they experienced when they found 
out that they would have been better off choosing the more difficult task. The 
presence of this effect of Judgement shows evidence of misprediction of decision- 
related affect in this group.
Table 4.7.1. Predicted and experienced regret and disappointment in the Feedback-better groups
(SDs in parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted
regret
Experienced
regret
Predicted
disappointment
Experienced
disappointment
Immediate 3.17(1.12) 2.17 (0.94) 3.17(0.94) 1.83 (0.84)
Delayed 2.67(1.30) 1.92(1.17) 2.33 (0.89) 1.50 (0.67)
Difficult task
Predicted
Regret
Experienced
regret
Predicted
disappointment
Experienced
disappointment
Immediate 2.00(1.12) 2.22(1.09) 3.33 (0.87) 2.33(1.41)
Delayed 2.11 (0.93) 1.78(0.97) 2.56(1.13) 2.44(1.33)
4.4. Difficult /  better (tables 4.7.1. & 4.7.2.; lower panels): The analysis revealed a 
weak effect of Affect [F(3, 24) = 12.20, p < .001], such that participants reported 
overall more regret and disappointment than rejoicing and elation. More 
importantly, the analysis also yielded an Affect*Judgement interaction [F(3, 24) = 
3.41, p = .034]. Participants marginally overpredicted the disappointment [r(8) =
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1.97, p  = .084] that they experienced when they found out that they would have 
been better off choosing the easier task. The presence of this weak effect of 
Judgement shows only fragile evidence of misprediction of disappointment in this 
group.
Table 4.7.2. Predicted and experienced rejoicing and elation in the Feedback-better groups (SDs in
parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted
rejoicing
Experienced
rejoicing
Predicted
elation
Experienced
elation
Immediate 1.08 (0.29) 1.50 (0.80) 1.00 (0.00) 1.83 (0.84)
Delayed 1.08 (0.29) 1.58(0.79) 1.00 (0.00) 1.50 (0.67)
Difficult task
Predicted
rejoicing
Experienced
rejoicing
Predicted
elation
Experienced
elation
Immediate 1.11(0.33) 1.22 (0.44) 1.22 (0.67) 1.56 (0.88)
Delayed 1.00 (0.00) 1.33 (0.71) 1.11 (0.33) 1.67 (0.71)
4.5. Easy /  worse (tables 4.8.1. & 4.8.2.; upper panels): The analysis revealed two 
main effects (Affect and Time); three two-way interactions (Affect*Time; and 
Affect*}udgement); and, to qualify all the other effects, it also yielded an 
Affect*Time*Judgement interaction [F(3, 39) = 3.04, p  = .040]. Analysis of this 
interaction revealed that participants overpredicted the immediate rejoicing [r(15) = 
2.55, p  = .022] and the immediate elation [f(15) = 3.09, p  = .007] that they 
experienced when they found out that they would have been worse off choosing the 
more difficult task and that they also underpredicted the immediate disappointment 
[t{l5) = -3.22, p = .006] and the delayed disappointment [f(13) = -2.92, p  = .012]
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that they experienced in these circumstances. No evidence of misprediction was 
obtained for the other decision-related emotions and time perspectives. The presence 
of this effect of Judgement shows evidence of overprediction of rejoicing and 
elation and underprediction of disappointment in this group.
Table 4.8.1. Predicted and experienced regret and disappointment in the Feedback-worse groups
(SDs in parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted Experienced Predicted Experienced
regret regret disappointment disappointment
Immediate 1.29(1.07) 1.29 (0.83) 1.29 (0.61) 2.36 (0.93)
Delayed 1.29 (0.83) 1.36 (0.84) 1.07 (0.27) 1.79 (0.98)
Difficult task
Predicted Experienced Predicted Experienced
Regret regret disappointment disappointment
Immediate 1.71(1.25) 1.57 (0.79) 1.71 (1.11) 2.00(1.15)
Delayed 1.29 (0.76) 1.57 (0.79) 1.29 (0.76) 1.57 (0.79)
4.6. Difficult /  worse (tables 4.8.1. & 4.8.2.; lower panels): The analysis revealed a 
main effect of Time [F(l, 6) = 10.74, p  = .017], such that immediate affective 
judgements were higher than delayed affective judgements. This effect was 
qualified by a significant Time*Judgement interaction that the analysis also yielded 
[F(l, 6) = 6.25, p  = .047]. Analysis of this interaction revealed that only judgements 
of immediate rejoicing were higher than judgements of delayed rejoicing [f(6) = 
2.76, p = .033]. More interesting was the main effect of Affect [F(3, 18) = 4.95, p -  
.011] that the analysis also revealed. Participants reported more overall rejoicing and 
elation than regret and disappointment. This effect was qualified by a significant
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Affect*Judgement interaction that the analysis also yielded [F(3, 18) = 3.22, p = 
.048]. Analysis of this interaction revealed that participants overpredicted only the 
immediate rejoicing [t(6) = 4.04, p = .007] that they experienced when they found 
out that they would have been worse off choosing the easier task. No evidence of 
misprediction was obtained for the other decision-related emotions. The presence of 
this effect of Judgement shows evidence of overprediction of immediate rejoicing in 
this group.
Table 4.8.2. Predicted and experienced rejoicing and elation in the Feedback-worse groups (SDs in
parentheses)
Easy task
Predicted
rejoicing
Experienced
rejoicing
Predicted
elation
Experienced
elation
Immediate 2.14(1.35) 1.36 (0.63) 2.71 (1.44) 1.57 (0.76)
Delayed 1.71 (1.00) 1.50 (0.76) 1.93(1.00) 1.36 (0.75)
DifTicult task
Predicted Experienced Predicted Experienced
rejoicing rejoicing elation elation
Immediate 3.86(1.21) 1.86(1.07) 3.57 (1.62) 2.57(1.27)
Delayed 2.00(1.00) 1.71 (0.95) 2.57(1.51) 2.29(1.25)
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 address two different research questions^. The first 
question is to what extent people’s risky choice behaviours are guided by their 
anticipations of their emotional reactions and by their comparisons of actual
 ^ The findings of Study 1 also relate to the question of overconfidence in forecasts of skilled 
performance. However, since this topic is not directly relevant to my purposes here, I shall not 
elaborate on these findings.
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outcomes to counterfactual ones. The second question is how accurately people 
predict their emotions when a.) they receive outcomes surprisingly better than the 
ones that they expected; and b.) they receive outcomes surprisingly worse than the 
ones that they expected. In what follows, I summarise and comment on the findings 
of Study I that are relevant to these questions.
Anticipated affective reactions and task choice
Regarding this question, the findings of Study 1 are clear. As Prospect 
Theory predicts (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), participants chose the easier task 
more often that the difficult task. Their choice of task partly depended on their 
subjective expertise in the task (i.e. in anagram-solving), but more so on the regret 
and rejoicing that they thought they would feel once they would receive the task 
outcomes and the task-relevant feedback. This finding is interesting for at least two 
reasons. Firstly, it replicates previous findings using a research setting that can be 
considered “richer” than the traditional gamble tasks that researchers in the domain 
have used. I take this setting to be richer in the sense that it involved participants’ 
evaluation and use of their skilled performance and also because it involved self­
relevant performance feedback -  which is very often the case in real-life situations.
Secondly, the above finding demonstrates that the influence of anticipated 
emotions on decision processes can be “emotion-specific” -  in other words, some of 
the aspects of this influence cannot be captured by general measures of affect. This 
is in line with Zeelenberg, van Dijk, and Manstead’s (1998) finding that general 
happiness measures cannot capture the relationship between responsibility for a 
decision and post-decisional emotional experiences, whereas more specific 
measures of regret can. In a different domain, measure specificity in the assessment 
of subjective experiences and evaluations has also been identified as a factor that
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enhances the predictive validity of the structural models of attitudes, as in the case 
of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (e.g. Ajzen, 1991).
Affective forecasts when outcomes are mildly surprising
When participants were told that they would have solved the same number of 
anagrams had they chosen the other task, participants who had chosen the easy task 
(easy/equal condition) were faced with a mild negative surprise (since with the same 
number of anagrams they could have made 29% more money), whereas participants 
who had chosen the difficult task (difficult/equal condition) were faced with a mild 
positive surprise (since with the same number of anagrams they could have foregone 
29% of their reward).
These participants indeed experienced more rejoicing than they had 
anticipated -  however, the effect was rather weak. However, participants in the easy 
task condition reported higher levels of positive than negative affect. I take these 
findings to indicate that, in general, participants in these two conditions did not 
bother too much with the (counterfactual) comparisons that I mentioned above. A 
number of factors may have led to this findings: a) the amounts of money involved 
were low; b) participants tried not to appear greedy to the experimenter; or c) 
participants did not perceive the intended boost (for those who did the easy task) or 
threat (for those who did the difficult task) to their self-esteem from the feedback.
Affective forecasts when outcomes are strongly negatively surprising
When participants were told that they would have been better off had they 
chosen the other task, participants who had chosen the difficult task (difficult/better 
condition) had good reasons to regret their choice. The task was seriously difficult: 
Overall, participants solved 29% of the anagrams, with the range of performance
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starting from as low as 13% and not exceeding 60%. Unsurprisingly, these 
participants experienced more regret and disappointment than rejoicing and elation. 
Regarding the accuracy of their affective forecasts to this situation, participants 
overpredicted their negative affect and they also tended to overpredict their 
disappointment. In contrast, they underpredicted their positive affect.
Turning to participants who had chosen the easy task (easy/better condition), 
when they were given similar feedback they too had reasons to regret their choice, 
since they could have solved more anagrams and made more money had they 
chosen the difficult task. Given the difficulty of the task, however, the plausibility of 
the cover story for these participants must have been rather low; therefore, we 
expected milder effects for this group. However, these participants experienced 
more regret and disappointment that rejoicing and elation. Regarding the accuracy 
of their affective forecasts to this situation, participants overpredicted their negative 
affect, regret, and disappointment. In contrast, they underpredicted their positive 
affect, rejoicing, and elation.
These comparisons also reinforce the argument on specificity of affective 
measures that was made above: In both groups, whereas regret and disappointment 
scores were higher than the corresponding rejoicing and elation scores, the overall 
scores of positive affect were higher than the overall scores of negative affect.
Affective forecasts when outcomes are strongly positively surprising
When participants were told that they would have been worse off had they 
chosen the other task, and given the level of task difficulty, participants who had 
chosen the easy task (easy/worse condition) had good reasons to be happy with their 
choice. Unsurprisingly, these participants experienced more rejoicing and elation 
that regret and disappointment. Regarding the accuracy of their affective forecasts to
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this situation, participants overpredicted their rejoicing and elation, but 
underpredicted their disappointment.
Turning to participants who had chosen the difficult task (difficult/worse), 
when they were given similar feedback they too had reasons to be happy with their 
choice, since they could have solved fewer anagrams and made less money had they 
chosen the easy task. Once again, given the difficulty of the task, the plausibility of 
the cover story for these participants must have been rather low; therefore, I 
expected milder effects for this group. However, these participants experienced 
more rejoicing and elation than regret and disappointment. Regarding the accuracy 
of their affective forecasts to this situation, participants overpredicted their rejoicing 
only.
Finally, regarding the argument on the specificity of affective measures, the 
findings from these two last groups are mixed. Whereas the overprediction of 
rejoicing and elation that was observed in the first group (easy/worse condition) was 
accompanied by an overprediction of positive affect, no evidence of misprediction 
of either positive or negative affect was obtained for the second group (difficult 
/worse condition).
Summary
Study 1 accomplished all of its aims. It provided evidence that studies that 
employ affective measures need to be explicit about the degree of specificity of 
these measures (see global indices vs. specific affective items). Study 1 also 
provided firm evidence that affective forecasts guide individual choice behaviour 
even though they are not accurate. Finally, Study 1 also showed that people 
overestimate the impact of major surprises, but that they are accurate when they 
judge the impact of minor surprises on their affective state.
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CHAPTER
5
Anticipated regret in investment decisions: 
An instance of focalism?
Post-decisional regret considerations in financial decision-making
Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) found empirical evidence for the presence of 
regret considerations in investment decisions. Their participants read a scenario that 
involved a choice between two positive, non-matched (i.e. not equally attractive) 
investment options, a safer option and a riskier option. Half of the participants were 
informed that their (hypothetical, scenario-based) sister had already chosen the riskier 
of the two options. According to Zeelenberg and Beattie, this information provided 
participants with expectations of post-decisional information (or “feedback”, as they 
called it) on the performance of the riskier investment option -  since no matter which 
option they opted for, at the end of the investment period they would find out how well 
the riskier investment had done from their sisters. The other half of the participants did 
not receive this expectation of feedback -  therefore, they had no way of finding out how 
well the riskier investment had done.
Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) reasoning was that participants who would not 
find out the outcome of the riskier option would prefer the safer investment. This is 
Prospect Theory’s prediction for risky choices in the domain of gains (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). However, participants who would find out the outcome of the riskier 
option from their sister would prefer the riskier alternative. In line with Boles and 
Messick’s (1995) findings that a possible source of post-decisional regret is 
interpersonal comparison between one’s self and others, Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) 
suggested that information on the outcome of the riskier investment would make the 
interpersonal comparison between participants and their sister salient. This, in turn, 
would make post-decisional regret considerations influential. These considerations 
would eventually lead to riskier investment preferences -  in other words, participants
86
would try to minimise the likelihood that they received worse outcomes than their 
sisters by opting for the same investment as she had opted for. Zeelenberg and Beattie’s 
(1997) empirical findings supported these predictions.
2. Studies 2 to 4: Aims and hypotheses
To summarise, the reasoning underlying the investment decisions of people who 
anticipate post-decisional feedback on an investment option is to block out any future 
information that could cause them to regret their initial decision. In line with Wilson et 
al.’s (2000) research on prospective focalism, I propose that these regret considerations 
can be attributed to focalism. Participants who face the possibility of regretting their 
decision in the future focus narrowly on this potential future regret, thereby discounting 
the other defining aspect of the decision -  namely its riskiness. If this is true, then if 
participants are de-focused from the decision in question before they report their 
investment preferences, the influence of regret-minimisation on participants’ 
investment decision should attenuate. The aim of the three studies summarised in this 
chapter was to test for this possibility.
Study 2
In Study 2 I presented participants with two uncertain positive investment 
options. One of the two options was riskier than the other. Participants were asked to 
indicate their intentions to invest in each of them. Half of the participants were 
expecting post-decisional feedback on the performance of the riskier investment (and 
their chosen investment if it was not the riskier one), whereas the other half of the 
participants were expecting post-decisional feedback on the performance of their
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chosen investment only (whichever this option was). In addition to the expectation of 
feedback, half of the participants in each group were de-focused before recording their 
intentions to invest. Before recording their investment intentions, de-focused 
participants completed a prospective diary of events likely to happen to them in the 
investment time-span.
Regarding participants’ investment intentions, I expected that focused 
participants would favour the riskier investment. This is the regret-minimising option 
that that RT predicts and Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) observed. I also expected that 
de-focused participants would favour the safer investment. This is the risk-minimising 
option that Prospect Theory predicts.
Method
Participants: One hundred and forty-eight students of the University of London 
volunteered to participate in the study (mean age = 24.75 years; SD = 6.23 years; 
seventy-eight females). Participants were not paid for their participation.
Variables and Design: The design was a 2*2 completely between-subjects design, with 
Anticipated Feedback (Choice only vs. Risky choice) and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as 
independent variables. There were 37 participants in each condition.
The dependent variable was participants’ intentions to invest in one of the two 
options.
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of the booklet,
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participants in the “choice-only” feedback condition were asked to imagine themselves 
as the protagonist in the following scenario (modified version of Zeelenberg & Beattie’s 
1997 scenario; p. 66);
“Kowr uncle has just died and left you £1000. You now have to decide how to invest the 
money fo r  3 years. A friend has just told you about two kinds o f investment; the first one 
is a Government Bond, which is guaranteed to pay back a total sum between £1000 and 
£1800 at the end o f the three years. The second one is to invest the money fo r  the same 
three years period in a High Interest Account, which is guaranteed to pay back a total 
sum between £1250 and £1350 at the end o f the three years. You know fo r sure that at 
the end o f the three years and in both instances, you will not be able to find out how 
much money you would have made if  you had chosen the other one".
The scenario for the “risky-choice” feedback condition read as follows:
''Your uncle has just died and left you £1000. You now have to decide how to invest the 
money fo r  the following 3 years. Your uncle has also left your sister £1000; she has 
already made up her mind and invested her money fo r the same three years period in a 
Government Bond, which is guaranteed to pay back a total sum between £1000 and 
£1800 at the end o f the three years. You can choose to invest your money in this kind o f 
investment too. On the other hand, a friend has just told you about another kind o f 
investment which you could choose, a High Interest Account, which is guaranteed to 
pay back a total sum between £1250 and £1350 at the end o f the three years. You know 
fo r  sure that at the end o f the three years you will find out how much money you would 
have made i f  you had chosen the Government Bond, because your sister will tell you”.
On the second page of the booklet, participants in the “diary” condition received 
the following instructions: "Now we would like you to think o f and briefly describe the
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major events that are likely to occur to you in the next three years (feel free to describe 
as many events as you likef'. Participants were given approximately three quarters of a 
page to describe the events that they could think of. Participants in the “no-diary” 
condition did not perform any filler task.
Finally, all participants went through the last page of the booklet, where they 
had to record their intentions to invest the money in one or the other option. The item 
read as follows: “/  intend to invest my £ 1 0 0 0 . . Participants gave their answers on a 9- 
point scale, anchored at -4 = definitely in the High Interest Account and +4 = definitely 
in the Government Bond’.
Results
Reported intentions to invest can be seen in Table 5.1. The intention scale was 
submitted to a Feedback*Diary ANOVA, with Feedback (Choice only vs. Risky 
choice) and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as between-subjects factors. The analysis 
yielded an unexpected effect of Diary [F(l, 144) = 8.71, p  = .004], such that “diary” 
participants were more risk-averse than “no-diary” participants.
The anticipated main effect of Feedback and the interaction between Feedback 
and Diary were not obtained.
’ Asking participants to indicate which one of the two options they would choose might seem a more 
straightforward measure here. Research on the measurement of behavioural intentions, however, suggests 
that continuous measures of intentions should be used instead (unipolar, or bipolar, as is the case here). A 
self-reported intention to perform a behaviour corresponds to a subjective probability that the person will 
eventually exhibit the behaviour rather than to a certainty (e.g. Ajzen, 1991; 2002; Himmelfarb, 1993; 
Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957).
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Table 5,1. Mean intentions to invest across conditions (SDs  in parentheses)
Choice only Feedback Risky choice Feedback
No Diary 1.00 (2.77) 1.22 (2.44)
0.00 (2.55) -0.30 (2.59)
Diary
Discussion
Study 2 failed to replicate the regret effect that Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) 
demonstrated. The difference between this study and theirs was that whereas they used 
two unipolar scales for the two investment options (i.e. an 1-7 scale for the safer option 
and another 1-7 scale for the riskier option), I assessed investment intentions using one 
single bipolar scale. From a normative viewpoint, people’s preferences for one 
investment over another should exhibit invariance to the representation of the problem. 
However, there is empirical evidence that different elicitation formats result in 
preference reversals between sets of options (for a classic account of preference 
reversals see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983).
For instance, Mellers and her colleagues looked at participants’ preferences for 
gambles presented in pairs using four different response formats (namely attractiveness 
ratings; buying prices; selling prices; and strength of preference judgements). They 
found that the different formats elicited different responses (Mellers, Chang, Bimbaum, 
& Ordonez, 1992). More relevant to these findings is the research by Bazerman, 
Loewenstein, and White (1992). They found preference reversals between choices and 
evaluations of alternatives. More importantly, they found that people put more 
emphasis on their own payoffs when they chose between alternatives, whereas they put 
more emphasis on the relative value of the same payoffs (that stemmed from the
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interpersonal comparison of payoffs for self versus payoffs for others) when they 
evaluated alternatives.
I suspect that this “choice vs. evaluation” discrepancy is the reason that I failed 
to replicate Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) findings. The bipolar scale that I used 
resembles a choice task: My participants saw the two options at the two opposite ends 
of a continuum. With this format, as with any binary choice format, the intention to 
invest in one of the option automatically precludes the intention to invest to the other. 
On the other hand, the unipolar scales that Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) used resemble 
more an evaluation (or strength of preference) task: Their participants evaluated the two 
options separately, such that “some” preference for one of them did not automatically 
preclude “some” simultaneous preference for the other one. Therefore, in Study 3, I 
sought to replicate the regret effect that Zeelenberg and Beattie observed using two 
unipolar scales.
Study 2 also demonstrated that the provision of a real-life context for the 
investment decision (via the de-focusing manipulation) led to uniformly risk-averse 
intentions. This finding is interesting because Prospect Theory’s postulate that people 
are risk-averse in the domain of gains is not enough to accommodate it. Participants in 
both the “no-diary” and the “diary” conditions were judging two positive investments, 
but only those in the “diary” condition exhibited risk-aversion. When I looked at the 
events that participants had mentioned in their diaries, the following major categories 
emerged: Getting a job (75%), graduating (53%), moving house (44%), continuing 
studies (37%), buying a house or a car (33%), starting a family (31%), and travelling 
(30%). These qualitative data seem to suggest the following tentative explanation for 
these participants’ risk-aversion: Most of the events that were mentioned in the diaries
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involve a substantial financial commitment. It is, therefore, plausible that this 
commitment led these participants to be risk-averse. This explanation is in line with 
Slovic’s (1964) idea that risk preferences are context-specific (see also Shapira, 1994). 
If this is the case, then it follows that different contexts (i.e. contexts evoked by 
qualitatively different diaries) would elicit different risk preferences. We tested this 
possibility in Study 3.
To summarise, the next steps that I took were, firstly, to try to replicate the 
regret effect that Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) demonstrated and, secondly, to further 
investigate the contextualisation effect of de-focusing.
Study 3
In Study 3 I presented participants with two uncertain positive investment 
options. One of the two options was riskier than the other. Participants were asked to 
indicate their intentions to invest in each of them. Half of the participants were 
expecting post-decisional feedback on the performance of the riskier investment, 
whereas the other half of the participants were expecting post-decisional feedback on 
the performance of their chosen investment only (whichever this option was). As in 
Study 2, in addition to the expectation of feedback, some participants were de-focused 
before recording their intentions to invest.
In order to test whether different evoked contexts would give rise to different 
risk preferences (e.g. Shapira, 1994; Slovic, 1964), in this study I also manipulated the 
context that the de-focusing manipulation evoked. For half of the de-focused 
participants the evoked frame of reference for the investment decision was one of future
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responsibilities; for the other half of the de-focused participants the evoked frame of 
reference for the investment decision was a more “carefree” one.
Moreover, I assessed the positive or negative valence of the diary-evoked 
contexts. In their initial investigation of focalism, Wilson et al. (2000) suggested two 
underlying de-biasing mechanisms that might be operating in the de-focusing stage. 
Since people are reminded of other occurrences that will take place together with the 
focal event, they are either distracted from the event (the “distraction hypothesis”), or 
they realise that the contextualising events will carry emotional consequences of their 
own and they will thereby influence people’s emotional state in addition to the focal 
event (the “affective competition hypothesis”), Wilson et al.’s (2000) data supported the 
distraction hypothesis. In Study 3 I attempted to discriminate between the two 
hypotheses. A pattern of reliable correlations between the valence of the diaries and the 
investment intentions would support the affective competition hypothesis. Absence of 
such pattern would fail to provide support for this hypothesis, thereby leaving only the 
distraction hypothesis.
Regarding the effects of the presence of context on participants’ investment 
intentions, I expected that focused participants would favour the riskier investment. For 
the de-focused participants, if the specific content of the de-focusing manipulation is 
irrelevant, then participants should uniformly take the safer option. However, if the 
specific content of the de-focusing manipulation is relevant, then participants should 
take the safer option when the context is one of forthcoming responsibilities and they 
should take the riskier option (or at least be risk-neutral) when the context is a carefree 
one. Regarding the effects of the type of context on participants’ investment intentions, 
following the findings of Study 2, I expected that their preference for the safer option
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would be stronger in the “responsibilities-diary” condition than in the “carefree-diary” 
condition and, conversely, that their preference for the riskier option would be stronger 
in the “carefree-diary” condition than in the “responsibilities-diary” condition.
Method
Participants: One hundred and sixty-two students of the University of London 
volunteered to participate in the study (mean age = 22.36 years; SD = 4.83 years; one 
hundred and nineteen females). Participants were not paid for their participation.
Variables and Design: The design was a 2*3 completely between-subjects design, with 
Anticipated Feedback (Choice-only versus Risky-choice) and Diary (No-Diary vs. 
Responsibilities-Diary vs. Carefree-Diary) as independent variables. There were 27 
participants in each condition.
The first dependent variable was participants’ intention to invest in the safe 
option (“safe”). The second dependent variable was participants’ intention to invest in 
the risky option (“risky”).
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of the booklet, 
participants in the “choice-only” feedback condition were asked to imagine themselves 
as the protagonist in the following scenario:
“Your uncle has just died and left you £1000. You now have to decide how to invest the 
money fo r 3 years. A friend has just told you about two kinds o f investment; the first one 
is a Government Bond, which is guaranteed to pay back a total sum between £1000 and
95
£1800 at the end o f the three years. The second one is to invest the money fo r  the same 
three years period in a High Interest Account, which is guaranteed to pay back a total 
sum between £1300 and £1500 at the end o f the three years. You know for sure that at 
the end o f the three years and in both instances, you will not be able to find out how 
much money you would have made if you had chosen the other one
The scenario for the “risky-choice” feedback condition read as follows:
“Towr uncle has just died and left you £1000. You now have to decide how to invest the 
money for the following 3 years. Your uncle has also left your sister £1000; she has 
already made up her mind and invested her money for the same three years period in a 
Government Bond, which is guaranteed to pay back a total sum between £1000 and 
£1800 at the end o f the three years. You can choose to invest your money in this kind o f 
investment too. On the other hand, a friend has just told you about another kind o f  
investment which you could choose, a High Interest Account, which is guaranteed to 
pay back a total sum between £1300 and £1500 at the end o f the three years. You know 
fo r  sure that at the end o f the three years you will find  out how much money you would 
have made if you had chosen the Government Bond, because your sister will tell you'\ 
On the second page of the booklet, one third of the participants 
(“responsibilities-diary”) received the following instructions: ''Now, we would like you 
to think o f and briefly describe two major events that are likely to occur to you during 
the next three years and are likely to increase your personal responsibilities^'. 
Participants were given two lines to summarise each event. After each event, 
participants also filled in the following two scales: "Tlie event described above 1 regard 
as positive” and "The event described above I regard as negative”. Participants gave
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their answers on two 8-point scales, anchored at 1 = strongly agree and 8 = strongly 
disagree.
Another third of the participants (“carefree-diary”) received the following 
instructions: ‘Wow, we would like you to think o f and briefly describe two major events 
that are likely to occur to you during the next three years but are unlikely to increase 
your personal responsibilities". After each event, participants also filled in the 
following two scales: '‘The event described above I  regard as positive" and "The event 
described above I regard as negative". Participants gave their answers on two 8-point 
scales, anchored at 1 = strongly agree and 8 = strongly disagree. Participants in the “no­
diary” condition did not perform any filler task.
Finally, all participants went through the last page of the booklet, where they 
had to record their intentions invest the money in the two investments. The two items 
read as follows: “7 intend to invest my £1000 in the High Interest Account" (“safe”); and 
“7 intend to invest my £1000 in the Government Bond' (“risky”). Participants gave their 
answers on 8-point scales, anchored at 1 = definitely no and 8 = definitely yes.
Results
7. Intentions to invest
Reported intentions to invest can be seen in Table 5.2. The intention scales were 
submitted to a Feedback*Diary*Option mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (Choice only 
vs. Risky choice) and Diary (No-Diary vs. Responsibilities-Diary vs. Carefree-Diary) as 
between-subjects factors and Option (Safe vs. Risky) as a within-subjects factor. The 
analysis revealed an effect of Option [F(l, 156) = 22.95, p < .001], such that
participants overall preferred the safer investment to the riskier one. This effect,
97
however, was qualified by the Feedback*Diary*Option interaction [F(2, 156) = 3.23, p 
= ,042]. I split this interaction into three Feedback*Option ANOVAs -  one for “no­
diary” participants, one for “responsibilities-diary” participants, and one for “carefree- 
diary” participants.
For “no-diary” participants the analysis revealed only a Feedback*Option 
interaction [F(l, 52) = 7.86, p -  .007]. Whereas “choice-only” feedback participants 
preferred the safer to the riskier investment [r(26) = 3.41, p  = .002], “risky-choice” 
participants were indifferent between the two investments [r(26) = -.64, p = .526].
Table 5.2. Mean intentions to invest across conditions (SDs in parentheses)
Choice-only Feedback Risky-choice Feedback
Safe option Risky option Safe option Risky option
No-Diary 5.78(7.65) 3.74(7.87) 4.37 (7.74) 4.78(7.86)
Responsibilities-Diary 5.22(7.85) 3.70(7.77 ) 5.78 (7.67) 3.37 (7.88)
Carefree-Diary 5.44(7.98) 4.15(2.08) 5.26(7.97) 4.33(2.06)
For “responsibilities-diary” participants the analysis revealed only a main effect 
of Option [F(l, 52) = 18.06, p < .001], such that participants overall preferred the safer 
to the riskier investment.
Finally, for “carefree-diary” participants the analysis also revealed a main effect 
of Option only [F(l, 52) = 4.83, p  = .032], such that participants overall preferred the 
safer to the riskier investment.
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2. Valence of diaries
For each event that participants reported in their diaries I computed a “positivity 
index” by subtracting the perceived negativity of the event from its perceived positivity. 
I then computed the correlations between intentions to invest (“safe”; “risky”) and the 
positivity indices. The resulting correlation coefficients were neither reliable (none was 
significant), nor sizeable (Pearson rs < .10).
Discussion
Study 3 replicated the regret effect that Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) observed. 
Participants favoured their sister’s chosen investment more when they would receive 
feedback on that investment only, arguably, in order to minimise the chances that they 
would experience post-decisional regret at the end of the investment period.
This regret-minimising choice was not observed when participants put their 
investment decision in the broader context of their lives. De-focused participants 
favoured the safer alternative -  as Prospect Theory predicts. Study 3, therefore, 
documents the presence of focalism in financial decision-making. Moreover, I found no 
evidence that the valence of the diaries influences subsequent self-reported intentions -  
a finding that corroborates Wilson et al.’s (2000) distraction hypothesis at the expense 
of the affective competition hypothesis.
Finally, I failed to document an influence of the evoked context on participants’ 
investment intentions -  although, as I had anticipated, the participants’ preference for 
the safer option was stronger in the “responsibilities-diary” condition than in the 
“carefree-diary” condition. Assuming that the manipulation of context was strong and
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relevant enough in order to induce the hypothesised context differences. Study 2 
provided no firm evidence that the effect of de-focusing is context-specific.
The next step that I took was to attempt to replicate the focalism effect in the 
domain of losses.
Study 4
Study 4 was a replication of Studies 2 and 3 in the domain of losses. Participants 
were presented with two uncertain negative investment options. One of them was 
riskier than the other. Participants were asked to indicate their intentions to invest to 
each of them. Half of the participants were expecting post-decisional feedback on the 
performance of the safer investment, whereas the other half of the participants were 
expecting post-decisional feedback on the performance of their chosen investment only 
(whichever this option was). In addition to the expectation of feedback, half of the 
participants were de-focused before recording their intentions to invest. As in Study 3, 
the positive or negative valence of the diaries was also assessed.
Regarding participants investment intentions, I expected that focused 
participants would favour the safer investment (i.e. they would prefer the regret- 
minimising option, as RT suggests). I also expected that de-focused participants would 
favour the riskier investment (i.e. they would prefer the risk-maximising option, as 
Prospect theory suggests). Regarding the comparison between the distraction hypothesis 
and the affective competition hypothesis for focalism, I expected that the de-focusing 
effects would depend on the presence of the evoked context, rather than on the valence 
of it.
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Method
Participants'. Fifty students from various London universities volunteered to participate 
in the study (mean age = 23.42; SD = 4.77; thirty-one females). Participants were paid 
£5 for their participation (in this and other studies).
Variables and Design'. The design was a 2*2 mixed design, with Anticipated Feedback 
(Choice-only vs. Safe-choice) as a between-subjects independent variable and Diary 
(No-Diary vs. Diary) as a within-subjects independent variable. There were 24-26 
participants in each condition.
The first dependent variable was participants’ intention to withdraw the money 
from the money market altogether (“safe”). The second dependent variable was 
participants’ intention to withdraw the money from their current investment and 
reinvest it in another option (“risky”).
Materials and Procedure'. All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page participants in the 
“choice-only feedback” condition were asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist 
of the following scenario:
""Some time ago a distant relative o f yours died and left you £1000. You decided to 
invest this money. After some investment market research, you eventually invested the 
money in a one-year Government Bond. Unfortunately however, because o f the World 
Trade Centre events, your Government Bond is not doing very well. In order not to lose 
your money, a friend suggests two solutions. The first one is to withdraw the money 
from the one-year Government Bond right away and not reinvest in anywhere. In this
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case you will sujfer a certain loss o f £300 -  £500. The second solution is to withdraw 
the money from this particular one-year Government Bond and reinvest it fo r  the 
remaining time in a private bond, the ABC Bond. In this case you will suffer a loss o f£0  
-  £800. You know for sure that at the end o f the investment period you will not find out 
how much money you would have saved had you chosen the other option (whichever 
that option is)".
The scenario for the “safe-choice feedback” condition read as follows:
''Some time ago a distant relative o f yours died and left you and your sister £1000. You 
decided to invest this money. After some investment market research, both o f you 
eventually invested the money in a one-year Government Bond. Unfortunately however, 
because o f the World Trade Centre events, your Government Bond is not doing very 
well. In order not to lose your money, your sister suggests the following solution: 
Withdraw the money from the one-year Government Bond right away. In this case you 
will suffer a certain loss o f £300 -  £500. In any case, that's what your sister has 
already made up her mind to do with her own investment. There is, however, a second 
option. You can withdraw the money from this particular one-year Government Bond 
and reinvest it fo r the remaining time in a private bond, the ABC Bond. In this case you 
will suffer a loss o f £0 — £800. You know for sure that at the end o f the investment 
period you will find out how much money you would have saved had you chosen to 
withdraw your money from the Government Bond and not reinvest it; this is because 
your sister will tell you".
On the second page of the booklet, participants were asked to indicate their 
investment intentions. The items read as follows: "I intend to withdraw my money from  
the Government Bond and not reinvest it" (“safe”); "I intend to withdraw my money
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from the Government Bond and reinvest it in the ABC Bond' (“risky”). Participants 
gave their answers on 8-point scales, anchored at 1 = definitely no and 8 = definitely 
yes.
Next, participants completed some unrelated personality scales and then they 
received the same investment scenarios again. This time, before indicating their 
intentions all participants went through the Diary manipulation. The diary instructions 
read as follows: “Now, we would like you to think o f and briefly describe two major 
events that are likely to occur to you during the following year". Participants were 
given two lines to summarise each event. After each event, participants also filled in the 
following two scales: “The event described above I regard as positive" and “The event 
described above I regard as negative". Participants gave their answers on two 8-point 
scales, anchored at 1 = strongly agree and 8 = strongly disagree. Finally, participants 
went through the last page of the booklet, where they filled in the two intention scales 
once again.
Results
1. Intentions to invest
Reported intentions to invest can be seen in Table 5.3. The intention scales were 
submitted to a Feedback*Diary*Option mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (Choice only 
vs. Safe choice) as a between-subjects factor and Diary (Diary vs. No-Diary) and 
Option (Safe vs. Risky) as within-subjects factors. The analysis revealed only a main 
effect of Option [F(l, 46) = 4.65, p  = .036], such that participants overall preferred the 
riskier to the safer option.
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2. Valence of diaries
For each event that participants reported in their diaries I computed a “positivity 
index” by subtracting the perceived negativity of the event from its perceived positivity. 
I then computed the correlations between intentions to invest (“safe”; “risky”) and the 
positivity indices. The resulting correlation coefficients were neither reliable (none was 
significant), nor sizeable (Pearson rs < .09).
Table 5.3. Mean intentions to invest across conditions (5Ds in parentheses)
Choice-only Feedback Safe-choice Feedback
Safe option Risky option Safe option Risky option
No Diary 3.67(1.93) 4.96(2.12) 3.69(1.81) 4.89(2.29)
Diary 3.58(1.98) 4.96(2.16) 3.81 (2.15) 4.42(2.28)
Discussion
As Prospect Theory predicts, participants preferred the riskier to the safer option 
in the domain of losses. In other words. Study 4 failed to document a regret effect in the 
domain of losses. Josephs, et al. (1992) also failed to document a regret effect in the 
domain of losses using a gamble task -  whereas they obtained the effect in the domain 
of gains. Josephs et al. (1992) argued that the motivation that underlies people’s regret 
aversion is the motivation to preserve a sense of high self-esteem. A regrettable 
decision implies that the decision-maker is incompetent -  hence the blow to one’s self­
esteem and the resulting regret avoidance (see also Larrick, 1993, for the self-esteem 
argument). However, when a decision is certain to lead to losses the decision-maker
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cannot appear competent, since, no matter how small the loss is, it is still a (regrettable) 
loss -  hence there is no room left for regret avoidance to influence the decision process.
Zeelenberg et al. (1996; experiment 3), however, obtained a regret effect in the 
domain of losses, using also a gamble task and the anticipated feedback manipulation 
that I used. Their rationale was that the anticipation of a complete resolution of 
uncertainty that the post-decisional feedback provides gives rise to regret considerations 
regardless of gains or losses. Closer inspection of their data (Zeelenberg et al. 1996; pp. 
155-156), however, suggests that the regret avoidance that they observed was only due 
to a weak preference for the safer gamble when feedback would be provided on the 
choice of that gamble [%^ (1) = 3.56, p  = .059]. Zeelenberg et al.’s (1996) participants’ 
preference for the risky gamble was not affected at all 1X (^1) = .89, p  = .346]. I consider 
these findings only weak evidence for the empirical documentation of regret avoidance 
in the domain of losses. I am not arguing that it is not possible or meaningful to 
document regret effects in the domain of losses. However, with the task that was used, 
the regret effect was not found^.
The absence of the regret effect in these findings precluded any test of focalism 
in the domain of losses. Interestingly, I found no evidence that the valence of the diaries 
influences subsequent self-reported intentions -  a finding that corroborates the 
corresponding finding of Study 3 and supports Wilson et al.’s (2000) distraction 
hypothesis. However, the absence of an effect of focalism precludes a firm conclusion
 ^ It should also be noted here that whereas a between-subjects design was used in Zeelenberg et al.’s 
(1996) experiment 3, in Study 4 I used a within-subjects design instead. If the inconsistency in the 
findings can be partly attributed to the choice of experimental design (as it has been done in the past 
regarding regret-related effects; see, for instance, Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 2000), it would also 
serve as further evidence of the non-robustness of regret effects in the domain of losses.
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regarding the comparison between the distraction hypothesis and the affective 
competition hypothesis on the basis of these data.
General Discussion
Overall, the research that I summarised in this chapter provides some empirical 
evidence for the presence of focalism in investment decisions. Specifically, whereas 
participants who were focused on a positive investment decision with regret potential 
exhibited regret-aversion, participants who were de-focused from the investment 
decision in question did not exhibit regret-aversion (Study 3). Moreover, de-focused 
participants’ behavioural intentions did not appear to be influenced by the positive or 
negative valence of the evoked frame of the investment decision (Study 3; Study 4). 
Finally, I did not observe either regret-aversion or focalism in negative investment 
decisions (Study 4).
The above findings provide partial empirical support for the hypotheses. Regret 
aversion was present when participants anticipated that they would find out how much 
better (or worse) off they would have been had they chosen an investment option 
different from the one that they actually chose. However, regret aversion was only 
present for decisions in the domain of gains. Furthermore, the elimination of regret 
aversion when participants were de-focused from the investment decision in question 
allows regret aversion to be attributed to focalism. In other words, when people are 
narrowly focused on the outcomes of an uncertain investment, they try to minimise the 
chances that they regret a current investment decision of theirs. However, when people 
see the same decision in a broader real-life frame, regret-aversion considerations seem 
to subside.
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Finally, this series of studies revealed two other, unrelated effects. The first 
effect was the effect of response format on people’s self-reported risk preferences 
(Study 2). A response format that resembles a binary choice task (i.e. unique bipolar 
intention scale for two investment alternatives) revealed different risk-preferences than 
a response format that resembles a strength-of-preference task (i.e. separate unipolar 
intention scales for the two investment alternatives). The second effect was the absence 
of regret aversion in the domain of losses. This null result both agrees (Josephs et al., 
1992) and conflicts (Zeelenberg et al., 1996) with previous findings.
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CHAPTER
6
Anticipated post-decisional emotional reactions in 
Ultimatum Game bargaining:
An instance of focalism?
Post-decisional emotional considerations in Ultimatum Game bargaining
A task that has been extensively used for the study of people’s behaviour in 
dyadic negotiation is the “Ultimatum Game” (UG). In the simplest form of the UG 
two players are allocated the roles of the “proposer” and the “responder”. The 
proposer is then endowed with an amount of money, which she has to split between 
herself and the responder. Once the proposer has made an offer, the responder can 
either accept the split, in which case the two players share the amount accordingly, 
or reject the split, in which case neither of the players makes any money.
After the UG’s first introduction into experimental research by Güth, 
Schmittberger, and Schwarz (1982), it has been extensively used by economists and 
psychologists alike (for reviews of the literature on UGs see Camerer & Thaler, 
1995; Güth, 1995; Roth, 1995; Thaler, 1988). The reason that the UG has attracted 
all this interest is the following: On the one hand, proposers usually offer around 
40% of the “pie” that has been allocated to them. On the other hand, responders 
usually reject offers of less than 20% of the “pie”. These findings go against the 
predictions of standard microeconomic theory. According to these predictions, since 
any positive (i.e. non-zero) offer adds something to the responder’s financial assets, 
the responder should accept it. It follows that the proposer should offer no more than 
the smallest amount possible (e.g. one penny, or one cent).
Since standard theory cannot account for observed behaviour in the UG, 
alternative accounts have been put forward. One suggestion is that proposers do not 
make offers that are too low because they behave according to a social norm of 
fairness. However, this explanation has been challenged. Research has demonstrated 
that, rather than being fair, proposers simply try to appear fair to the responders: 
When perceived fairness considerations are made redundant (for instance, by 
obliging responders to accept any offer that the proposer makes in a variant of the
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UG that is called the “Dictator Game”), proposers’ offers are markedly lower. In 
other words, proposers try to anticipate the responders’ fairness considerations not 
because they are altruistically concerned with fairness, but because they try to 
maximise the chances that their offers will be accepted (for a review of the fairness / 
perceived fairness accounts see Camerer & Thaler 1995; Thaler, 1988).
Within the same motivational perspective, research has recently looked into 
anticipated post-game emotional reactions. Looking at the responder’s side, Pillutla 
and Muminghan (1996) introduced the “wounded spite / pride” model of UG 
behaviour. The model accommodates the existing behavioural observations by 
postulating that positive but small offers are rejected by responders who feel angry 
at the size of the pie that has been allocated to them by the proposer. Pillutla and 
Muminghan’s (1996) experimental findings support the predictions of the model. 
Importantly, the evidence that they obtained reveals experienced anger as a better 
predictor of offer rejection than perceived unfairness of the offer.
Looking at the proposer’s side, Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997; experiments 
2a & 2b) investigated post-game regret considerations. According to their rationale, 
two things can go regrettably wrong for the proposer. The first thing is offering too 
little and, consequently, receiving a rejection. In this case the proposer obviously 
regrets offering too little. The second thing is offering too much; receiving an 
acceptance; but then finding out that the offer that the responder was ready to accept 
was lower than the offer that the proposer actually made. In this case the proposer 
regrets offering too much -  in other words, the excessive offer is construed as a 
foregone gain. Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) rationale for the introduction of the 
latter regret follows research on the “winner’s curse”, where negotiators find out at 
the end of the negotiation that they have paid more than their opponent’s reservation 
price (Thaler, 1994).
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Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) suggested that when making an offer the 
proposer tries to minimise both types of post-game regret that she might experience. 
In order to empirically test this suggestion, Zeelenberg and Beattie assigned all their 
participants the role of the proposer and asked them to make an offer to a responder. 
Before stating their offers, half of the participants were told that at the end of the 
game they would find out the responders’ “minimum acceptable offer” (MAO) -  in 
other words, they could anticipate post-game regret for offering too much. The other 
half of the participants would not receive any information on their responder’s MAO 
-  therefore, for them post-game regret for offering too much was not a possibility. 
Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) reasoning was that participants who knew that they 
would find out the responder’s MAO would anticipate the regret associated with 
making an unnecessary large offer and that this anticipation would lead to smaller 
offers. Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) empirical findings supported this prediction.
Studies 5 and 6: Aims and hypotheses
To summarise, the regret-minimisation strategy that Zeelenberg and Beattie 
(1997) postulated implies that proposers generate an affective self-prediction -  in 
other words, they try to anticipate a future emotional state of theirs. This affective 
prediction subsequently influences their negotiation behaviour. The strategy that 
underlies the negotiation behaviour of proposers who anticipate post-negotiation 
feedback on their opponents’ MAO is to minimise the chances that they regret an 
initial allocation decision that was unnecessary large.
In line with Wilson et al.’s (2000) research on focalism, I propose that the 
observed regret considerations in UG situations can be attributed to focalism. 
Proposers who face the possibility of regretting a too generous allocation decision in 
the future focus narrowly on this potential future regret and adopt a regret-
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minimising strategy. If this is true, then de-focusing participants from the allocation 
decision before they make their offers should attenuate the influence of regret- 
minimisation on participants’ offers. The first aim of studies 5 and 6 was to test for 
this possibility.
The second aim of these studies was to provide a further empirical test of 
focalism. In their empirical tests of focalism and the de-focusing manipulation, 
Wilson et al. (2000) asked participants to predict how they would be feeling after 
the results a football game; after a hypothetical space tragedy; and, finally, after a 
hypothetical successful military operation of US forces in Iraq. The basic difference 
between these tasks and an UG negotiation task is that the latter is more controllable 
than the former. Empirical evidence suggests that task controllability influences the 
intensity of people’s affective reactions to the outcomes of a task. For instance, 
Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, and de Vries (2000) demonstrated that people feel worse 
over an unfortunate outcome when the outcome is more attributable to their own 
behaviours than when the outcome is less attributable to their own behaviours.
Behaviour in an UG is more controllable compared to football games or 
other “external” events, because the outcome of the task (i.e. acceptance or rejection 
of the offer) largely depends on the participant’s initial decision (i.e. the allocation 
decision). Therefore, I used the UG paradigm in order to test for the presence of 
focalism in predictions of post-game affective reactions.
Study 5
I presented participants with a hypothetical UG. All participants were 
allocated the role of the proposer. Then they made an offer to a hypothetical 
responder and they stated their confidence that the offer would be accepted. Half of 
the participants were told that at the end of the game they would find out the
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responder’s MAO; no reference to the responder’s MAO was made to the other half 
of the participants. In addition to the expectation of the MAO information, half of 
the participants completed a diary of events that regularly occur to them in a typical 
day of theirs before making their offers and stating their subjective confidence.
Regarding participants’ game behaviour, I anticipated that participants who 
expected information about the responder’s MAO would make lower offers than 
participants who did not expect such information. Regarding the influence of 
affective forecasts on participants’ game behaviours, I anticipated that the diary 
completion would attenuate the influence of anticipated post-game information 
about the responder’s MAO on participants’ offers. In other words, I anticipated that 
only focused participants would make regret-minimising offers.
Method
Participants: One hundred and forty-five participants volunteered for the study 
(mean age = 18.37 years; SD = 3.00 years; age data missing from three participants; 
one hundred and nineteen females; twenty two males; gender data missing from four 
participants). The majority of participants were recruited during a group laboratory 
demonstration session and were not paid. Others were recruited via notices in 
buildings of the University of London and were paid £4 for their participation (in 
this and other studies).
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Variables and Design: The design was a 2*2 completely between-subjects design, 
with Anticipated Feedback (No-Feedback vs. Feedback) and Diary (No-Diary vs. 
Diary) as independent variables. There were between 32-41 participants in each 
condition. The dependent variables were participants’ offers to the responders and 
participants’ confidence that responders would accept the offers.
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of the booklet, 
participants in both Feedback conditions received the following instructions: ''This 
questionnaire is actually a simulated paper-and-pencil game, with very simple rules. 
Two players participate, one o f them being the “proposer"; the other one being the 
“responder". The proposer is given £10 in cash, and what he/she is asked to do is to 
allocate this money between himself/herself and the responder. Once he/she has 
made up his/her mind, the proposer makes an offer (i.e. he/she decides what amount 
he/she is willing to allocate to the responder)".
Instructions for the “no-feedback” condition went on as follows: ''I f the 
responder agrees with the proposed split, then the two players share the money 
according to the proposed split, and the game is over. I f  the responder does not 
agree with the proposed split, then neither o f the two players gets any money at all, 
and the game is over". Instructions for the “feedback” condition went on as follows: 
''If the responder agrees with the proposed split, then the two players share the 
money according to the proposed split, the game is over, and the responder lets the 
proposer know what is the minimum amount o f  money he/she would have accepted 
anyway. I f  the responder does not agree with the proposed split, then neither o f  the 
two players gets any money at all, the game is over, and the responder lets the
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proposer know what is the minimum amount o f money he/she would have accepted 
anyway".
The last part of the instructions was identical for the two Feedback 
conditions: *'What you are asked to do fo r  this study is to imagine that you are the 
“PROPOSER”, and that you have been given £10 to share between yourself and an 
unknown responder. In the pages that follow, we would like you to say how much 
money you would be willing to allocate to the responder, i f  you were to actually play 
the ultimatum game, and fill in some other relevant scales, as well”.
On the second page of the booklet, participants in the “diary” condition 
received the following instructions: “Now before you make your offer we would like 
you to take some time and describe a typical day o f yours during this term. Describe 
all kinds o f activities in which you are usually involved throughout the day, 
beginning from  what you usually do in the morning and going on till the moment 
you usually go to bed (e.g. eating, having class, being out with friends, sleeping, 
etc.). To help you with this task an hourly diary is provided. Fill in the diary 
following these instructions”. Participants were provided with a 24-hour diary and 
they were asked to fill in the slot that appeared next to each hour of the day. 
Participants in the “no-diary” condition did not perform any filler task.
Finally, all participants went through the last page of the booklet, where they 
had to write down the amount of money (out of the allocated £10) that they were 
willing to offer to the responder. Participants also stated their confidence that their 
offers would be accepted. The confidence item read as follows: “How likely is it that 
the responder would accept your offer?” Participants gave their answers on an 11- 
point percentage scale, anchored at 0% = he/she would definitely reject it and 100% 
= he/she would definitely accept it, through the 50% midpoint = acceptance or 
rejection would be a 50-50 chance.
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Results
Participants’ offers and confidence judgements can be seen in Table 6.1. The 
offers and the confidence judgements were submitted to a 
Feedback*Diary*Judgement mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (No-Feedback vs. 
Feedback) and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as between-subjects factors and 
Judgement (Offer vs. Confidence) as a within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded 
only a main effect of Judgement [F(l, 141) = 1952.18, p  < .001]. This effect was 
anticipated and also it is theoretically uninteresting, since offers and confidence 
were measured on different scales.
Table 6.1. Mean offers (out of £10) and confidence across conditions {SDs in parentheses)
Offers Confidence
No-
Feedback
Feedback
No-
Feedback
Feedback
No-Diary 4.67 (1.10) 4.33 (7.29) 0.72 (0.22) 0.66 (0.24)
Diary 4.53 (1.20) 4.69 (1.00) 0.68 (0.26) 0.70 (0.22)
Discussion
Study 5 failed to replicate the regret effect that Zeelenberg and Beattie 
(1997) demonstrated. However, closer inspection of their findings reveals that, 
whereas anticipated feedback influenced offers, it actually failed to influence 
participants’ anticipated regret if they made a too low offer or participants’ 
anticipated regret if they made a too high offer (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997; pp. 70- 
71). Therefore, it appears that their attribution of the observed influence of 
anticipated feedback on offers to people’s post-game regret considerations was not
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empirically warranted. I am not arguing that anticipated regret does not influence 
UG bargaining behaviour. However, anticipation of feedback on the responder’s 
MAO may not be enough to trigger these regret effects. In addition, since in Study 5 
a hypothetical UG was used, the possibility that participants’ low involvement with 
the experimental task contributed towards the null result cannot be excluded.
Since regret effects could not be inferred from participants’ self-reported 
allocation intentions, it follows that Study 5 also failed to provide an empirical test 
for the presence of focalism in UG bargaining. In order to resolve these 
inconsistencies. Study 6 was designed to replicate this investigation in a real UG 
situation. In Study 6, I also took direct measures of participants’ predicted and 
experienced post-game affective reactions, including regret.
Study 6
Participants were presented with two sequential UGs. All participants were 
allocated the role of the proposer. Then they made an offer to a responder (in reality, 
the experimenter) and they stated their confidence that the offer would be accepted. 
Half of the participants were told that at the end of the game they would find out the 
responder’s MAO; no reference to the responder’s MAO was made to the other half 
of the participants. In addition to the expectation of the MAO information, all 
participants were de-focused before playing the second game. Participants played 
both games first and then they found out the outcomes (all offers were actually 
rejected).
Participants were also asked to predict their post-game affective reactions 
upon receiving the outcomes of the games. As soon as both games were over, 
participants were asked to record their experienced affective reactions after
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receiving the outcomes. Finally, participants were contacted a few days later and 
they were asked to record their post-game affective reactions again.
Regarding participants’ game behaviour, I anticipated that participants who 
expected information about the responder’s MAO would make lower offers than 
participants who did not expect such information. Regarding the influence of 
affective forecasts on participants’ game behaviours, I anticipated that diary 
completion would attenuate the influence of anticipated post-game information 
about the responder’s MAO on participants’ offers. In other words, I anticipated that 
only focused participants would make regret-minimising offers. Finally, regarding 
participants’ affective self-predictions, I anticipated that de-focused participants’ 
forecasts would be more accurate than focused participants’ forecasts.
Method
Participants: Forty-seven participants volunteered for the study (mean age = 23.68 
years; SD = 4.80 years; twenty-eight females). Participants were paid £5 for their 
participation (in this and other studies).
Variables and Design: The design was a 2*2 mixed factorial design, with 
Anticipated Feedback (No-Feedback vs. Feedback) as a between-subjects factor and 
Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as a within-subjects factor. There were 23-24 
participants in each condition.
Regarding the dependent variables of the experiment, for each game 
participants made an offer to the responder and they also stated their confidence that 
their offers would be accepted. Participants also predicted their post-game 
immediate and delayed emotional reactions if their offers were accepted and if their 
offers were rejected after each game. Participants used the PANAS (Watson et al.,
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1988) and the “decision-related affect” items that were introduced in Study 1 to 
record these predictions. Participants also recorded their confidence that the 
experienced emotional state would match the predicted one.
Once both games were over and participants knew the outcomes, they 
reported their experienced emotional reactions (PA; NA; and decision-related 
affect). Finally, a few days later, participants reported their emotional reactions once 
again.
Materials and Procedure'. All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. In the first stage of the 
experiment, participants in the “no-feedback” condition received the following 
instructions: ‘T/iw section o f the questionnaire is actually a paper-and-pencil game. 
The game is very simple: You are playing with another participant o f this study, 
whom you are not supposed to meet at any part o f the game. You have been 
assigned the role o f the proposer"; the other participant has similarly been 
assigned the role o f the “responder". The proposer is given by the researcher £10 
in cash, and what he/she is asked to do is to allocate this money between him/herself 
and the responder. Once he/she has made up his/her mind, the proposer writes 
down in the “AMOUNTPROPOSED" space on the questionnaire sheet the amount 
he/she is willing to allocate to the responder. Right after that, the researcher takes 
this sheet to the responder, who is waiting in another room. I f  the responder agrees 
with the proposed split, then he/she ticks the “I  ACCEPT" option on that same 
sheet. The researcher gets back to the proposer, informs him/her on the outcome o f  
the offer, gives him/her the agreed money, does the same with the responder, and 
the game is over. I f  the responder does not agree with the proposed split, then 
he/she ticks the “I DON’T ACCEPT" option on that same sheet. The researcher gets
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back to the proposer, informs him/her on the outcome o f the offer, none o f the two 
players gets any money at all, and the game is over".
The instructions for the “feedback” condition were identical regarding the 
description of the game. However, in addition to the acceptance, or rejection of their 
offers by the responder, participants were also told: '"Whether the responder accepts 
or rejects the offer, he/she also writes down the amount fo r  which he/she would have 
accepted the offer anyway in the “MINIMUM/AMOUNTACCEPTED” space on the 
questionnaire sheet. The researcher gets back to the proposer, informs him/her on 
the outcome o f the offer and the minimum amount that would have been accepted by 
the responder, and the game is over".
Participants were then asked to write down the amount of money (out of the 
allocated £10) that they were willing to offer to the responder and to state their 
confidence that their offers would be accepted. The confidence item read as follows: 
“How likely is it that the responder accepts your offer?" Participants gave their 
answers on an 11-point percentage scale, anchored at 0% = he/she will definitely 
reject it and 100% = he/she will definitely accept it, through the 50% midpoint = 
acceptance or rejection is a 50-50 chance.
In the second stage of the experiment, participants were asked to predict how 
they thought they would be feeling immediately after the game and a couple of days 
later. Since at this stage participants did not know the outcomes of their offers, they 
predicted their emotional reactions for both outcome possibilities (i.e. acceptance 
and rejection of their offers). The instructions were a modified version of the 
PANAS instructions (Watson et al., 1988; p. 1070) and read as follows: “The list 
that follows consists o f a number o f words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer to the space next to 
that w o rd \  Participants were provided with two time perspectives and two outcome
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contingencies. Instructions for each of these combinations read as follows: "[...] 
immediately after finding out that your offer is accepted"' (“immediate acceptance”); 
“/’...y immediately after finding out that your offer is rejected" (“immediate 
rejection”); “[...] a week after finding out that your offer is accepted" (“delayed 
acceptance”); and ‘Y ..J  a week after finding out that your offer is rejected" 
(“delayed rejection”).
In the third stage of the experiment, participants completed some unrelated 
personality measures. In the fourth stage of the experiment, participants received the 
same UG instructions and all dependent measures again. This time, before 
participants made their offers, stated their confidence, predicted their emotional 
reactions, and stated their confidence in their affective forecasts, they received the 
following instructions: '"Now before you make your offer we would like you to take 
some time and describe a typical day o f yours during this term. Describe all kinds o f  
activities in which you are usually involved throughout the day, beginning from  
what you usually do in the morning and going on till the moment you usually go to 
bed (e.g. eating, having class, being out with friends, sleeping, etc.). To help you 
with this task an hourly diary is provided. Fill in the diary following these 
instructions"". Participants were provided with a 24-hour diary and they had to fill in 
the slot that appeared next to each hour of the day. In addition to this diary, 
participants were asked to complete a second 24-hour diary that referred specifically 
to the day of the experiment.
In the fifth stage of the experiment, participants received the outcomes of the 
two games. The outcomes were manipulated, so that all participants were told that 
their offers were rejected*. “No-feedback” participants were simply told that their
* It has been suggested that people dread post-decisional regret and disappointment (i.e. negative 
emotions) more than they savour post-decisional rejoicing and elation (i.e. positive emotions; e.g. 
Ritov & Baron, 1995). This is in line with the primary focus of anticipated affect theories on negative
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offers had been rejected; “feedback” participants were told that their offers had been 
rejected and they were also given a MAO that the responder would have accepted. 
The MAO that was communicated to all participants exceeded their offers by £1. 
After receiving this information, participants recorded their emotional reactions to 
the rejection of their offers (PANAS and decision-related affect items).
The sixth stage of the experiment was arranged approximately a week later. 
Participants came back in the laboratory and reported their emotional reactions 
(PANAS and decision-related affect items) to the rejections of their offers. 
Participants were also given the opportunity to compare their experienced with their 
predicted affective judgements. The comparison item read as follows: “To what 
extent do you think that your emotional state now matches the emotional state you 
initially predicted (i.e. at the first session o f this study)?'' Participants gave their 
answers on an 11-point scale, anchored at -5  = my emotional state now is less 
intense than I predicted and +5 = my emotional state now is more intense than I 
predicted, through the 0 midpoint = my emotional state now matches perfectly what 
I predicted.
Results
1. Anticipated emotions and UG behaviour
Participants’ offers and confidence judgements can be seen in Table 6.2. The 
offers and the confidence judgements were submitted to a 
Feedback*Diary*Judgement mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (No-Feedback vs. 
Feedback) as a between-subjects factor and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) and 
Judgement (Offer vs. Confidence) as within-subjects factors. The analysis yielded
emotions rather than on positive ones and also with the concept of loss aversion. The assumption that 
people are more motivated to to avoid painful experiences than to pursue positive ones provided the 
rationale for rejecting all the offers in this experiment.
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only a main effect of Judgement [F (l, 45) = 1550.01, p  < .001]. This effect was 
anticipated and also it is theoretically uninteresting, since offers and confidence 
were measured on different scales.
Next, I used hierarchical regression modelling in order to predict offers in 
the two games on the basis of anticipated affective reactions to the outcomes of the 
games and confidence scores. The 10 positive items and the 10 negative items of the 
PANAS were separately summed in order to obtain the overall PA and NA scores, 
respectively. Across the eight predictive judgements (“immediate acceptance” ; 
“immediate rejection”; “delayed acceptance”; and “delayed rejection” across two 
diary conditions) the PA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .89, with 
Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .81 to .93. The NA scale had a 
mean inter-item reliability of .90, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients 
ranging from .83 to .98.
Table 6.2. Mean offers (out of £10) and confidence as a function of Feedback and Diary (5Ds in
parentheses)
Offers Confidence
No-
Feedback
Feedback
No-
Feedback
Feedback
No-Diary 4.67 (0.92) 4.85 (0.51) 0.65 (0.17) 0.77 (0.13)
Diary 4.63 (0.77) 4.61(1.16) 0.59 (0.16) 0.75 (0.14)
For both the “no-diary” and the “diary” game I built two-stage models, with 
confidence entering in the first stage and anticipated emotional reactions entering in 
the second stage. All four affective predictions (i.e. “immediate acceptance”; 
“immediate rejection” ; “delayed acceptance”; and “delayed rejection”) of PA, NA,
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and decision-related affect were included simultaneously in the second stage 
regression models.
As can be seen in Table 6.3, the inclusion of post-game affective 
anticipations improved accuracy of prediction of the offers for the “no-diary” game, 
but not for the “diary” game. For the “no-diary” game, more disappointment, less 
PA, and less elation after a possible rejection led participants to make higher offers. 
In other words, the worse participants thought that they would feel after receiving a 
rejection, the more they tried to avoid it by making higher offers.
Table 6.3, Regression modelling of offers as a function of confidence and anticipated post-game
emotions
Offers
stage
model
(confidence)
Predictors
(b-weights)*
2“** stage 
model 
(confidence & 
anticipated 
emotions)
Predictors
(b-weights)*
Gain in 
accuracy
No-Diary
UG
R" = .14; 
F (l,4 6 ) = 
7.23, p  = 
.010
Confidence (.37)
= .76; F(25, 
21) = 2.65, p = 
.013
Rejoic.-DR(1.12)** 
PA-IR (.86) 
Disappoin.-DR (.63) 
Confidence (.51) 
PA-DR (-.85) 
NA-IR (-.63) 
Elation-IR (-.53) 
Regret-IA (-.38)
R^= .62; 
F(24,21) =
2.26, p =
.032
Diary UG
R^=.22;
F (l,4 5 ) = 
12.46, p = 
.001
Confidence (.47)
= .63; F(25, 
21) = 1.41, p = 
.213
F  ^= .41; 
F (24 ,21 )=  
.96, p = .539
*A11 predictors significant at p < .05; ** Abbreviations: IR: immediate rejection; lA: immediate 
acceptance; DR; delayed rejection; DA; delayed acceptance
At the same time, however, more rejoicing, more PA, and less NA after a 
possible rejection and also less regret after a possible acceptance also led 
participants to make higher offers. In other words, the better participants thought 
that they would feel after receiving a rejection and the worse they thought they 
would feel after receiving an acceptance, the more they tried to avoid rejection by
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making higher offers. I come back to this pattern of contradictory findings in the 
Discussion. However, the most important feature of the results presented in Table 
6.3 is that emotions predicted UG offers in the no-diary condition but not in the 
diary condition.
2. Predicted and experienced positive and negative affect (PANAS)
Across the four experienced judgements (“immediate rejection”; and 
“delayed rejection” across two diary conditions) the PA scale had a mean inter-item 
reliability of .92, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .90 to 
.95. The NA scale had a mean inter-tem reliability of .78, with Cronbach Alpha 
reliability coefficients ranging from .70 to .82.
Since all participants were told that their offers were rejected, in the analyses 
of emotional reactions I included only predictions about immediate and delayed 
affect contingent on rejection of the offers. Participants’ predicted and experienced 
emotional reactions to the outcomes of the two games were submitted to an 
Affect*Time*Judgement*Diary*Feedback mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (No- 
Feedback vs. Feedback) as a between-subjects factor and Affect (PA vs. NA), Time 
(Immediate vs. Delayed), Judgement (Prediction vs. Experience), and Diary (No- 
Diary vs. Diary) as within-subjects factors.
The analysis yielded three main effects (Affect; Time; and Diary), four two- 
way interactions (Judgement*Feedback; Time*Affect; Judgement*Affect; and 
Judgement*Diary), and, to qualify some of the other effects, it also yielded a 
Judgement*Time*Feedback interaction. Conceptually, these effects can be grouped 
as follows^:
 ^It should be noted here that the proposed grouping is conceptual in the sense that it does not follow 
the rigid rationale of the underlying statistical analyses. For instance. Diary and Judgement effects 
also interact. However, I have chosen to present these effects under separate headings, in order to
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1. Effects that involve “Judgement”: They address the question of accuracy of 
affective judgements.
2. Effects that involve “Diary”: They address the question of de-focusing.
3. Effects that involve “Affect”: They address the differences between PA and 
NA.
In order to make the analysis easier to follow, I have analysed the interactions 
reported above on the basis of the above conceptualisation.
2.7. Accuracy o f affective judgements: Effects that involve ''Judgement"
I split the Judgement*Time*Feedback interaction [F (l, 42) = 5.68, p  = .022] 
into two Judgement*Time ANOVAs -  one for “feedback” participants and one for 
“no-feedback” participants. Results for both Feedback conditions can be seen in 
Table 6.4.
Table 6.4. Mean PA and NA as a function of Feedback, Judgement, and Time (5Ds in parentheses)
Immediate
Delayed
No Feedback Feedback
Prediction Experience Prediction Experience
16.90 (4.29)
14.07 (4.55)
15.26 (433)
14.55(4.99)
15.12(2.85)
12.92 (2.84)
16.33 (4.23)
13.81 (3.87)
For “feedback” participants, the analysis revealed only a main effect of Time 
[F (l, 20) = 34.54, p  < .001], such that immediate affective judgements were higher 
than delayed.
For “no-feedback” participants the analysis revealed a main effect of Time 
[F (l, 22) = 10.19, p  = .004] and a main effect of Judgement [F (l, 22) = 8.56, p  =
highlight their relevance to the hypotheses under empirical test. Certainly other groupings of these 
results could also be suggested. These comments also apply to Section 3.
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.008], both of which were qualified by the Time*Judgement interaction [F (l, 22) = 
6.88, p  = .016]. Whereas “no-feedback” participants overpredicted their immediate 
affective reactions [r(23) = 3.11, p  = .005], no evidence of misprediction was 
obtained for their delayed affective reactions [t{22) = -1.08, p  = .292].
2.2. De-focusing: Effects that involve Diary”
Moving on to the Judgement*Diary interaction, [F (l, 42) = 8.65, p  = .005], 
whereas participants predicted more intense affective reactions when they were 
focused than when they were de-focused [f(46) = 4.02, p  < .001], their experienced 
affective reactions did not differ as a function of the de-focusing [r(43) = .75, p  = 
.459]. These results can be seen in Table 6.5. and they demonstrate that the effect of 
diary completion is a reduction in the affective forecasts, rather than an influence in 
the affective experiences.
Table 6.5. Mean PA and NA as a function of Judgement and Diary (SDs in parentheses)
Predictions Experiences
No-Diary 15.12 fi.5^) 14.93 ('4.05)
Diary 14.45 (3.75) 15.04 {4.01)
2.3. PA V.S. NA: Effects that involve "Affect”
Finally, decomposing of the Judgement*Affect interaction, [F(l, 42) = 
10.28, p  = .003] revealed that, whereas participants overpredicted their NA [r(43) = - 
2.11, p = .041], they underpredicted their corresponding PA [r(43) = 3.91, p < .001]. 
These results can be seen in Table 6.6.
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Table 6.6. Mean PA and NA as a function of Judgement (SDs in parentheses)
Predictions Experiences
PA 15.01(5.14) 16.56(6.32)
NA 14.50(4.53) 13.40(3.68)
Analysis of the weaker Time*Affect interaction [F (l, 42) = 3.81, p = .058] 
revealed that, whereas participants reported equal levels of PA and NA immediately 
after the task [?(46) = 1.38, p  = .175], they reported higher levels of PA than NA 
later on [f(43) = -3.11, p  = .003]. These results can be seen in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7. Mean PA and NA as a function of Time (5Ds in parentheses)
Immediate Delayed
PA 16.70 f5.57) 15.14 (5.67)
NA 15.29(4.55) 12.5% (3.68)
3. Predicted and experienced decision-related affect
As was the case with the PANAS scores, participants’ predicted and 
experienced decision-related affect was submitted to an 
Affect *Time * Judgement *Di ary *Feedback mixed ANOVA, with Feedback (No- 
Feedback vs. Feedback) as a between-subjects factor and Affect (Regret vs. 
Disappointment vs. Rejoicing vs. Elation), Time (Immediate vs. Delayed), 
Judgement (Prediction vs. Experience), and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as within- 
subjects factors.
The analysis yielded three main effects (Affect; Time; and Diary), six two- 
way interactions (Judgement*Feedback; Judgement*Time; Judgement*Affect; 
Judgement*Diary; Time*Diary; and Time*Affect), three three-way interactions
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(Judgement*Diary*Feedback; Time*Judgement*Affect; and Time*Diary*Affect), 
and, to qualify some of the other effects, the analysis also yielded a 
Judgement*Diary*Affect*Feedback interaction. In what follows, I have analysed 
these interactions according to the conceptualisation that I introduced for the PA and 
NA indices. It should be noted, however, that the observed interaction between 
Judgement and Diary brings the questions of accuracy and de-focusing into a single 
analysis.
3.1. Accuracy o f affective judgements and de-focusing: Effects that involve 
Judgement” and “Diary"
I split the Judgement*Diary*Affect*Feedback interaction [F(2.31, 96.98) = 
4.14, p  = .014] in two Judgement*Diary*Affect ANOVAs -  one for “feedback” 
participants and one for “no-feedback” participants.
For “feedback” participants the analysis only revealed a main effect of 
Affect [F(1.33, 26.54) = 26.68,/? < .001], such that participants reported more regret 
and disappointment than rejoicing and elation. For “no-feedback” participants, the 
analysis revealed three main effects (Judgement; Diary; and Affect), two two-way 
interactions (Judgement*Diary; and Judgement*Affect), and, to qualify all these 
effects, the analysis also revealed a Judgement*Diary*Affect interaction [F(2.36, 
51.96) = 4.42, p  = .013]. 1 split this interaction into four Judgement*Diary ANOVAs 
-  one for each emotion. These results can be seen in Table 6.8.
For regret, the analysis revealed only a Judgement*Diary interaction [F(l, 
22) = 5.74, p = .025]. Whereas participants overpredicted their regret when they 
were focused on the game [t{22) = 2.04, p  = .054], no evidence of misprediction of 
regret was obtained when participants were de-focused from the game [t(22) = .46, p  
= .650].
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For disappointment, the analysis revealed a main effect of Judgement [F (l, 
22) = 8.02, p  = .010], such that participants generally overpredicted their 
disappointment. However, this effect was qualified by the Judgement*Diary 
interaction [F(l, 22) = 9.10, p  = .006]. Whereas participants overpredicted their 
disappointment when they were focused on the game [r(22) = 3.95, p  = .001], no 
evidence of misprediction of disappointment was obtained when participants were 
de-focused from the game [r(22) = .79, p = .437]. So, for negative decision-related 
affect, effects were as predicted.
For rejoicing and elation, the analysis failed to reveal any effects.
Table 6.8. Mean decision-related affect as a function of Judgement and Diary (SDs in parentheses)
Regret
Disappointment
Rejoicing
Elation
Predictions Experiences
No-Diary 2.04 (1.08) 1.54 (0.69)
Diary 1.74 (0.95) 1.67 (0.73)
No-Diary 3.09(0.72) 2.30 (0.77)
Diary 2.52 (0.86) 2.37 (0.88)
No-Diary 1.33 (0.82) 1.28 (0.56)
Diary 1.24(0.54) 1.26(0.56)
No-Diary 1.25 (0.59) 1.23 (0.52)
Diary 1.21 (0.58) 1.19(0.51)
3.2. More effects that involve “Diary”
I split the Time*Diary*Affect interaction [F(2.61, 109.54) = 5.32, p  = .003] 
into four Time*Diary ANOVAs -  one for each emotion. These results can be seen 
in Table 6.9,
For regret, the analysis revealed a main effect of Time [F (l, 43) = 6.93, p  = 
.012], such that participants reported more regret immediately after the games than
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later on. This effect was qualified by the weak Time*Diary interaction [F(I, 43) = 
3.67, p  = .062]. Whereas participants reported more immediate than delayed regret 
when they were focused on the game [f(43) = 3.01, p  = .004], they reported equal 
immediate and delayed regret when they were de-focused from the game [t(43) = 
1.55, p  = .129].
For disappointment, the analysis revealed a main effect of Time [F (l, 43) = 
90.56, p < .001], such that participants reported more disappointment immediately 
after the games than later on. The analysis also revealed a main effect of Diary [F(l, 
43) = 5.49, p  = .024], such that participants reported more disappointment when 
they were focused on the games than when they were de-focused form the games. 
However, both effects were qualified by the Time*Diary interaction [F(l, 43) = 
15.50, p  < .001]. Participants reported more immediate disappointment when they 
were focused on the game than when they were de-focused from it [r(46) = 3.56, p  = 
.001]. De-focusing did not have any effect on judgements of delayed disappointment 
[f(43) = 76, p  = .452].
For rejoicing and elation, the analysis failed to reveal any effects.
Table 6.9. Mean decision-related affect as a function of Time and Diary {SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary
Immediate
2.07 (0,99)
Delayed
1.76 (0,68)
Regret
Diary 1.93 (1.06) 1.80 (0,86)
No-Diary 3.23 (0,91) 2.06 (0,78)
Disappointment
Diary 2.86 (1,04) 1.99 (0,75)
No-Diary 1,19(0,49) 1.24 (0,60)
Rejoicing
Diary 1,11(0,46) 1.22 (0,55)
No-Diary 1.20 (0,50) 1,19(0,50)
Elation
Diary 1.18(0.52) 1,16(0.43)
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3.3. Regret vs. Disappointment vs. Rejoicing vs. Elation: Effects that involve
Finally, I split the weak Time*Judgement*Affect interaction [F(2.23, 93.68) 
= 2.62, p  = .072] into four Time*Judgement ANOVAs -  one for each emotion. 
These results can be seen in Table 6.10.
For regret, the analysis revealed a main effect of Time; this effect has been 
described above. This effect was qualified by the Time*Judgement interaction [F (l, 
43) = 6.50, p  -  .014]. Whereas participants overpredicted their immediate regret 
[/(46) = 2.39, p  = .021], no evidence of misprediction of delayed regret was obtained 
[r(43) = -.28, p  = .llS ].
Table 6.10. Mean decision-related affect as a function of Judgement and Time {SDs in parentheses)
Predictions
Immediate
2.19(1.11)
Delayed
1.76 (0.74)
Regret
Experiences 1.81 (1.16) 1.80 (0.92)
Predictions 3.24 (0.96) 2.11(0.83)
Disappointment
Experiences 2.85 (1.05) 1.93 (0.85)
Predictions 1.14 (0.39) 1.19(0.59)
Rejoicing
Experiences 1.23 (0.60) 1.26 (0.62)
Predictions 1.16(0.46) 1.14(0.48)
Elation
Experiences 1.22 (0.56) 1.21(0.52)
For disappointment, the analysis revealed a main effect of Time; this effect 
has also been described above. The analysis also revealed a main effect of 
Judgement [F(l, 43) = 6.55, p = .014], such that participants generally overpredicted 
their disappointment.
For rejoicing and elation, the analysis failed to reveal any effects.
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4. Post-game emotional experiences
In order to further investigate the determinants of participants’ post-game 
experienced affect, I first multiplied participants’ offers by their corresponding 
confidence judgements that the offers would be accepted. I used these “weighted 
offers” (i.e. rather than the initial unweighted offers) in the analyses of experienced 
affective reactions. My rationale for doing this was that people’s affective reactions 
to behavioural outcomes have been shown to depend on a.) the objective quality of 
the outcomes and b.) people’s prior expectations regarding the likelihood of 
occurrence of possible outcomes. For instance, people who are holding high 
expectations regarding an upcoming outcome are more disappointed when they 
realise that the outcome falls below their initial expectations than people who are 
not holding any expectations at all (e.g. Klaaren, Hodges, & Wilson, 1994; for a 
review, see Wilson & Klaaren, 1992).
Applying this rationale to the UG behaviour under investigation, 1 reasoned 
that the more confident participants were about their offers, the worse they would 
feel as soon as they received the rejections. For instance, a rejection of a £4-offer 
should be more aversive for someone who was 80% confident that the offer would 
be accepted (weighted offer: £3.20) than for someone who was 60% confident that 
the offer would be accepted (weighted offer: £2.40).
1 calculated correlations between participants’ weighted offers and their 
immediate and delayed affective experiences. For the “no-diary” game, higher 
weighted offers were associated with lower delayed PA (Pearson r = -.30, p  = .048) 
and lower delayed rejoicing (Pearson r = -.29, p  = .053). For the “diary” game, 
higher weighted offers were associated with lower delayed regret (Pearson r = -.39, 
p  = .009). 1 shall come back to this apparent shift in the influence of weighted offers 
on affective experiences in the Discussion.
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5. Post-game comparisons o f affective predictions
Participants had the opportunity to compare their pre-game emotional 
anticipations to their post-game emotional experiences with the following item: ‘To 
what extent do you think that your emotional state now matches the one you 
predicted?'" Participants responded on a -5 (experienced less intense than predicted) 
to 4-5 (experienced more intense than predicted) scale. The mean response was -.86. 
This value is significantly lower than zero [r(43) = -3.44, p  < .001], thereby 
indicating that participants experienced less intense emotions than their predictions.
Affective comparisons did not vary as a function of Feedback [/(37.49) = - 
.95, p  = .349]. Moreover, correlations between comparisons, weighted offers, and 
confidence in affective predictions were neither significant, nor sizeable (all Pearson 
rs < .23). Finally, since participants overall overpredicted their post-game affective 
reactions and the mean comparison was downward, it appears that the comparisons 
were in the correct direction. This finding can be taken to indicate that participants 
had some insight into their affective experience. However, when I divided 
participants in those whose comparisons were appropriate (i.e. negative value; n = 
26) and those whose comparisons were not (i.e. positive value or zero; n = IS), a 
chi-square failed to reveal any reliable difference between the number of 
participants in the two groups \ ^ { l )  = 1.46, p  = .228]. In other words, I did not 
obtain any reliable evidence that participants’ affective comparisons were more 
likely to be appropriate than inappropriate.
Discussion
Study 6 was designed to test the following three hypotheses:
Hypothesis a.) Participants who expected information on the responder’s MAO 
would make lower offers than participants who did not expect such information.
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Hypothesis b.) Diary completion would make participants’ affective forecasts more 
accurate.
Hypothesis c.) Diary completion would attenuate the influence of anticipated post­
game information on the responder’s MAO on participants’ offers.
In what follows, first, I discuss the findings of Study 6 that are related to each one of 
the above hypotheses. Second, I elaborate on the determinants of participants’ 
emotional experiences.
Hypothesis a: Anticipated emotions and game behaviour
Study 6 showed that anticipated post-game emotions influence people’s 
negotiation behaviours. However, the pattern of findings that emerged from Study 6 
was more complicated than anticipated. On the one hand, participants made higher 
offers when they associated higher levels of disappointment and lower levels of 
positive affect with a rejected offer. The emerging factor here appears to be 
avoidance of painful rejections. This motivation reflects Zeelenberg and Beattie’s
(1997) idea that people in the UG situation try to minimise their regrets about 
offering too little (and having their offers rejected because of this). Moreover, 
participants made lower offers when they associated higher levels of regret with an 
accepted offer. The emerging factor here appears to be avoidance of painful 
acceptances. This motivation reflects Zeelenberg and Beattie’s (1997) idea that 
when people in the UG situation try to minimise their regrets about offering too 
much.
On the other hand, participants made higher offers when they associated 
higher levels of rejoicing and positive affect and lower levels of negative affect and 
elation with a rejected offer. At first glance, it is rather hard to discern participants’ 
considerations here -  actually, these findings seem to directly contradict what 1 have
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said so far. However, a recent development in the theoretical conceptualisation of 
post-decisional emotions could provide an account of such considerations.
The characterisation of a negotiation decision (or of any decision) as “good” 
or “bad” or “regrettable” involves a judgement about two different aspects of the 
decision: The decision outcome and the decision process. In other words, both good 
outcomes and regrettable outcomes can stem from conscious and effortful 
deliberation or from pure luck. Schematically then, the following four possibilities 
are open:
a. Good process good outcome
b. Good process -> regrettable outcome
c. Regrettable process good outcome
d. Regrettable process -> regrettable outcome
Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) recently accommodated these possibilities within 
Decision Justification Theory (DJT; see also Connolly & Reb, 2003; Inman & 
Zeelenberg, 2002; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 2003). DJT explicitly discriminates 
between “outcome regret” and “decision regret”. The former regret stems from 
unfortunate outcomes, which did not necessarily result from bad decisions. The 
latter regret stems from bad decisions, which did not necessarily result in 
unfortunate outcomes.
I suggest, therefore, that participants who associated higher levels of 
rejoicing and positive affect and lower levels of negative affect and elation with a 
rejected offer reported their negotiation behaviour-related emotions, rather than their 
negotiation outcome-related emotions. At this stage and without additional empirical 
results this explanation cannot be but tentative. However, Wright, Ayton, and 
Djemal’s (2003) recent finding that people tend to infer the quality of a decision
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process by the quality of the outcomes of that process provide some indirect 
empirical support for this argument.
Hypotheses b and c: Focalism, the accuracy o f affective anticipations, and their 
influence on game behaviour
Whereas participants who were narrowly focused on the allocation decision 
generally overpredicted their post-game affective reactions, de-focused participants’ 
affective predictions were in line with their post-game affective experiences. This 
finding, on the one hand, replicates Wilson et al.’s (2000) findings regarding the 
presence of focalism in prospective judgements of affect and, on the other hand, it 
extends Wilson et al.’s (2000) documentation of focalism to a controllable situation.
Not only were affective anticipations more accurate when participants were 
de-focused from the allocation decision, they also had less influence on participants’ 
game behaviour. When participants were de-focused from the allocation decision, 
the influence of the emotional considerations on their offers was eliminated. The 
only predictor of participants’ game behaviour was their subjective confidence that 
their offers would be accepted. This finding reflects people’s motivation to 
maximise their chances of making some profit out of the negotiation. Moreover, the 
motivation to maximise profit was present even when the affective anticipations 
were salient (i.e. when participants were focused on the allocation decision).
At a more conceptual level, the moderating influence of the de-focusing 
manipulation on affective predictions seems to be the route via which de-focusing 
makes game behaviour relatively “immune” to anticipated post-game emotions. 
Schematically, the de-focusing from the allocation decision leads participants to 
construe the emotional impact of the game as more moderate than they would have
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construed it had they been focused on the game. Once the affective anticipations 
have been attenuated, they lose their influence on people’s negotiation behaviours.
Surprise effects and participants ’ emotional experiences
Surprise effects were present in participants’ experienced emotional 
reactions. Regarding focused participants’ emotions, those of them who were more 
confident that their offers would be accepted experienced less positive affect and 
less rejoicing when they found out that their offers had actually been rejected than 
participants who held lower expectations. This finding provides further empirical 
evidence for the assumption of DT and DAT -  SEP that people feel better or worse 
when they receive the outcomes of their decisions depending on the level of their 
pre-decisional expectations about these outcomes.
Regarding de-focused participants’ emotions, those of them who were more 
confident that their offers would be accepted experienced less regret when they 
found out that their offers had actually been rejected than participants who held 
lower expectations. The “behaviour-related emotions” versus “outcomes-related 
emotions” distinction that I introduced earlier seems to be applicable to this finding 
too. Participants who were more confident that they made a reasonable offer to the 
responder (i.e. an offer that they judged more likely to be accepted than to be 
rejected) had fewer regrets after receiving a rejection than participants who were 
less confident that they made a reasonable offer.
I take the fact that this shift from “outcomes-related emotions” to 
“behaviour-related emotions” was brought about by the de-focusing manipulation as 
indirect evidence for the relevance of the DJT for the findings. In agreement with 
the essence of de-focusing, de-focused negotiators appear to see beyond the 
immediate impact of negative negotiation outcomes. What determines their post­
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negotiation pleasure is the quality of their negotiation behaviour -  which does not 
fully determine negotiation outcomes. As was the case with the DJT conjectures in 
relation to the influence of anticipated emotions on game behaviour, this explanation 
remains tentative until direct further empirical tests are undertaken.
Finally, regarding people’s self-insight into their affective experiences the 
findings of Study 6 were mixed. On the one hand, participants generally viewed 
their affective predictions too intense, as they should have done, since they 
overpredicted their post-game affective reactions. On the other hand, closer analysis 
of individual participants’ responses revealed that they were not more likely to make 
the appropriate comparison than an inappropriate one.
General Discussion
Overall, the research reported in this chapter provides empirical evidence for 
the presence of focalism in negotiation decisions. Specifically, whereas participants 
were heavily influenced by their post-negotiation affective anticipations when they 
were focused on the outcomes of the negotiation, they were less influenced by these 
anticipations when they saw the outcomes of the negotiation in a broader, real-life 
frame (Study 6). Moreover, de-focused participants’ predictions of post-negotiation 
affect were more accurate than the corresponding predictions of focused participants 
(Study 6). Taken together, these findings seem to suggest that affective forecasts, in 
general, are influential precisely because they are exaggerated.
Moreover, neither the anticipation of post-negotiation feedback, nor the de- 
focusing manipulation had a direct effect on participants’ observed negotiation 
behaviour (Study 5; Study 6). It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that, 
whereas affective anticipations (when they are overpredictions) are instrumental in 
shaping people’s negotiation behaviour, the anticipation of post-negotiation
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feedback on the responder’s intended behaviour and the de-focusing manipulation 
do not influence behaviour directly, but only through their influence on affective 
anticipations.
Finally, regarding participants’ experienced affective reactions, this research 
provides evidence that they are susceptible to surprise effects. Failures that were 
more unexpected were more aversive than those that were less unexpected (Study 
6).
This research also documented some effects that were not anticipated. 
Participants associated reasonable negotiation behaviours with higher levels of post­
negotiation pleasure, even after a possible failure of the negotiation (Study 6). In 
addition, participants were actually happier when negotiation failures came after 
more reasonable behaviours than when they came after less reasonable behaviours 
(Study 6). I tentatively interpret these findings according to the model of dual 
affective evaluations that DJT suggests. People associate reasonable (i.e. good or 
otherwise justifiable) behaviours with more post-behaviour pleasure and 
unreasonable (i.e. bad or otherwise unjustifiable) behaviours with more post­
behaviour pain -  independently of the quality of the behavioural outcomes per se.
Taken together with the shift in focus from outcome-related emotions to 
behaviour-related emotions that was observed for de-focused participants (Study 6), 
these findings point towards a possibility of integrating DJT and the focalism 
mechanism. The hypothesis is the following: In situations where the perceived 
behavioural control is high, people who are narrowly focused on a decision are 
mostly influenced by their anticipated affective reactions to the decision outcomes, 
whereas people who adopt a wider frame of reference for the decision in question 
are mostly influenced by their anticipated affective reactions to the decision process. 
This hypothesis contrasts the temporary character of outcomes with the more
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permanent character of decision processes and sees decision-makers as adopting one 
of two strategies: Either focusing on the “next day” of a particular decision (when 
outcomes become known and profits, regrets, etc. materialise) or focusing on the 
“next similar decision” (when a decision situation arises that demands a decision 
process that has been judged effective in the past irrespectively of its interaction 
with external contingencies that determined the outcomes). This hypothesis remains 
to be empirically tested.
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CHAPTER
7
Anticipated post-decisional emotional reactions in 
a naturalistic setting:
An instance of focalism?
The accuracy of affective self-forecasts
Empirical research has documented evidence that people are inaccurate 
when they predict their future emotions. For instance, Mitchell et al. (1997) found 
that people overpredict how happy they will be during a vacation or when they go 
on a trip. Sieff et al. (1999) found that people overpredict how distressed they will 
be if they receive positive HIV tests results or how relieved they will be if they 
receive negative HTV test results. Metiers (2000) showed that people overpredict 
how distressed they will be if they receive (undesirable) positive results at a 
pregnancy test or negative feedback for their progress on a dieting programme or, 
conversely, how happy they will be if they receive negative results at the pregnancy 
test or positive feedback for their progress on the dieting programme. Wilson et al. 
(2000; study 3) demonstrated that people overpredict how happy they will be if their 
favourite football team wins an important game or how unhappy they will be if their 
team loses the game. Finally, Buehler and McFarland (2001) found that people 
overpredict how happy they will be if they receive unexpectedly high grades or how 
unhappy they will be if they receive unexpectedly low ones. Overall, the flavour of 
the research on “affective self-forecasting” is that people are inaccurate when they 
predict what their affective reactions to future events will be.
Further empirical research has documented focalism as one of the 
underlying mechanisms that contributes to affective mispredictions (see Chapter 2). 
In their discussion of the overpredictions of affect that they documented, Wilson and 
his colleagues suggested that when people generate predictions about how they will 
be feeling after a future event “ ...people focus too much on the event in question 
and not enough on the consequences of other future events” (Wilson et al., 2000; p. 
821). The pattern of findings that Wilson and his colleagues obtained in their
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experimental studies provided some initial empirical evidence supportive of the 
focalism account.
Working independently, Schkade and Kahneman (1998) also found 
empirical evidence supportive of the “focalism” account. Schkade and Kahneman
(1998) attributed self-other discrepancies in judgements of general happiness in a 
mechanism that they called “focusing illusion”. In their words:
“When a judgment about an entire object or category is made with 
attention focused on a subset of that category, a focusing illusion is 
likely to occur, whereby the attended subset is overweighted relative 
to the unattended subset” (Schkade & Kahneman, 1998; p. 340).
The observation that Midwesterner participants judged Californians as happier than 
themselves (whereas Californian participants did not actually judge themselves as 
happier than Midwesterners) was attributed by Schkade and Kahneman (1998) to 
this “focusing illusion”. The attended category in this case was the weather -  
generally better in California, than in the Midwest.
Study 7; Aims and hypotheses
To summarise, focalism has been empirically documented both in predictive 
judgements of general happiness about one’s self (Wilson et al., 2000) and also in 
concurrent judgements of general happiness about others (Schkade & Kahneman, 
1998). Study 7 was aimed as a further empirical test of focalism in controllable and 
natural circumstances. In this respect. Study 7 is an extension of Studies 1 and 6.
In Study 6, participants did two dyadic negotiation tasks, the outcomes of 
which they thought they were mostly in control of and they predicted their post­
negotiation emotions. Before participants predicted their post-negotiation emotions 
for the second task they were de-focused from the outcomes of the negotiation.
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Therefore, Study 6 was an empirical investigation of focalism in circumstances 
assumed to be controllable. These circumstances were laboratory-based: Participants 
negotiated in the laboratory environment; the feedback that they received was 
manipulated by the experimenter; and, finally, the negotiation task itself (i.e. the 
UG) is a typical laboratory-task. Therefore, all the criticisms regarding the 
generalisability of the findings of such experimental demonstrations that I 
mentioned in Chapter 4 apply here equally.
In Study 1, I investigated the accuracy of affective predictions and their 
influence on binary choice behaviour. The research setting was laboratory-based 
too. However, it involved a.) participants’ evaluation and use of their skilled 
performance and b.) self-relevant performance feedback for the participants. Since 
these two features of the research setting of Study 1 represent features commonly 
present in real-life choice circumstances, they address to some extent the criticism 
of lack of generalisability that has been raised against the typical gamble tasks that 
have been used so far.
Combining features of Studies 1 and 6, I designed Study 7. In this study, I 
tested for the presence of focalism in predictions of affective reactions regarding 
results at an academic assignment. As was the case with the UGs that I used in 
Study 6 , 1 consider class assignments more controllable than football games or other 
“external” events, because the outcome of the task (i.e. obtained marks) is largely a 
function of the participants’ effort. I approached students and asked them to predict 
how they thought they would be feeling after receiving marks on assignments that 
they had to hand in for their seminar and laboratory classes. When students had 
received feedback on their work, I approached them again and asked them to report 
how they were actually feeling about their performance.
145
Regarding students’ affective predictions, in line with the research that I 
summarised above, I anticipated that students would overpredict both their pleasure 
(if they did well) and their pain (if they did poorly). In addition, in line with Wilson 
et al.’s (2000) research on focalism, I propose that, if students are indeed inaccurate, 
these inaccuracies can be attributed to focalism. Students who are predicting what 
their affective reactions to their marks will be are narrowly focusing on receiving 
the marks and they neglect other occurrences that will occupy their minds at that 
time. If this is true, then if students are de-focused from receiving the marks before 
they make their affective predictions, these predictions should be better calibrated. 
The aim of study 7 was to test for this possibility.
Method
Participants: Thirty-nine participants from seminar and laboratory classes 
volunteered for the study (mean age = 19.65 years; SD = 1.50 years; age data 
missing from 16 participants; twenty-seven females; gender data missing for three 
participants). The majority of participants were not paid for the participation; some 
participants received £4 for participating in the study.
Variables and Design: The design was a two independent groups design, with Diary 
(No-Diary vs. Diary) as the independent variable. There were 12-27 participants in 
each condition.
Regarding the dependent variables of the experiment, participants predicted 
their performance and stated their confidence in their performance prediction. 
Participants also predicted what their emotional reactions would be when they 
received feedback on their performance. Participants used the PANAS (Watson et
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al., 1988) and the decision-related affect items that I introduced in Study 1 to record 
these predictions. Participants also predicted the duration of their affective reactions.
When participants had received feedback on their assignments, I recorded 
their actual performance and their experienced emotions. Finally, some participants 
also recorded their experienced emotions a week later.
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. In the first stage if the study, all 
participants were told that the study investigated '"people's perceptions o f and 
reactions to everyday situations'' and that the situation that was selected for them 
was coursework writing. It was stressed to participants that study itself was 
completely unrelated to their seminar or laboratory classes and to the class 
assignments that they had to submit for these classes. In addition, the study was 
anonymous. Participants were assigned a code (that they worked out themselves, 
rather than the code been given by the experimenter) in order for the experimenter to 
be able to match their responses across the different stages of the study.
Once participants had been given this information, they were asked to make 
their predictions. Regarding their performance, participants predicted the mark that 
they would obtain for a particular piece of coursework that they were about to 
submit and they also stated their confidence in this prediction. The confidence item 
read as follows: "What do you think is the probability (0% -  100%) that the mark 
you actually obtain falls within 5 marks either way o f the mark you just now 
predicted (e.g. i f  you predicted 50, then: 45 ^50-^55)?"  Participants gave their 
answers on an 11-point percentage scale, anchored at 0% = it will definitely not fall 
within 5 marks either way and 100% = it will definitely fall within 5 marks either
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way, through the 50% midpoint = falling within 5 marks either way is a 50-50 
chance.
Regarding their post-feedback emotions, participants predicted what they 
thought their affective reactions would be after receiving the mark for their 
coursework. Since at this stage participants did not know what their actual marks 
would be, they predicted their emotional reactions for both lower than expected and 
higher than expected marks (i.e. negative and positive surprises). Participants were 
given five possibilities: They predicted how they would be feeling if their actual 
performance matched their estimated one; if their actual performance exceeded their 
estimated one by 5 marks; if their actual performance exceeded their estimated one 
by 10 marks; if their actual performance was lower than their estimated one by 5 
marks; and if their actual performance was lower than their estimated one by 10 
marks. The instructions were a modified version of the PANAS instructions 
(Watson et al., 1988; p. 1070) and read as follows: ''The list that follows consists o f  
a number o f words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to 
what extent you will be feeling this way immediately after being given your mark fo r  
this essayâab-reporf\ Instructions for each of the five possibilities outlined above 
read as follows: "[...] i f  obtained mark equals predicted” (“accurate prediction”); 
“7-” 7 i f  obtained mark is 5 points lower than predicted" (“small over-prediction”); 
“7"-7 i f  obtained mark is 10 points lower than predicted" (“large over-prediction”); 
“7'” 7 i f  obtained mark is 5 points higher than predicted" (“small under-prediction”); 
and "[...] i f  obtained mark is 10 points higher than predicted” (“large under­
prediction”).
Participants also predicted the duration of their affective reactions after 
receiving the marks. The duration item read as follows: "In the above list you just
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now described your emotional state as soon as you find  out the mark fo r  your 
essayâab-report. For how long do you think you will be feeling this way after being 
announced your mark fo r  your essay/lab-report? Give a rough estimate o f the 
duration o f your emotional reaction by filling in the appropriate number next to the 
word that best describes the duration o f your feelings (e.g. 10 minutes, or 10 days, 
or 10 weeks, etc.). Again keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers*'. 
Participants were provided with four duration items (“minutes”; “days”; “weeks”; 
and “months”) with a space next to each one of them and they were instructed to fill 
in one of these spaces with their best estimate.
The only difference between the “diary” and “no-diary” participants was that 
before making the above predictions, participants in the “diary” condition received 
the following instructions: '"'"Now we would like you to take some time and describe a 
typical day o f yours during this term. Describe all kinds o f activities in which you 
are usually involved throughout the day, beginning from  what you usually do in the 
morning and going on till the moment you usually go to bed (e.g. eating, having 
class, being out with friends, sleeping, etc.). To help you with this task an hourly 
diary is provided. Fill in the diary following these instructions'*. Participants were 
provided with a 24-hour diary and they had to fill in the slot that appeared next to 
each hour of the day. Participants in the “no-diary” condition did not perform any 
filler task.
The second stage of the study was arranged after participants received their 
marks. Participants reported their emotional reactions (PANAS and decision-related 
affect items) to the marks that they had received. Participants were also given the 
opportunity to compare their experienced with their predicted affective judgements. 
The comparison item read as follows: “Tb what extent do you think that your 
emotional state now matches the emotional state you initially predicted (i.e. at the
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first session o f this study)?'' Participants gave their answers on an 11-point scale, 
anchored at -5  = my emotional state now is less intense than I predicted and +5 = 
my emotional state now is more intense than I predicted, through the 0 midpoint = 
my emotional state now matches perfectly what I predicted.
Finally, 14 “no diary” participants went through a third stage of the study. 
These participants were approached again approximately a week after they had 
received their marks and they were asked to record their emotional reactions once 
again.
Analysis'. Since I had no way of knowing how well participants would do at the 
coursework task, the major methodological issue in this study was how to match the 
affective predictions with the predictions of performance. My approach was the 
following: I took a performance prediction to be accurate if the actual mark fell 
between zero and four marks (either way) of the predicted mark (i.e. a zero to four 
marks discrepancy). I took a prediction to be a “small under- / over-prediction” if 
the actual mark fell between five and nine marks (either way) of the predicted mark 
(i.e. a five to nine marks discrepancy). Finally, I took a prediction to be a “large 
under- / over-prediction” if the actual mark fell 10 marks or more and beyond (either 
way) the predicted mark (i.e. a ten marks and beyond discrepancy).
On the basis of this criterion, I chose which one of the five affective 
predictions would be the prediction to which the affective experience would be 
compared. When students received the marks, I calculated the deviation between 
expected and actual marks. Mark discrepancies between zero and four marks were 
matched with affective predictions for “accurate predictions” of performance; mark 
discrepancies between five and nine marks were matched with affective predictions 
for “small under- / over-prediction” of performance; and mark discrepancies of ten
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marks or more were matched with affective predictions for “large under- / over­
predictions” of performance. For instance, if a student had predicted that she would 
obtain 55% and she actually obtained 61%, I compared her experienced emotions 
against what she thought that she would be feeling i f  obtained mark is 5 points
higher than predicted' -  in other words, I considered her prediction a “small under­
prediction”.
Results
1. Errors in performance prediction and confidence
Table 7.1 depicts two error indices: An “absolute error index” (AEI) and a 
“signed error index” (SEI). By subtracting participants’ absolute predicted 
performance from their absolute actual performance, I obtained the AEI. A one- 
sample f-test on this index revealed that participants indeed mispredicted their 
performance [mean AEI = 7.74; SD = 5.00; t{33) = 9.02, p  < .001]. The diary 
manipulation did not have any effect on AEI [f(32) = 1.41, p  = .171].
Likewise, by subtracting participants’ predicted performance from their 
actual performance, I obtained the SEI. A one-sample r-test on this index revealed 
that participants indeed underpredicted their performance [mean SEI = 3.44; SD = 
8.63; f(33) = 2.33, p  = .026]. As was the case with the AEI, the diary manipulation 
did not have any effect on SEI [t{32) = .23, p  = .817].
Table 7.1. Errors in performance prediction and confidence across Diary conditions (5Ds in
parentheses)
AEI SEI Confidence
No-Diary 8.50(4.62) 3.67 (9.69) 0.69(6.79)
Diary 5.90(5.65) 2.90(7.82) 0.68 (6.22)
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Moreover, when I divided participants into those who predicted their 
performance accurately (N = 9), those who underpredicted it (N = 19), and those 
who overpredicted it (N = 6), I found that participants were more likely to 
underpredict their performance than overpredict it or predict it accurately [% (^2) = 
8.18, p  = .017]. Therefore, performance underpredictions were a general trend rather 
than being due to individual differences in predictive accuracy (and to the resulting 
outlying error scores that such individual differences would entail).
2. Predicted and experienced positive and negative affect and decision-related 
emotions
The 10 positive items, and then 10 negative items of the PANAS were 
separately summed in order to obtain the overall PA and NA scores, respectively. 
Across the two judgements (one predictive and one experienced) the PA scale had a 
mean inter-item reliability (Cronbach Alpha) of .91. The NA scale had an inter-item 
reliability (Cronbach Alpha) of .89.
Participants’ predicted and experienced PA and NA can be seen in Table 7.2. 
I compared affective predictions and experiences separately for “no-diary” and 
“diary” participants. Whereas “no-diary” participants overpredicted the PA that they 
experienced when they received their marks [t{22) = 2.60, p  = .016], there was no 
misprediction for “diary” participants [r(9) = -.47, p  = .649]. A similar analysis 
failed to reveal any evidence of misprediction of participants’ NA in either diary 
condition [“no-diary”: t{22) = -1.03, p  = .313; “diary”: t{9) = -.10,/? = .924].
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Table 7.2. Predicted and experienced PA and NA across Diary conditions {SDs  in parentheses)
No-Diary Diary
Predictions Experiences Predictions Experiences
PA 27.10 (11.46) 22.13(8.06) 19.S0 (5.69) 20.60(7.44)
NA 13.48(5.95) 14.57(5.01) 13.90(5.22) 14.10(5.45)
Participants’ predicted and experienced regret, disappointment, rejoicing, 
and elation can be seen in Table 7.3. As with the general indices of PA and NA, I 
compared affective predictions and experiences separately for “no-diary” and 
“diary” participants. Whereas “no-diary” participants overpredicted the rejoicing 
and elation that they experienced when they received their marks [for rejoicing: 
t{22) = 4.49, p < .001; for elation: t{22) = 3.23, p  = .004], there was no 
mispredictions for “diary” participants [for rejoicing: r(9) = 1.00, p = .343; for 
elation: t(9) = .69, p -  .509]. A similar analysis failed to reveal any evidence of 
misprediction of participants’ regret or disappointment in either diary condition 
[“no-diary”; regret: t{22) = -1.82, p  = .083; disappointment: t{22) = -.97, p  = .342; 
“diary”; regret: t(9) = .19,/? = .853; disappointment: t(9) = 1.18, p  = .269]. Taken 
together, these analyses demonstrate that diary completion renders affective 
forecasts (of positive emotions) more accurate.
3. Post-feedback emotional experiences
In order to investigate the determinants of participants’ post-feedback 
experienced affect, I first multiplied participants’ estimated performance by their 
corresponding confidence judgements that this would be their actual performance. 
As was the case in Study 6 , 1 used these “weighted predictions” (i.e. rather than the 
initial unweighted performance estimates) in the analyses of experienced affective
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reactions. The rationale for doing this was introduced in detail in the relevant section 
of the results of Study 6 (p. 132), therefore it will not be repeated here.
Table 7.3. Predicted and experienced decision-related affect across Diary conditions {SDs in
parentheses)
No-Diary Diary
Predictions Experiences Predictions Experiences
Regret 1.34 (OJl) 1.74 (0.92) 1.80 (1.32) 1.70 (0.82)
Disappointment 1.65 (1.11) \.9\(1.16) 2.10(1.37) 1.70 (0.68)
Rejoicing 2.87 (1.60) 1.91(1.04) 1.90 (1.52) 1.50 (0.97)
Elation 2.70 (1.46) 1.83 (0.83) 1.80 (1.48) 1.60 (0.97)
I calculated correlations between “no-diary” participants’ weighted 
performance estimates and their immediate affective experiences and found that 
higher weighted performance estimates were associated with lower experienced NA 
(Pearson r = -.42, p  = .046). In other words, the more confident participants were in 
their (low) performance forecasts, the less pain they experienced when they received 
their marks.
4. Predicted duration o f affective reactions and comparisons o f affective predictions 
Participants had the opportunity to compare their initial emotional 
anticipations to their post-feedback emotional experiences with the following item: 
‘To what extent do you think that your emotional state now matches the emotional 
state you initially predicted {i.e. at the first session o f this study)?'' Participants 
responded on a -5  (experienced less intense than predicted) to 4-5 (experienced more
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intense than predicted) scale. The mean response was -.79 {SD = 1,73). This value 
was significantly lower than zero [t{32) = -2.62, p  = .013], thereby indicating that 
participants experienced less intense emotions than their predictions.
Affective comparisons did not vary as a function of Diary [r(31) = .24, p  = 
.810], or Assessment [F(2, 30) = .95, p -  .399]. Moreover, there was no association 
between comparisons and weighted performance estimates. Finally, since “no-diary” 
participants over-predicted their post-feedback pleasure and the mean comparison 
was downward, it appears that the comparisons were broadly appropriate. This 
finding can be taken to indicate that participants had some insight into their affective 
experience. However, when I divided “no-diary” participants (N = 23) into those 
who made appropriate comparisons (i.e. negative; N = 13) and those who made 
inappropriate ones (i.e. positive or zero; N = 10) a chi-square failed to reveal a 
reliable difference between the number of participants in the two groups [% (^1) = 
.39, p  = .532]. In other words, there was no firm evidence that participants were 
more likely to make affective comparisons appropriately than inappropriately.
4. Ajfective reactions across time
Fourteen “no-diary” participants completed the third stage of the study. In 
addition to the first two assessments, these participants also reported their emotions 
one week after they had received their marks. Again, the 10 positive items and the 
10 negative items of the PANAS were separately summed in order to obtain the 
overall PA and NA scores. Across the three judgements that these participants 
generated (one predictive and two experienced) the PA scale had a mean inter-item 
reliability of .92, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .89 to 
.96. The NA scale had an inter-item reliability of .80 with Cronbach Alpha 
reliability coefficients ranging from .68 to .87.
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Predicted and experienced PA and NA across the three assessments can be 
seen in Table 7.4. These judgements were submitted to an Affect*Time ANOVA, 
with Affect (PA vs. NA) and Time (Predictions vs. Immediate experiences vs. 
Delayed experiences) as within-subjects factors.
The analysis yielded a main effect of Affect [F(l, 13) = 18.23, p  = .001], 
such that participants reported more PA than NA. However, this effect was qualified 
by the Affect*Time interaction that the analysis also revealed [F(1.21, 15.68) = 
6.81, p  = .016]. A trend an a] y sis revealed that, whereas there was a reliable linear 
trend decreasing across time for PA [F(l, 13) = 6.72, p  = .022], no reliable trend 
was found for NA [F(l, 13) = 3.14,p = .100].
Table 7.4. Predicted and experienced PA and NA across Time (SDs in parentheses)
Time
Predictions Immediate Experiences Delayed Experiences
PA 2SM  (11.76) 23.64(7.57) 20.19(7.14)
NA 12.93(4.39) 14.11 (4.92) 14.93(3.89)
Turning now to these participants’ decision-related affect, their predicted and 
experienced regret, disappointment, rejoicing, and elation can be seen in Table 7.5. 
As was the case for the aggregate indices of PA and NA, these judgements were 
submitted to a Affect*Time ANOVA, with Affect (Regret vs. Disappointment vs. 
Rejoicing vs. Elation) and Time (Predictions vs. Experiences-Immediate vs. 
Experiences-Delayed) as within-subjects factors.
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Table 7.5. Predicted and experienced decision-related affect across Time (SDs  in parentheses)
Time
Regret
Disappointment
Rejoicing
Elation
Predictions
1.29(0.67)
1.57 (1.02) 
3.14(7.67) 
2.93 (1.49)
Immediate Experiences Delayed Experiences
1.86 (1.03)
1.93 (1.00) 
2.00 (1.18) 
2.00 (0.96)
1.64(0.84)
1.64 (0.75) 
1.71(0.97)
1.64 (0.93)
The analysis yielded a main effect of Time [F(2, 26) = 4.48, p  = .021], such 
that participants’ decision-related affect showed a reliable decrease across time [F(l, 
13) = 9.24, p  = .009]. This effect was qualified by the Affect*Time interaction that 
the analysis also revealed [F(2.50, 32.54) = 6.68, p  = .002]. Whereas the analysis 
failed to document any effects for regret or disappointment, for rejoicing it yielded a 
main effect of Time [F(1.44, 18.67) = 10.40, p = .002]. Whereas participants’ 
rejoicing decreased from predictions to immediate experiences [F (l, 13) = 24.47, p  
< .001], it remained stable from immediate experiences to delayed experiences [F(l, 
13) = .88,/7 = .365].
Likewise, for elation the analysis revealed a main effect of Time [F(2, 26) =
6.97, p  = ,004]. Whereas participants’ elation decreased from predictions to 
immediate experiences [F (l, 13) = 8.29, p  = .013], it remained stable from 
immediate experiences to delayed experiences [F (l, 13) = .88, p = .365].
Discussion
Study 7 was designed to test the hypothesis that diary completion would 
make students’ affective forecasts more accurate. The research setting employed to 
test this hypothesis was designed to be a naturalistic one: The research environment 
was the students’ classrooms, rather than the laboratory. Moreover, the task itself
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was an actual academic assignment that the students had to hand in as part of their 
term coursework. Finally, the performance feedback that the students received was 
also not manipulated. In what follows, first, I summarise the findings of Study 7 that 
are related to the accuracy hypothesis. Second, I elaborate on the determinants of 
participants’ emotional experiences. Finally, I discuss the quest for naturalistic 
research settings in the study of judgement and decision-making.
Focalism and the accuracy o f ajfective anticipations
Whereas students who were narrowly focused on receiving their marks 
overpredicted their post-feedback pleasure, de-focused students’ predictions of 
pleasure were in line with their post-feedback pleasure experiences. This finding 
replicates the relevant findings of Study 6. Therefore, regarding the accuracy of 
affective self-forecasts. Study 7 replicates Wilson et al’s (2000) findings related to 
the presence of focalism in prospective judgements of affect and also serves as an 
extension of their documentation of focalism to a controllable situation.
Surprise effects and participants’ emotional experiences
Study 7 reported surprise effects qualitatively different from the ones that 
Study 1 and Study 6 documented. In Study 1, participants were genuinely surprised 
when, for instance, they chose the harder task and they found out that they could 
have performed worse with the easier one or when they chose the easy task and 
found out that they could have done better with the harder one. The emotional 
impact of surprises (both positive and negative) was generally overpredicted by 
these participants. Likewise, in Study 6, participants were also genuinely surprised 
when they made reasonable offers and received rejections. The emotional impact of 
these negative surprises was generally overpredicted by these participants too.
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Unlike Studies 1 and 6, in Study 7 the outcomes that participants received 
(i.e. their marks) were not manipulated. However, participants appeared to be 
surprised here too. The main reason for their surprise was that in Study 7 
participants underpredicted how well they would do at the coursework task. 
Therefore, when their actual performance exceeded their estimated one they were 
quite happy -  actually, the more confident they were that their performance would 
be low when they estimated it, the less unhappy they were when they received their 
marks. I take these findings as a clear demonstration of “defensive pessimism” (e.g. 
Shepperd et al., 1996; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998; van Dijk et al., 2003): In order to 
avoid post-feedback disappointment with unrealistically high hopes, students chose 
to keep their expectations low -  especially since coursework-feedback was more or 
less imminent.
Naturalistic research settings: Environments, tasks, and measures
The pattern of affective mispredictions that Study 6 documented in an 
artificial setting (i.e. the laboratory) using an artificial task (i.e. the UG) was also 
present in Study 1, in a similarly artificial setting (i.e. the laboratory) using a less 
artificial task (i.e. choice between more and less rewarding unknown task 
accompanied by performance-related feedback). This pattern of affective 
mispredictions was replicated again by Study 7 in a natural setting (i.e. the students’ 
seminar and laboratory classes) and with a purely naturalistic task (i.e. coursework 
writing).
The quest for naturalistic environments and naturalistic tasks has recently 
become a pressing one within the JDM research domain (e.g. Hastie, 2001). The 
practical consequence of this is that researchers are urged to choose designs that, to 
the best of their knowledge, simulate the situation outside the laboratory. Regarding
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the research on affective self-forecasting, however, if one accepts the premise of 
ecological validity, then the question of task selection becomes very hard (if not 
impossible) to solve. Li other words, it can be argued that the task of assigning a 
number to an affective experience has absolutely no meaning in the world outside 
the laboratory. Certainly people can talk about their affective experiences; they can 
also anticipate these experiences and create affective memories. However, assigning 
numbers to them cannot be claimed to be a generic or intuitive way of describing, 
predicting, or recalling these experiences -  hence the difficulty of having an 
ecologically valid task of this sort.
A more general problem with the ecological validity approach is that the 
premise of “ecological validity” (i.e. the premise that the ultimate goal of 
psychological models is the parsimonious description of real-life behaviours) can 
itself be challenged. From a cognitive psychology or cognitive science viewpoint it 
can be argued that non-ecologically valid tasks can be at least as informative as 
ecologically valid ones in the search of the processes that underlie people’s 
behaviours (e.g. Goldstein, in press; Harvey, 1997a; 1997b).
For instance, when people with normal vision judge the length of a couple of 
lines under some conditions (e.g. when inward-looking arrows have been added to 
one of the lines, whereas outward-looking arrows have been added to the other one) 
they perceive one line as being longer than the other, whereas actually the two lines 
are of equal length (the Müller-Lyer illusion; e.g. Goldstein, 2002). Similarly, when 
people with average numerical ability are asked to predict the outcome of a single 
toss of a fair coin under some conditions (e.g. when the last five tosses have come 
out “tales”) they will predict that it is more likely that the coin toss will come out 
“heads” rather than “tails” (e.g. the representativeness heuristic; e.g. Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1982). Both these examples come from research areas that demonstrate
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the presence of “illusions” (visual and cognitive) in human judgement and can be 
thought of as typical illustrations of the argument that non-ecologically valid tasks 
can provide valid insights into human judgement^.
’ However, whereas the assessment of visual illusions appears to be a straightforward issue, the 
assessment of cognitive illusions has triggered a substantial (and still on-going) discussion (e.g. 
Ayton & Wright, 1994).
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CHAPTER
8
Post-decisional emotional reactions after recalled real-life decisions: 
How do de-focusing manipulations work?
The accuracy of affective recall
Wilson et al. (2000) found that people estimate that their affective reactions 
to future events will be more intense than they actually are and they attributed these 
mispredictions to focalism (see Chapter 7). Focalism has also been found to 
influence people’s judgements of their affective reactions to past events (Mitchell et 
al. 1997; Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, in press). For example, Mitchell et al. (1997) 
found that people’s retrospective judgements of enjoyable events, such as bicycle 
trips and vacations, were more positive than their judgements that were 
contemporaneous with these events. Wilson et al. (2000) argue that “retrospective 
focalism” arises for the same reason as “prospective focalism”: People pay too much 
attention to the focal event and not enough to the consequences of other events that 
occur at the same time as the focal event.
Wilson et al. (2000; study I) demonstrated that asking people to complete a 
diary of activities in which they expected to be engaged around the time of the focal 
event reduced the intensity of the emotions associated with that event. They argued 
that the diary manipulation had its effect by reducing focalism: Specifically, they 
suggested that its effect is to reduce the extent to which people expect to be thinking 
about the focal event after it has occurred. I also obtained both indirect (Studies 2, 3, 
& 4) and direct (Studies 6 & 7) empirical evidence that the diary manipulation is 
effective is reducing focalism across a variety of research settings.
Regarding the way that the de-focusing effect of diary occurs, Wilson et al. 
(2000) suggested that it could be brought about in one of two ways. First, asking 
people to complete a diary may make them realise that that other events would 
occupy their thought and thereby distract them from thinking about the target event. 
As a result, they would ensure that they moderated their affective forecasts that they 
are asked to generate (the “distraction hypothesis”). Second, people may focus their
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attention on the affective consequences of the other events rather than at the 
likelihood of being distracted by those events. In other words, they may believe that 
the affective consequences of the focal event will be diluted or cancelled out by the 
affective consequences of the other events occurring around the same time. As a 
result, they attenuate their affective forecasts of the focal event (the “affective 
competition hypothesis”).
In fact, Wilson et al. (2000; study 4) in their investigation of prospective 
focalism found that the affective valence of events in participants’ diaries had no 
effect on forecast affect for the focal event. Consequently, they concluded that the 
“affective competition hypothesis” was not viable; the “distraction hypothesis” 
provided the more plausible account of their diary manipulation. In the present 
research, the indirect test of the two hypotheses undertaken in Study 4 also did not 
provide any empirical grounds for the support of the “affective competition 
hypothesis”.
Studies 8 to 10: Aims and hypotheses
To summarise, for Wilson et al. (2000; p. 835), “Any time people think 
about how an event in the future or the past will or did affect them, they are likely 
too focus on that event too much and not enough on other occurrences that will or 
did occupy their thoughts and influence their behaviour”. Both their experiments 
and the present research provide empirical support for the focalism account of 
inaccuracies in affective forecasts. However, two further issues need to be 
addressed. First, there is only little direct evidence that retrospective judgements of 
affect are influenced by focalism (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Wilson et al., in press). 
Second, there is no direct evidence that de-focusing people from the recalled event 
attenuates their affective judgements.
164
Therefore, the aim of the three studies reported in this chapter was twofold. 
First, the present studies were aimed as further empirical tests of Wilson et al.’s 
suggestion that focalism operates retrospectively, as well as prospectively. More 
specifically, I tested for the presence of focalism in delayed judgements of post- 
decisional emotional reactions. Second, the present studies were also designed to 
provide a direct empirical test of the underlying mechanism that leads to the effects 
of focalism and de-focusing.
Study 8
I asked participants to recall a real-life decision of theirs. Half of them were 
asked to recall a bad decision; the others were asked to recall a good decision. All 
participants were asked to report how they felt at the moment regarding the recalled 
decision. Half of the participants were de-focused before they reported their post- 
decisional emotions. De-focused participants completed a diary of events that had 
occurred to them at the same time as the recalled decision.
Regarding participants’ post-decisional emotions, I anticipated that that de- 
focused participants would report lower levels of post-decisional affect than 
participants who remained focused on the recalled decision throughout the 
experiment.
Method
Participants: One hundred and twelve current and prospective students of the 
University of London volunteered to participate in the study (mean age = 19.53 
years; SD = 2.62 years; ninety females). The majority of participants were recruited 
during a group laboratory demonstration session and were not paid. Others were
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recruited via notices in buildings of the University of London and were paid £5 for 
their participation (in this and other studies).
Variables and Design: The design was a 2*2 completely between-subjects design, 
with Decision (Satisfactory vs. Unsatisfactory) and Diary (No-Diary vs. Diary) as 
independent variables. There were 28 participants in each condition. The dependent 
variable was post-decisional affect.
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing experimental manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of 
the booklet, participants in the “satisfactory decision” condition received the 
following instructions (instructions for the “unsatisfactory decision” condition in 
parentheses): "'First o f  all, we would like you to recall a decision o f yours from  your 
own life, the outcome o f which led you to feel intense satisfaction (regret). Provide a 
brief description o f this decision, such that the person who reads it understands why 
you feel satisfied with (regret) it”. Participants were given three quarters of a page to 
summarise their decisions.
On the second page of the booklet, participants in the “diary” condition were 
requested to provide a diary. The instructions read as follows: "Now, we would like 
you to write down as many events as you can that occurred to you at the same time 
as the decision you previously described'. Participants were again given 
approximately three quarters of a page to summarise the events that they could 
recall. There was no filler task for participants in the “no-diary” condition.
Finally,” all participants rated their post-decisional affect. For the 
“satisfactory decision” the affect item read as follows (the item for the 
“unsatisfactory decision” in parentheses): "To what extent do you feel satisfied with
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(regret) the decision you described above?” Participants gave their answers on an 8- 
point scale, anchored at 1 = moderately and 8 = very much.
Results
Reported regret and satisfaction with the outcomes of the recalled decisions 
can be seen in Table 8.1. Two independent samples f-tests on these ratings revealed 
that whereas the Diary was effective in lowering reported regret [r(46.59) = 1.97, p  
= .055], it did not had any effect on reported satisfaction [f(54) = .37, p = .711].
Table 8.1. Mean post-decisional affect across conditions (5Ds in parentheses)
Satisfactory decision Unsatisfactory decision
No-Diary 6.96 (1.23) 6.36 (1.42)
Diary 6.86(0.89) 5.39(2.17)
Discussion
The attenuation of reported regret by the diary manipulation that Study 8 
documented shows that Wilson et al.’s (2000) distraction hypothesis can be 
extended to retrospective judgements of affect. The lack of an effect for 
retrospective judgements of positive affect replicates the asymmetry between 
positive and negative affect that Wilson et al. (2000) also documented. Wilson et al. 
(2000) argued that the asymmetry arises because positive emotional states are more 
fragile than negative ones.
Before concluding that the diary manipulation did indeed produce a 
distraction effect, I need to exclude the possibility that it disrupted emotional 
processing of the focal event that had been retrieved from memory. Study 9 was 
designed to do this.
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Study 9
In Study 8 the diary was inserted between the recall of an emotional event 
and the assessment of the emotions associated with that event. If the act of retrieval 
of an emotional event itself elicits some emotional response and if that response is 
used in the assessment, then interposing the diary completion task between event 
retrieval and assessment may have its effect by displacing the cues used for 
assessment from working memory. In other words, the effect of the diary may have 
been to interfere with emotional processing (i.e. rather than to contextualise it as the 
distraction hypothesis suggests).
In Study 9 participants were again asked to recall a past decision of theirs, 
the outcomes of which led to either positive, or negative affect, and describe how 
they felt about it at present. Some of the participants were de-focused by completing 
a diary of events that had occurred to them at the same time as the recalled decision. 
Some other participants were given an anagram-solving task to solve before 
reporting their post-decisional emotions. Finally, some participants reported their 
post-decisional emotions immediately after the recall of the decision.
If the interference hypothesis is correct then interposing tasks irrelevant to 
the retrieved emotional event should also displace information required for 
emotional assessment from working memory. Any task that has this effect should 
produce interference. In this study, I examined whether solving anagrams has any 
effect on retrospective judgements of the emotions associated with the target event.
Regarding participants’ post-decisional emotions, if the distraction 
hypothesis is correct, then I anticipated that de-focused (i.e. diary) participants 
would report lower levels of post-decisional affect than participants who either 
remained focused on the recalled decision throughout the experiment, or did the 
anagram-solving task. However, if the interference hypothesis is correct, then I
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anticipated that both de-focused (i.e. diary) participants and participants who solved 
anagrams would report lower levels of post-decisional affect than participants who 
remained focused on the recalled decision throughout the experiment.
Method
Participants'. One hundred and ninety-two current and prospective students of the 
University of London volunteered to participate in the study (mean age = 19.08 
years; SD -  4.55 years; one hundred and forty-seven females). The majority of 
participants were recruited during a group laboratory demonstration session and 
were not paid. Others were recruited via notices in buildings of the University of 
London and were paid £3 for their participation.
Variables and Design'. The design was a 2*3 completely between-subjects design, 
with Decision (Satisfactory vs. Unsatisfactory) and Condition (No-Diary vs. Diary 
vs. Anagrams) as independent variables. There were 32 participants in each 
condition. The dependent variables were the measures of affect. I used the PANAS 
(Watson et al., 1988) and the decision-related affect items that I introduced in Study 
1 to record participants’ post-decisional affect.
Materials and Procedure'. All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing experimental manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of 
the booklet, participants were told that the study investigated '"people’s perceptions 
o f and reactions to everyday situations”. On the second page of the booklet, 
participants in the “satisfactory decision” condition received the following 
instructions (instructions for the “unsatisfactory decision” condition in parentheses): 
“First o f all, we would like you to recall a decision o f yours from  your own life, the
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outcome o f which led you to feel intense positive affect (negative affect). Provide a 
brief description o f this decision, such that the person who reads it understands why 
you feel good (bad) about i f \  Participants were given approximately three quarters 
of a page to summarise their decisions.
On the third page of the booklet, one third of the participants (“diary” 
condition) were then requested to provide a diary; the instructions read as follows: 
'"Now, we would like you to recall and write down as many events as you can that 
occurred to you at the same time as the decision you previously described!'. 
Participants were again given approximately three quarters of a page to summarise 
the events that they could recall.
Another third of participants (“anagrams” condition) were asked to solve 13 
four-letter anagrams; the instructions read as follows: ''Now we would like you to 
solve the following anagrams. The first one has been worked out fo r  you, as an 
example. All o f the anagrams can be solved!'. The example was: "ARTY TRAY'. 
There was no filler task for participants in the “no-diary” condition.
Finally, all participants went through the last two pages of the booklet, where 
they had to fill in the PA and NA scales and the decision-related affect scales. The 
instructions were a modified version of the PANAS instructions (Watson et al., 
1988; p. 1070) and read as follows: "The list that follows consists o f  a number o f  
words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark 
the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you 
are feeling this way, with respect to the decision you just now described. Keep in 
mind that there are no right or wrong answers". Participants gave their answers on 
5-point scales, anchored at 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely.
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Results
1. Post-decisional decision-related emotions
Regret, rejoicing, disappointment, and elation were submitted to a 
Decision*Condition*Affect mixed ANOVA, with Decision (Satisfactory vs. 
Unsatisfactory) and Condition (No-Diary vs. Diary vs. Anagrams) as between- 
subjects factors and Affect (Regret vs. Disappointment vs. Rejoicing vs. Elation) as 
a within-subjects factor. This analysis yielded two main effects (Decision and 
Affect), and two two-way interactions (Affect*Decision, and Affect*Condition), all 
of which were qualified by the interaction between Decision, Condition, and Affect 
[F(6, 558) = 3.68, p  < .001]. I split this interaction into two Affect*Condition 
ANOVAs -  one for “satisfactory” and one for “unsatisfactory” decisions.
Decision-related affect for satisfactory decisions can be seen in Table 8.2. 
The analysis revealed only the anticipated main effect of Affect [F(1.99, 185.04) =
107.08, p < .001], such that participants reported more rejoicing and elation than 
regret and disappointment.
Table 8.2, Mean decision-related affect “satisfactory decision” conditions {SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary Diary Anagrams
Regret 1.25 {0.67) 1.13(0.42) 1.47 (0.88)
Disappointment 1.25 (0.57) 1.22(0.55) 1.44 (0.80)
Rejoicing 3.06 (1.08) 3.16(1.11) 2.72 (1.46)
Elation 3.00 (1.34) 3.09 (1.30) 3.13(7.39)
Decision-related affect for unsatisfactory decisions can be seen in Table 8.3. 
The analysis revealed again the anticipated effect of Affect [F(1.76, 163.29) = 
130.53, p < .001], such that participants reported more regret and disappointment 
than rejoicing and elation. However, this effect was qualified by the
171
Affect*Condition interaction [F(3.51, 163.29) = 4.55, p  = .003]. I divided this 
interaction into four one-way ANOVAs -  one for each decision-related emotion.
For regret, the analysis revealed an overall effect of Condition [F(2, 93) =
3.08, p  = .051]. Analyses of contrasts further revealed that “diary” participants 
reported lower levels of regret than “no-diary” participants [r(93) = 1.98, p  = .050] 
and that “anagrams” participants also reported lower levels of regret than “no-diary” 
participants [/(93) = 2.28, p  = .025].
For disappointment the pattern was similar. The analysis revealed an overall 
effect of Condition [F(2, 93) = 4.59, p  = .013]. Analyses of contrasts further 
revealed that “diary” participants reported lower levels of disappointment than “no­
diary” participants [r(93) = 1.93, p  = .056] and that “anagrams” participants also 
reported lower levels of disappointment than “no-diary” participants [r(93) = 2.99, p  
= .004].
Table 8.3. Mean decision-related affect “unsatisfactory decision” condition {SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary Diary Anagrams
Regret 4.31 (1.06) 3.69 (1.36) 3.59 (1.34)
Disappointment 3.53 (1.41) 2.84 (1.51) 2.47 (1.34)
Rejoicing 1.09 (0.39) \.4A(1.08) 1.50(7.02)
Elation 1.03 (0.18) 1.44 (0.77) 1.47 (0.84)
For elation, the analysis revealed an overall effect of Condition [F(2, 93) = 
4.34, p  = .016]. Analyses of contrasts further revealed that “diary” participants 
reported higher levels of elation than “no-diary” participants [r(34.30) = -2.95, p  =
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.006] and that “anagrams” participants also reported higher levels of elation than 
“no-diary” participants [r(33.73) = -2.88, p  = .007].
Finally, for rejoicing the overall analysis failed to reveal a reliable effect.
2. Post-decisional positive and negative affect (PANAS)
The 10 positive items and the 10 negative items of the PANAS were 
separately summed, in order to obtain the overall PA and NA scores. Across the six 
experimental conditions the PA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .81, with 
Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .60 to .90. The NA scale had a 
mean inter-item reliability of .83, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients 
ranging from .75 to .89.
PA and NA scores were submitted to a Decision ^ Condition* Affect mixed 
ANOVA, with Decision (Satisfactory vs. Unsatisfactory) and Condition (No-Diary 
vs. Diary vs. Anagrams) as between-subjects factors and Affect (PA vs. NA) as a 
within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded two main effects (Decision and Affect), 
and a two-way interaction (Affect*Decision), all of which, however, were qualified 
by the marginal interaction between Decision, Condition, and Affect [F(2, 185) = 
2.37, p  = .10]. I split this interaction into two Affect*Condition ANOVAs -  one for 
“satisfactory” and one for “unsatisfactory” decisions.
PA and NA for satisfactory decisions can be seen in Table 8.4. The analysis 
revealed only the anticipated main effect of Affect [F (l, 92) = 348.14, p < .001], 
such that participants reported more PA than NA.
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Table 8.4. PA and NA across “satisfactory decision” conditions (SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary Diary Anagrams
PA 34.59 (6.71) 34.81 (7.71) 34.69 (7.58)
NA 16.09(5.57) 16.54(5.04) 17.75(7.77)
PA and NA for unsatisfactory decisions can be seen in Table 8.5. The 
analysis revealed again the anticipated effect of Affect [F (l, 93) = 19.14, p  < .001], 
such that participants reported more NA than PA. A weak Affect*Condition 
interaction [F(2, 93) = 2.58, p  = .081] qualified this effect. I split this interaction 
into two one-way ANOVAs -  one for PA and one for NA.
For NA, the analysis failed to reveal an effect of Condition. However, for PA 
the analysis revealed an overall effect of Condition [F(2, 93) = 5.44, p  = .006]. 
Analyses of contrasts further revealed that “diary” participants reported higher 
levels of PA than “no-diary” participants [r(41.96) = -2.76, p  = .009] and that 
“anagrams” participants also reported higher levels of PA than “no-diary” 
participants [r(42.51) = -3.48, p  = .001].
Table 8.5. PA and NA across “unsatisfactory decision” conditions {SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary Diary Anagrams
PA 15.16(4.70) 20.25 (9.61) 21.44 (9.35)
NA 24.69 (5.75) 24.50 (5.75) 24.28 (9.35)
Discussion
The results of Study 9 unequivocally support the interference hypothesis. 
Effects of the diary completion task and the anagrams task were the same: Both of 
them resulted in people judging their emotions associated with unsatisfactory focal 
events as less negative. They showed less regret and disappointment and more
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dation and rejoicing. General positive affect was significantly increased by both 
manipulations (though, curiously, negative affect remained unaffected).
Before concluding that the diary completion task acts to interfere with the 
contents of working memory in the manner outlined above, I need to exclude an 
alternative explanation of the results of this study. The anagrams that were used 
were very simple: Virtually all participants solved them. Hence it is possible that 
success in the anagrams task temporarily elevated participants’ moods and this boost 
in their positive affect transferred to their retrospective judgements of affect 
associated with the focal event that they had retrieved from memory. In other words, 
feeling good about the anagrams task may have made them feel better about their 
unsatisfactory decisions. Thus the argument is that the effects of the two interfering 
tasks were the same but occurred via different routes. Diary completion de-focused 
participants by making them aware that they would be distracted from the focal 
event by other events (Wilson et al., 2000); anagram-solving produced a mood 
elevation that transferred to participants’ assessment of their affect associated with 
the retrieved focal event. Study 10 was designed to distinguish between the “single 
route model” (i.e. both tasks produce an interference effect) and the “dual route 
model” (i.e. diary completion has its effect via distraction but anagram solving has 
its effect via affect transfer).
Study 10
I assumed that the extent of the affect transfer does not depend on the source 
of the affect. Thus for the “dual route model” to hold, affect should be elevated by 
anagram solving but not by diary completion (or, at least, it should be elevated more 
by anagram solving). Thus I examined whether mood increased more between the 
start of the experiment and the completion of the interfering task in the anagrams
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condition than in the diary completion condition. To check that mood monitoring 
itself does not affect de-focusing, I compared the no-diary / no-mood-monitoring 
condition that was included in Studies 8 and 9 with a no-diary / mood-monitoring 
condition in which participants’ moods were monitored in the absence of any task 
interposed between focal event retrieval and assessment of affect.
In addition to the dependent variables used in Study 9, I also included 
participants’ perceptions of their personal responsibility for the outcome of the focal 
event and of the degree to which that outcome was influenced by situational factors. 
Previous research has linked the feeling of personal responsibility for a outcome 
with experienced regret (Zeelenberg et a l, 1998; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, van der 
Pligt, Manstead, van Empelen, & Reinderman, 1998) and so it is possible that diary 
completion has its effect by causing participants to regard the unfortunate events 
less as their own fault, which, in turn, decreases the degree of negative affect that 
they associate with that event. This “responsibility reduction hypothesis” is an 
alternative to Wilson et al.’s (2000) distraction hypothesis in the dual route model. It 
predicts that judgements of personal responsibility will be lower after diary 
completion, whereas the distraction hypothesis is neutral in this respect.
Method
Participants'. Eighty-five students of various London Universities volunteered to 
participate in the study (mean age = 25.78 years; SD = 8.25; sixty females). The 
majority of participants were paid £8 for their participation (in this and other 
studies). Other participants were not paid for their participation.
Variables and Design: The design was a four independent groups design, with 
Condition (No-Diary /  No-Mood-monitoring vs. No-Diary / Mood-monitoring vs.
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Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. Anagrams / Mood-monitoring) as the independent 
variable. There were 20-22 participants in each condition.
The first set of dependent variables comprised the measures of affect. I used 
the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988) to record participants’ moods and the PANAS 
accompanied by the decision-related affect items that were introduced in Study 1 to 
record participants’ post-decisional affect. The second set of dependent measures 
comprised the ratings of perceived personal responsibility for the outcome of the 
decision (PR) and perceived contribution of situational factors to the outcome of the 
decision (SF).
Materials and Procedure: All participants were presented with a short booklet 
containing manipulations and dependent measures. On the first page of the booklet, 
participants were told that the study investigated '"people’s perceptions o f and 
reactions to everyday situations”. On the second page of the booklet, participants in 
the mood monitoring conditions were asked to record their current mood using the 
PANAS. The instructions were a version of the standard PANAS instructions 
(Watson et al., 1988; p. 1070), and read as follows: ""The list that follows consists o f  
a number o f words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to 
what extent you are feeling this way right now, that is at the present moment. Keep 
in mind that there are no right or wrong answers”. Participants gave their answers 
on 5-point scales, anchored at 1 = very slightly or not at all and 5 = extremely. There 
was no filler task for participants in the “no-diary/no mood monitoring” condition.
On the third page of the booklet, all participants received the following 
instructions: ""First o f all, we would like you to recall a decision o f yours from  your 
own life, the outcome o f which led you to feel intense negative affect. Provide a brief
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description o f this decision, such that the person who reads it understands why you 
feel bad about i f \  Participants were given approximately three quarters of a page to 
summarise their decisions.
Next, participants in the “diary/mood-monitoring” condition were requested 
to complete a diary; the instructions read as follows: ''Now, we would like you to 
think o f and briefly describe TWO MAJOR EVENTS that occurred to you at the 
same time as the decision you described". Participants were given two lines to 
summarise each event.
Participants in the “anagrams/mood-monitoring” condition were asked to 
solve 13 four-letter anagrams; the instructions read as follows: "Now we would like 
you to solve the following anagrams. The first one has been worked out fo r  you, as 
an example. All o f the anagrams can be solved". The example was: "ARTY  
TRAY". There was no filler task for participants in the “no-diary/mood-monitoring” 
and “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” conditions.
As soon as participants had finished with the recall task (“no-diary” 
conditions), or the recall and the diary tasks (“diary” condition), or the recall and the 
anagrams tasks (“anagrams” condition), they were asked to record their mood once 
again, using the same PA and NA scales. Instructions were the same as before. The 
order of the items in the scales was randomised across the stages of the experiment. 
Again, there was no filler task for participants in the “no-diary/no-mood- 
monitoring” condition.
Finally, all participants went through the last two pages of the booklet, 
where they had to fill in the PA and NA scales, the decision-related affect scales, 
and the perceived responsibility scales. Instructions for the affect scales were very 
similar to the ones described above, the only difference being the following: “ ... 
Indicate to what extent you are feeling this way, with respect to the decision you just
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now described". The personal responsibility (PS) item read as follows [the 
situational factors (SF) item in parentheses]: ‘To what extent do you think you 
(situational factors) are responsible fo r  the bad outcome o f the decision you 
described above?'" Participants gave their answers on two 8-point scales, anchored 
at 1 = not at all and 8 = very much.
Results
1. Moods before and after the experimental tasks
In order to measure participants’ moods before and after the tasks, the 10 
positive items and the 10 negative items of the PANAS were separately summed, 
resulting in four mood measures: PA before the recall task (“PA-before”); NA 
before the recall task (“NA-before”); PA after the recall, or diary, or anagrams tasks 
(“PA-after”); and NA after the recall, or diary, or anagrams tasks (“NA-after”). 
Across the three experimental conditions the PA scale had a mean inter-item 
reliability of .78, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .67 to 
.88. The NA-before scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .80, with Cronbach 
Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .75 to .82. The PA-after scale had a mean 
inter-item reliability of .91, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging 
from .89 to .93. The NA-after scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .81, with 
Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .75 to .89.
PA-before and NA-before and PA-after and NA-after scores can be seen in 
Table 8.6. These scores were submitted to a Condition*Time*Affect mixed 
ANOVA, with Condition (No-Diary / No-Mood-monitoring vs. No-Diary / Mood- 
monitoring vs. Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. Anagrams / Mood-monitoring) and 
Time (Before vs. After) as between-subjects factors and Affect (PA vs. NA) as a 
within-subjects factor.
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The analysis yielded a main effect of Affect [F (l, 61) = 109.00, p < .001], 
such that participants reported overall higher levels of PA than NA. This effect was 
qualified by an interaction between Time and Affect [F (l, 61) = 8.46, p  = .005] that 
the analysis also revealed. Whereas participants’ PA was lower after the tasks than 
before [r(63) = 2.72, p  = .009], their corresponding NA tended to be higher after the 
tasks than before [f(63) = -1.91, p = .060].
Importantly, there was no suggestion of an interaction between Time and 
Condition. The reduction of participants’ moods over the course of the experiment 
was no greater when participants completed a diary as an interfering task than when 
they solved anagrams as their interfering task. In other words, there was no 
indication that anagram solving boosted participants’ moods more or depressed 
them less than diary completion. Therefore, I have no evidence for a dual route 
model; for parsimony reasons, I maintain the single route model based on the 
“interference hypothesis”.
Table 8.6. PA and NA before and after the tasks across “mood-monitoring” conditions (5Ds in
parentheses)
No-Diary Diary Anagrams
PA-before 28.51 (8.27) 26.32 (5.25) 26.27 (6.23)
NA-before 14.91 (5.05) 14.24 (4.70) 16.59 (6.03)
PA-after 25.43 (9.47) 24.23 (7.84) 25.46 (9.19)
NA-after 16.14(5.73) 15.24(4.25) 18.05(7.93)
2. Post-decisional decision-related affect
Reported decision-related emotions can be seen in Table 8.7. Regret, 
rejoicing, disappointment, and elation were submitted to a Condition*Affect mixed
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ANOVA, with Condition (No-Diary / No-Mood-monitoring vs. No-Diary / Mood- 
monitoring vs. Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. Anagrams / Mood-monitoring) as a 
between-subjects factor and Affect (Regret vs. Disappointment vs. Rejoicing vs. 
Elation) as a within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded a main effect of Affect 
[F(1.51, 122.28) = 51.88, p < .001], such that participants reported more regret and 
disappointment than rejoicing and elation. The analysis also yielded a main effect of 
Condition [F(3, 81) = 8.72, p < .001], such that participants in the “no-diary/no­
mood-monitoring” condition reported higher levels of decision-related affect than 
the other three conditions.
Table 8.7. Mean decision-related affect across conditions (SDs in parentheses)
No-Diary /  
No-Mood- 
monitoring
No-Diary /  
Mood- 
monitoring
Diary /  
Mood- 
monitoring
Anagrams /  
Mood- 
monitoring
Regret 4 .1 4 (7 .//) 2.91 (1.64) 2.52(1.47) 3.00(7.45)
Disappointment 4.10(7.2(5) 2.48 (1.66) 2.14(7.42) 2.59 (1.50)
Rejoicing 1.48 (1.08) 1.61 (0.90) 1.29 (0.64) 1.36 (0.73)
Elation 1.52 (0.75) 1.58(7.05) 1.41 (0.70) 1.41 (0.67)
These main effects were qualified by a significant Condition*Affect 
interaction [F(4.53, 122.28) = 3.11, p  = .014]. I split this interaction into four one­
way ANOVAs -  one for each decision-related emotion.
For regret, the analysis revealed an overall effect of Condition [F(3, 81) = 
5.00, p  = .003]. Analyses of contrasts further revealed that “diary/mood-monitoring” 
participants reported lower levels of regret than “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” 
participants [f(81) = -3.67, p < .001] and that “anagrams/mood-monitoring” 
participants also reported lower levels of regret than “no-diary/no-mood-
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monitoring” participants [f(81) = -2.62, p  = .011]. Importantly, participants in the 
“diary/mood-monitoring” and “anagrams/mood-monitoring” conditions reported 
same levels of regret as “no-diary/mood-monitoring” participants’ [“no-diary/mood- 
monitoring”-“diary/mood-monitoring” contrast: r(81) = -.86, p  = .391; “no- 
diary/mood-monitoring”-“anagrams/mood-monitoring” contrast: r(81) = .22, p  = 
.828].
For disappointment the pattern was similar. The analysis revealed an overall 
effect of Condition [F(3, 81) = 7.32, p  < .001]. Analyses of contrasts further 
revealed that “diary/mood-monitoring” participants reported lower levels of 
disappointment than “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” participants [f(81) = -4.31, p  < 
.001] and that “anagrams/mood-monitoring” participants also reported lower levels 
of disappointment than “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” participants [f(81) = -3.36, 
p  = .001]. Importantly, participants in the “diary/mood-monitoring” and 
“anagrams/mood-monitoring” conditions reported same levels of disappointment as 
“no-diary/mood-monitoring” participants’ [“no-diary/mood-monitoring”- 
“diary/mood-monitoring” contrast: r(81) = -.74, p  = .464; “no-diary/mood- 
monitoring”-“anagrams/mood-monitoring” contrast: f(81) = .26, p  = .799].
For elation and rejoicing the analysis failed to reveal a reliable effect.
3. Post-decisional positive and negative affect
The 10 positive items and the 10 negative items were separately summed, in 
order to obtain the PA and NA scale scores, respectively. Across the four 
experimental conditions the PA scale had a mean inter-item reliability of .90, with 
Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients ranging from .87 to .93. The NA scale had a 
mean inter-item reliability of .88, with Cronbach Alpha reliability coefficients 
ranging from .85 to .91.
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PA and NA scores can be seen in Table 8.8. PA and NA scores were 
submitted to a Condition * Affect mixed ANOVA, with Condition (No-Diary / No- 
Mood-monitoring vs. No-Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. 
Anagrams / Mood-monitoring) as a between-subjects factor and Affect (PA vs. NA) 
as a within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded a main effect of Condition [F(3, 81) 
= 5.72, p  = .001], such that participants in the “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” 
condition reported higher levels of affect than the other three conditions.
Table 8.8. PA and NA across conditions (5Ds in parentheses)
PA
NA
No-Diary /  
No-Mood- 
monitoring
22.57 (9.16) 
31.05(10.01)
No-Diary /  
Mood- 
monitoring
Diary /  
Mood- 
monitoring
21.05(8.87) 
20.71 (8.60)
22.29 (9.11) 
17.81 (7.69)
Anagrams / 
Mood- 
monitoring
21.50(5.^7) 
22.77 (10.04)
This main effect was qualified by the Condition*Affect interaction [F(3, 81) 
= 3.20, p  = .028]. I split this interaction into two one-way ANOVAs -  one for PA 
and one for NA.
For PA the analysis failed to reveal a reliable effect. For NA the analysis 
revealed an overall effect of Condition [F(3, 81) = 8.56, p  < .001]. Analyses of 
contrasts further revealed that both “diary/mood-monitoring” participants reported 
lower levels of NA than “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” participants [r(81) = -4.80, 
p  < .001] and that “anagrams/mood-monitoring” participants also reported lower 
levels of NA than “no-diary/no-mood-monitoring” participants [7(81) = -3.16, p  = 
.002]. Importantly, participants in the “diary/mood-monitoring” and 
“anagrams/mood-monitoring” conditions reported same levels of NA as “no­
diary/mood-monitoring” participants’ [“no-diary/mood-monitoring”-“diary/mood-
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monitoring” contrast: r(81) = -1.03, p  = .305; “no-diary/mood-monitoring - 
“anagrams/mood-monitoring” contrast; f(81) = .66, p  = .513].
4. Assessment o f personal responsibility
PR and SF ratings can be seen in Table 8.9. These ratings were submitted to 
a Condition*Responsibility mixed ANOVA, with Condition (No-Diary / No-Mood- 
monitoring vs. No-Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. Diary / Mood-monitoring vs. 
Anagrams / Mood-monitoring) as a between-subjects factor and Responsibility (PR 
vs. SF) as a within-subjects factor. The analysis yielded only a main effect of 
Responsibility [F(l, 81) = 9.26, p  = .003], such that participants perceived the 
unfortunate decision as a result of their own responsibility, rather than a result of 
external factors. Importantly, there was no suggestion of an interaction between 
Responsibility and Condition. Thus there was no evidence that people considered 
themselves less responsible for the outcome after they had completed the diary. 
Therefore, there was no support for the “responsibility reduction hypothesis”. Given 
that I have already reported mood-monitoring analyses that reject dual route models, 
this is to be expected.
Table 8.9. PR and SF ratings across conditions (S£>s in parentheses)
PR
SF
No-Diary / 
No-Mood- 
monitoring
6.14(7.79; 
5.23 (2.00)
No-Diary / 
Mood- 
monitoring
Diary / 
Mood- 
monitoring
5.91 (1.70) 
5.43 (2.23)
6.00(1.84)
5.14(7.97)
Anagrams /  
Mood-monitoring
6.55 (1.47) 
4.50 (7.92)
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Discussion
Study 10 allowed the examination of participants’ moods before and after 
the decision recall task. The comparison of moods revealed a change in participants’ 
moods over the interval between stating the experience and stating their ratings of 
affect. It showed that their originally good mood became worse. This finding 
replicates findings from mood induction research, where it is assumed that a 
particular mood-state can be induced if participants imagine events that brought 
about emotions similar to the desired mood-state (e.g. Brewer, Doughtie, & Lubin, 
1980; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; for a review, see Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 
1996). Importantly for my purposes, however, the deterioration of moods was not 
greater in the diary completion condition. As a result, there was no scope for 
differential affect transfer between conditions. This serves to eliminate the dual 
route model from consideration.
When moods were monitored, there was no difference between either the 
“diary” condition and the “no-diary” condition or between the “anagrams” condition 
and the “no-diary” condition. Thus monitoring of moods eliminated the de-focusing 
effects found in Studies 8 and 9. However, negative affect (regret, disappointment, 
NA) was lower in the “no-diary / mood-monitoring” condition than in the “no-diary 
/ no-mood-monitoring condition”. In other words, mood monitoring itself had the 
same de-focusing effect that diary completion and anagram solving had in Studies 8 
and 9. It appears that any mental activity (i.e. diary completion; anagram-solving; 
mood-monitoring) that is interposed between retrieval of the decision and judging 
the affect associated with that decision serves to reduce the level of the judged 
affect.
Finally, ratings of personal responsibility for the decision outcome and of the 
effects of situational factors on that outcome did not depend on the experimental
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condition. Thus Study 10 provided no evidence that responsibility reduction caused 
the reduction in rated affect in the “diary” conditions of Studies 8 and 9.
General Discussion
Studies 8 to 10 were not designed to study retrospective focalism directly: I 
did not measure participants’ levels of affect at the time of the original decision and 
so I could not show that levels of affect associated with that decision when it is 
recalled at a later date are elevated. However, focalism of this type has been 
reported previously (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997; Wilson et al., in press). The results 
are not in conflict with these findings or with Wilson et al.’s (2001) argument that 
both prospective and retrospective focalism occur because people pay too much 
attention to the focal event and not enough attention to other events that provide a 
context for the focal one.
Wilson et al. (2000) showed that focalism is decreased by requiring people 
to complete a diary of their activities around the time of the focal event. In other 
words, the diary completion manipulation lowered the level of affect associated with 
the focal event. Studies 8 to 10 were designed to explore the reason for this “de- 
focusing” (i.e. affect-lowering) effect. In Study 8, I demonstrated that the effect of 
diary completion that Wilson et al. (2000) had shown for prospective judgements 
can be extended to retrospective judgements too (albeit only those pertaining to 
unsatisfactory events). Wilson et al. (2000) argued that such effects occur because 
completing the diary makes people realise that other events that provide context to 
the focal one would also influence their level of affect. Once this realisation has 
taken place, people lower their affective judgements to allow for the effects of this 
distraction (the distraction hypothesis).
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Study 9 showed that solving anagrams has the same effect as completing a 
diary. It is rather implausible to argue that solving anagrams would make people 
realise that the focal event is embedded in other affect-inducing events. Although 
parsimony should have led me to reject the distraction hypothesis as an explanation 
of the diary completion effect at this juncture, I did consider a dual route model in 
which the distraction hypothesis was retained for diary completion and an affect- 
transfer hypothesis was proposed to explain the effects of anagram solving.
Study 10 showed that solving anagrams had no more favourable effects on 
participants’ moods than completing diaries. This rendered the affect-transfer 
hypothesis untenable. Furthermore, mood-monitoring itself was found to have the 
same affect-lowering properties as diary completion and anagram solving. Rather 
than retaining the distraction hypothesis for diary completion and developing other 
hypotheses to explain why anagram solving and mood monitoring produce similar 
effects, it would be better to provide a unitary account for all these phenomena.
Obviously, the retaining of the interference hypothesis for retrospective 
judgements of affect carries some implications for my interpretation of the effects of 
diaries in the studies of anticipated affect. In the light of the present findings, it 
could be argued that diary completion did not broaden the way people thought about 
the anticipated outcomes of their decisions (as Wilson and his colleagues have 
argued). It rather interfered with the processing that led to these judgements. If this 
is true, then I would expect that anagram solving would have the same effects on 
affective anticipations as in affective experiences.
In order to test this alternative for affective anticipations, I asked 53 
participants (mean age 18.34, SD = 3.61 years; forty-seven females) to answer the 
following question: “Think about the next six months o f your life: Is there a decision 
that you will probably need to take during these six months and that will have a
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negative impact on your feelings (i.e. it will result in you feeling low)?” after 
participants had described their decisions, 17 of them (“diary” condition) completed 
a diary of events likely to happen to them in the same time span (i.e. in the next six 
months), whereas another 17 (“anagrams” condition) solved the same four-letter 
anagrams that I used in studies 9 and 10. Nineteen participants (“control” condition) 
did not undergo any filler task. Finally, all participants reported what they thought 
their emotions would be regarding the decisions that they had previously described 
using the PANAS.
Analysis of these data replicated the findings of Study 8 and thus provided 
further support for the interference hypothesis. Whereas there was no reliable effect 
of Condition (Control vs. Diary vs. Anagrams) on participants’ self-reported NA 
[F(2, 50) = .33, p  = .723], the analysis revealed a reliable effect on their self- 
reported PA [F(2, 50) = 3.20, p  = .049], such that “diary” and “anagrams” 
participants taken together (M = 3.24, SD = .60) reported higher levels of PA than 
“control” participants [M = 2.78, SD = .94; r(50) = -2.18, p  = .034].
On the basis of all the above findings, it appears that all the effects occur 
when a task that requires cognitive processing is interposed between people’s recall 
of a past decision and their judgements of their affect associated with that decision. 
Without an interfering task, affect judgements are high; with one, they are lower. 
My proposal is that recalling a decision leads properties associated with it (including 
affect-related ones) to be placed in working memory. While they are in working 
memory, these properties can be assessed for strength, valence, etc. However, 
requiring people to perform a cognitive task between loading the properties into 
working memory and assessing those properties interferes in some way with their 
assessment.
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Just how the interference occurs depends on how working memory is 
conceptualised. If one considers that its limitations arise from its restricted storage 
capacity (e.g. Miller, 1956), one would argue that information required for the 
intervening tasks displaces (some of) the information required for affect assessment. 
If one argues that it is limited in terms of the activation available for focal 
attentional processing (e.g. Cantor & Engle, 1993), one would say that performing 
the intervening task (partially) de-activates the memory representations required for 
affect assessment. If one believes that it is limited because of a shortage of the 
inhibitory resources needed to suppress activation of information that is no longer 
relevant (e.g. Bjork, 1989; Hasher & Zachs, 1988), one would propose that 
irrelevant information from the interfering task adds noise to the processing that 
subserves affect assessment. Whatever the precise mechanism, my claim is that an 
interfering task acts to disrupt the processing that underlies the judgements of affect.
Disruption of processing implies that output will be closer to whatever the 
default value is prior to any processing. Intervening tasks do not so much lower 
levels of judged affect as prevent them from moving as far from their default value 
as they would otherwise. What would the default value have been in my 
experiments? It is most likely to have been the centre of the rating scales (i.e. 2.50). 
In the absence of information about true affect levels, this would tend to minimise 
mean squared error. Inspection of Tables 8.1, 8.3, and 8.7 does indeed reveal that 
ratings are closer to this default value in interfering task conditions when the effect 
of the intervening task is significant (i.e. for unsatisfactory decisions).
Diary completion effects in studies of prospective judgements of affect are 
likely to arise for exactly the same reasons as those in studies of retrospective 
judgements of affect. For example, Wilson et al. (2000; study 3) asked football fans 
in their experimental group to complete a diary and then to forecast their affect
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levels just after their team had won or lost a future fixture. Insufficient inhibitory 
resources (Bjork, 1989; Hasher & Zachs, 1988) would ensure that diary-related 
events were still active in working memory during the period in which affective 
forecasts were made. The resulting interference lowered these forecasts for the 
reasons just outlined. In Wilson et al.’s (2000; study 3) control group, no cognitive 
task preceded affective forecasting. Without interference, uninterrupted processing 
allowed ratings to move further from their default (baseline) values. Hence they 
were higher.’
Judgements of affect related to satisfactory outcomes did not appear to be 
subject to the focalism that affected those related to unsatisfactory outcomes. They 
remained close to their default values even when no interference was present (Table 
8.3). For example, while regret associated with an unsatisfactory decision was rated 
4.31 on the five-point scale in the No-Diary condition of Study 9, elation associated 
with a satisfactory decision was only rated as 3.00 on the same scale in the same 
condition. Effects of interference cannot lower ratings if they are already close to 
their default value.
Of course, processing without interference does not have to lead to ratings different from the 
default values; When the control group of Wilson et al.’s (2000) football study were asked to predict 
what their affect would be some days after the game, their ratings were close to baseline.
190
CHAPTER
General Discussion
1. Main hypotheses of this research; Overview of the empirical findings
As stated in Chapter 3, the aim of the present research was to investigate the 
accuracy of people’s anticipations of post-decisional emotions and also the influence 
of these emotional anticipations on people’s observed deci si on -behavi ours. In what 
follows, I outline the hypotheses of the present research again and then summarise 
the empirical findings that are relevant to each one of them.
First hypothesis. When people are focused on the possible outcomes of their 
decisions or choices, their predictions of the emotions that they will experience 
when they receive the outcomes of their decisions are overpredictions.
This hypothesis is grounded in the research on “affective forecasting” (see 
Chapter 2; section 2). This research has provided ample empirical support for the 
claim that people generally exaggerate when they predict what their emotional 
reactions to future events will be, or when they predict how easy or difficult they 
will find it to adapt to changes in their current life circumstances.
The present research provided empirical support for this hypothesis. 
Participants who found out that they would have done worse had they chosen a 
different version of an anagram-solving task overpredicted their happiness and 
participants who found out that they would have done better overpredicted their 
frustration (Study 1). Likewise, participants who received surprising rejections in an 
UG negotiation task overpredicted their frustration (Study 6) and, in general, 
negotiators overpredicted the post-negotiation emotions that the negotiation 
outcome triggered (Study 6). Finally, students who received surprisingly good 
marks for the coursework that they submitted overpredicted their happiness (Study 
7) and, in general, students overpredicted the emotions that receiving their 
coursework marks triggered (Study 7).
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Second hypothesis. When people put the possible outcomes of their decisions in a 
broader context (i.e. when they see them as sources of pleasure or pain among other 
sources of pleasure or pain that they are face with in their everyday lives) their 
predictions of the emotions that they will experience when they receive the 
outcomes of their decisions are accurate.
This hypothesis is grounded in the research on focalism (see Chapter 2; 
section 3.4). Focalism is one of the mechanisms (among others; see Chapter 2; 
sections 3.1. to 3.3.) to which affective mispredictions have been attributed. 
According to Wilson et al. (2000), who provided initial empirical support for the 
existence and the influence of focalism in affective self-prediction, “Any time 
people think about how an event in the future or the past will or did affect them, 
they are likely to focus on that event too much and not enough on other occurrences 
that will or did occupy their thoughts and influence their behaviour” (Wilson et al., 
2000; p. 835). The implication for decision-related emotions is that if people are led 
to realise that the outcomes of their decisions are embedded in a big mosaic of 
unrelated occurrences that will compete for their attention when the decision 
outcomes materialise, their predictions of the intensity of the decision-related 
emotions will not be exaggerated (i.e. they will be accurate).
The present research provided empirical support for this hypothesis too. 
Participants who received surprising rejections at an UG negotiation task predicted 
their frustration accurately when they put the negotiation outcomes in the broader 
perspective of their everyday lives (Study 6). More generally, negotiators predicted 
accurately the post-negotiation emotions that the negotiation outcome triggered 
when the latter was contextualised (Study 6). Likewise, students who received 
surprisingly good marks for the coursework that they submitted predicted their 
happiness accurately when they put the coursework feedback in the broader
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perspective of their everyday lives (Study 7). As was the case with the negotiators, 
students predicted accurately the emotions that the dissemination of their 
coursework marks triggered when the latter was contextualised (Study 7).
Moreover, the present research documented findings that extend this 
hypothesis to affective reactions after recalled decisions. Participants associated less 
pain with past unfortunate decisions of theirs when they recalled these decisions in 
the broader perspective of their lives at the time when the decisions were made than 
when they recalled them in the absence of this context (Studies 8 and 9).
Third hypothesis. People actively try to minimise the pain and maximise the 
pleasure that they think they will experience when they receive the outcomes of 
their decisions only when they are narrowly focused on the decision outcomes in 
question. When people put the possible outcomes of their decisions in a broader 
context (i.e. when they see them as sources of pleasure or pain among other sources 
of pleasure or pain that they are face with in their everyday lives) their effort to 
minimise post-decisional pain and maximise post-decisional pleasure subsides.
This hypothesis is grounded in the models of post-decisional affective 
reactions (RT; DT; and DAT -  SEP; see Chapter 1) and also in the research on 
focalism. RT, DT, and DAT -  SEP share the postulate that when people make 
decisions, they anticipate their post-decisional emotions and they actively try to 
maximise the pleasure and minimise the pain that they will experience once the 
outcomes of their decisions materialise. Moreover, these models also claim that 
these anticipated emotions depend not only on the factual valence of the outcomes, 
but also on the counterfactual comparisons between obtained and foregone 
outcomes, and chosen and rejected decision behaviours.
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However, if people exaggerate their affective reactions to future events, it 
follows that their pre-decisional anticipations of the post-decisional emotional 
impact of the outcomes of their decisions are exaggerated too. If this is the case, 
then it can be argued that these affective anticipations have an influence on decision 
behaviour exactly because they are exaggerated. Therefore, if in a given decision 
situation people are led to contextualise their decision outcomes, their anticipation 
of the impact of these outcomes on their overall well-being will be accurate and, 
thereby, these anticipations will be less influential on decision behaviour.
The present research provided empirical support for this hypothesis too. 
Participants who were faced with a risky choice between two investment options 
chose the investment that minimised their post-decisional regret when they were 
narrowly focused on the investment outcomes, but they chose the investment that 
minimised risk when they saw the investment within the context of their everyday 
lives (Study 3). Likewise, negotiation behaviour of participants who were narrowly 
focused on the negotiation outcome was a function of their anticipated pleasure and 
pain after a possible failure of the negotiation, but a function of their effort to make 
the most out of the negotiation when they saw its outcome within the context of 
their everyday lives (Study 6).
2. A secondary hypothesis of this research: Overview of the empirical findings
In the investigation of the effects of focalism on affective predictions and 
decision behaviours I used the following manipulation to contextualise participants’ 
decisions: Participants were asked to complete diaries of events contemporaneous 
with their decisions. These diaries were prospective when the consequences of the 
decision would show in the future (Studies 2 to 7), or retrospective when the 
consequences of the decision had already shown (Studies 8 to 10).
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This manipulation was first introduced as a way to contextualise people’s 
judgements by Wilson and his colleagues (Wilson et al., 2000). In fact, these 
researchers showed that diary completion is an effective way to attenuate the effects 
of focalism on people’s prospective judgements of affect. Regarding the exact way 
the diaries function, Wilson et al. (2000) suggested two possibilities. First, asking 
people to complete a diary may make them realise that that other events would 
occupy their thoughts and thereby distract them from thinking about the target 
event. As a result, they would ensure that they moderate their affective forecasts that 
they are asked to generate (the “distraction hypothesis”). Second, people may focus 
their attention on the affective consequences of the other events rather than at the 
likelihood of being distracted by those events. In other words, they may believe that 
the affective consequences of the focal event will be diluted or cancelled out by the 
affective consequences of the other events occurring around the same time. As a 
result, they attenuate their affective forecasts of the focal event (the “affective 
competition hypothesis”).
In their original investigation of prospective focalism, Wilson et al. (2000) 
found no empirical support for the “affective competition hypothesis”. 
Consequently, they concluded that the “distraction hypothesis” provided the more 
plausible account of their diary manipulation. I also failed to obtain evidence in 
support of the affective competition hypothesis: The valence of the diaries that 
participants completed before choosing between a regret minimising and a risk 
minimising investment option had no effect on their investment intentions (Study 3).
However, in the investigation of retrospective focalism, I found that 
participants who completed a diary did not report lower post-decisional pain than 
participants whose affective processing was simply interfered with with an anagram- 
solving task (Study 9). In other words, the empirical results supported an
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“interference hypothesis” at the expense of the distraction hypothesis. An additional 
(ad hoc) empirical test of the interference hypothesis provided converging evidence 
that the same pattern arises in prospective judgements of affect as well -  thus 
consolidating the effect further.
Moreover, when I assumed a dual route model for the emergence of the 
effects of distraction and interference, I failed to find any supportive empirical 
evidence (Study 10). Finally, participants who underwent identical experimental 
tasks and procedure, but who were monitoring their moods throughout the 
experiment also reported lower post-decisional emotions than participants who were 
focused on the recalled decision (Study 10). This last finding provided further 
empirical support for the interference hypothesis: Any mental activity that is 
interposed between decision recall and assessment of post-decisional emotions 
associated with it serves to reduce the levels of these emotions'’ .^
3. Theoretical implications and directions for future research
The empirical findings that were outlined above carry theoretical 
implications. These implications concern, first, the research on modelling of 
anticipated post-decisional affect and, second, the research on affective self­
forecasting. In what follows, I consider these implications separately for each one of 
these research areas.
‘ An interesting experimental possibility is the following: Mental activities need not be interposed 
between decision recall and affective judgements; they can precede the recall / anticipation task.
The fact that the interference hypothesis seems to provide a more parsimonious account for these 
observations does not automatically render the distraction account uninteresting. I agree with 
Gilbert’s stance that, after all, “... lots of things could lead people to moderate their predictions, and 
we wouldn’t expect a single mechanism [i.e. focalism] for all of them” (D. T. Gilbert, personal 
communication, December 11, 2003).
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Modelling anticipated post-decisional affect: What about accuracy ?
Over the last 15 years, the modelling of anticipated post-decisional 
emotional reactions has become one of the “hot” topics in the JDM area. Evidence 
for this is the attention that the relevant models, especially RT, have been attracting 
among researchers. The immediate output of this upsurge in research is ample 
empirical evidence that anticipated emotions do indeed have an influence on 
people’s decision behaviours. Moreover, the latest reviews of the empirical work 
and theoretical directions of the JDM field explicitly refer to the topic (Hastie, 2001; 
Mellers et al., 1998), and there has been at least one review devoted to RT 
(Zeelenberg, 1999a).
However, this proliferation of empirical research has not been accompanied 
by further theoretical development of the initial models. This lag between empirical 
data and their formal modelling has resulted in the following paradox; Whereas the 
interest in anticipated post-decisional emotions was sparked by formal 
conceptualisations of the function of these emotions, these conceptualisations do not 
seem to have been affected by the empirical findings -  at least not to the extent that 
one would hope. The area, therefore, seems to be at a loss for an overarching formal 
model.
The first attempt at such a model was the one by Mellers’ and her 
colleagues, who introduced DAT -  SEP (Mellers, 2000; Mellers et al., 1997; 
Mellers et al., 1999). Their model suggests an interesting conceptual combination of 
regret and disappointment effects under the generic term “subjective expected (dis-) 
pleasure”; however, this combination is still in need of empirical validation. The 
second interesting suggestion that Mellers and her colleagues have put forward is 
that, if decision-makers actually generate affective forecasts and if these forecasts 
are influential on their subsequent behaviour, then these forecasts ought to be
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accurate. In other words, what is the point in the decision-makers predicting how 
they will be feeling after receiving the outcomes of their decisions, if these 
predictions are not in line with their actual emotional experiences?
I believe that the accuracy question is an important but neglected one. I agree 
with Mellers’ stance that, should affective forecasts be granted a functional role to 
play in people’s decisions (cf. Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1999b), they should also be 
accurate. However, the question of whether people are accurate forecasters of their 
own decision-related emotional reactions is in need of empirical investigation. The 
present research should be regarded as a first systematic attempt to address this 
question. The findings show that decision-makers are generally inaccurate -  at least, 
in the decision circumstances that were studied. Moreover, their inaccuracies are 
more often than not overpredictions: Decision-makers exaggerate the impact of 
some decision outcomes rather than others on their subjective well-being.
This pattern of findings does not stand in isolation in the literature. Research 
on affective self-forecasting (i.e. forecasting of future affective states, not 
necessarily related to the reception of some decision outcomes) has also documented 
that people in general exaggerate the degree to which their subjective well-being 
will be elevated by positive events or be depressed by negative events that will 
happen to them in the future. This pattern in affective self-prediction has recently 
been termed “impact bias” -  in other words, people exaggerate the impact of future 
events on their well-being, hence the bias (for a review, see Wilson & Gilbert, 
2003).
These empirical results need further replication -  not least because the 
research on affective self-forecasting does not explicitly address the question of 
accuracy of post-decisional affective anticipations. However, taken together with the 
results of the present investigation, the above pattern of affective overprediction
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appears to conflict with the assumption of forecast accuracy put forward by Mellers. 
In turn, if this is the case, then the claimed functional and rational aspect of affective 
anticipations (e.g. Roese, 1997; Zeelenberg, 1999b) need to be re-considered.
The impact bias in affective self-forecasting: What about optimism?
When people think about the future, they exaggerate the impact of future 
events on their subjective well-being -  hence the overpredictions and the emergence 
of the impact bias. The bias has been documented in people’s affective self­
predictions regarding both positive (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1997) and negative future 
events (e.g. Gilbert et al., 1998).
The presence of the bias in prospective judgements about positive events is 
in agreement with the research on optimism. This research has identified two types 
of optimism (for a review of optimism, see Armor & Taylor, 1998): “Dispositional 
optimism” refers to the observation that some people are more optimistic than 
others. “Optimism in specific expectations” refers to the following inter-related 
observations:
a.) People think that they would receive better outcomes than the average person 
would receive, or has been shown to receive, in the same situation. For instance, 
Sherman (1980) found that people thought that they would behave in a more 
socially desirable way in given situations than others who have been in the same 
situations. In his programmatic research on optimism, Weinstein (e.g. 1980; 1982; 
1984) found that people believe that future health problems will affect them less 
than the average person and that the future will be generally rosy, especially for 
themselves. Since these self-perceptions totally disregard actual base rate 
information about the events in question, Weinstein termed this optimism
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“unrealistic” (for a review of the research on “unrealistic optimism”, see Weinstein 
& Klein, 1996).
b.) People (“targets”) are more optimistic about their future achievements than 
observers are about the targets’ achievements. For instance, Buehler, Griffin, and 
Ross (1994) found that when target-participants were asked to judge how much time 
it would take them to finish an assignment, they generated predictions that were 
more optimistic than the predictions of observer-participants about the targets’ 
times. Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1995) also found that when target-participants 
were asked to judge the future course of their personal relationships, they judged 
these relationships as much better and much more likely to remain stable over time 
than observer-participants judged those targets’ relationships.
When people judge that a future event will boost their well-being more than 
it actually does, the overprediction is in line with these optimistic self-perceptions: 
Since the future will be good, especially for one’s self, a good event cannot have but 
a big positive impact -  hence the misprediction. However, when people judge that a 
future event will be more damaging to their well-being than it actually is, the 
overprediction seems to conflict with the optimistic self-perceptions outlined above: 
Since the future will be good, especially for one’s self, how can an isolated bad 
event have a big negative impact?
I suggest the following explanation for this conundrum: People overpredict 
the impact of negative events on their well-being exactly because they perceive a 
rosy future for themselves -  in other words, the impact bias for negative events is 
due to a contrast effect^. For instance, when a participant predicts her emotional 
reactions to a failed negotiation, the failure is (or is perceived as) an infrequent
 ^For a discussion of contrast effects in social judgements see Sherif and Hovland (1961), Sherif and 
Sherif (1967), and Sherif, Sherif, and Nebergall (1965).
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negative event embedded in an otherwise rosy perspective. The fact that this event 
has been singled out in the experimental situation contributes to the perception of its 
affective consequences as worse than they will actually be.
This explanation does not conflict with the focalism account of affective 
mispredictions. The impact bias is observed when people think about the target 
event in isolation -  in other words, when they are focused on it. When people 
contextualise the target event (for instance, when they are asked to complete a diary 
of other events that are bound to happen concurrently with the target event) the 
impact bias is eliminated. Likewise, Weinstein and Lachendro (1982) found that 
when participants were asked to think carefully about others’ circumstances, 
unrealistic optimism regarding personal future misfortunes was reduced. Weinstein 
and Lachendro (1982) concluded that unrealistic optimism is not due to the lack of 
relevant information about others, but to people’s egocentrism. In other words, self­
optimism arises because people are focused on their own circumstances, thereby 
neglecting others’ circumstances. Consequently, when people are de-focused from 
themselves (for instance, when they are asked to think in detail about others) 
unrealistic optimism is attenuated.
Weinstein and Lachendro’s (1982) manipulation and findings bear strong 
resemblances to the de-focusing manipulations and findings of the present research. 
Therefore, in addition to the distinction between prospective and retrospective 
focalism, I propose a distinction between “intra-individual” and “inter-individual” 
focalism. The former is the focalism introduced by Wilson and his colleagues and 
tested in the present research. The latter is the focalism introduced by Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) and tested by Weinstein and Lachendro (1982) in the context of 
unrealistic optimism. These conjectures regarding the link between optimism and 
focalism await empirical testing.
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